Thomas v. Prator ( 2006 )


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  •                                                        United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    F I L E D
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT                 March 28, 2006
    Charles R. Fulbruge III
    Clerk
    No. 05-30209
    Summary Calendar
    JOHN A. THOMAS,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    versus
    STEVE PRATOR; JOHN SELLS; CADDO CORRECTIONAL CENTER;
    LOUISIANA STATE UNIVERSITY MEDICAL CENTER SHREVEPORT;
    SERGEANT SEMON; DEPUTY KLINE; DEPUTY EDMONSON; DAVID
    REED; LIEUTENANT BRADFORD; SHARON CAMPBELL; J. MARTIN;
    KEITH HIGHTOWER; JIM ROBERTS; E.R.T. MCKEEVER; RYAN
    DIBLER; DEPUTY JACORBY; LIEUTENANT HARP; JOHN CARTER;
    SERGEANT HUGHES; E.R.T. KRAFT; SERGEANT TROUDT; E.R.T.
    PACE; M. GAY; DEPUTY DAVIS; DEPUTY MICHELLE; DEPUTY
    MIXON; SYLVIA BUSIC, Nurse; J. JACKSON, Nurse,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    --------------------
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Western District of Louisiana
    USDC No. 5:02-CV-1655
    --------------------
    Before HIGGINBOTHAM, BENAVIDES, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    John A. Thomas, Louisiana prisoner # 177753, moves to
    proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) and for appointment of counsel to
    appeal the summary judgment dismissal of his 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
    suit without prejudice for failure to exhaust administrative
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
    this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
    under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
    No. 05-30209
    -2-
    remedies.   By moving for IFP, Thomas is challenging the district
    court’s certification that IFP status should not be granted on
    appeal because his appeal is not taken in good faith.     See Baugh
    v. Taylor, 
    117 F.3d 197
    , 202 (5th Cir. 1997).   Thomas argues that
    he was not required to exhaust prior to filing his civil rights
    suit and, in the alternative, that prison officials impeded his
    efforts to utilize the prison grievance system by ignoring his
    complaints, thereby excusing his failure to exhaust his
    constitutional claims.
    Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), Thomas was
    required to exhaust his administrative remedies before filing the
    instant civil rights suit.    42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); Wendell v.
    Asher, 
    163 F.3d 887
    , 890 (5th Cir. 1998).   While we have
    recognized that the exhaustion requirement may be excused where
    administrative remedies are inadequate because prison officials
    ignore or interfere with a prisoner’s pursuit of relief, Holloway
    v. Gunnell, 
    685 F.2d 150
    , 154 (5th Cir. 1982), the evidence does
    not support such a conclusion in Thomas’s case.   The evidence
    instead indicates that Thomas violated the grievance policy by
    filing multiple grievances during the period of step-one review
    and that his abuse of the procedure resulted in a backlog of
    unanswered grievances.   As such, the failure to exhaust is not
    fairly attributable to an impediment created by prison officials
    such that the exhaustion requirement would be excused.      Thomas’s
    contention that his placement in restrictive housing limited his
    No. 05-30209
    -3-
    access to the law library and to the PLRA, thereby impeding his
    ability to exhaust, is belied by evidence that he filed multiple
    grievances.
    “[N]othing prevents the appellate court from sua sponte
    dismissing the case on the merits pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 42.2
    when it is apparent that an appeal would be meritless.”   See
    Baugh, 
    117 F.3d at
    202 n.24.   Thomas has failed to show that his
    appeal involves nonfrivolous legal issues, and therefore his
    appeal is dismissed.
    MOTIONS FOR IFP STATUS AND APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL DENIED;
    APPEAL DISMISSED.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 05-30209

Judges: Benavides, Dennis, Higginbotham, Per Curiam

Filed Date: 3/28/2006

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/5/2024