Workman v. Calogero , 174 F. App'x 824 ( 2006 )


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  •                                                        United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    F I L E D
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT                   April 5, 2006
    Charles R. Fulbruge III
    Clerk
    No. 04-31050
    Summary Calendar
    JAMES A. WORKMAN,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    versus
    PASCAL F. CALOGERO, JR., in his personal capacity; JEFFREY P.
    VICTORY, in his personal capacity; JEANNETTE THERIOT KNOLL, in
    her personal capacity; CHET D. TRAYLOR, in his personal capacity;
    CATHERINE D. KIMBALL, in her personal capacity; BERNETTE J.
    JOHNSON, in her personal capacity; JOHN L. WEIMER, in his
    personal capacity; CHARLES B. PLATTSMIER, in his personal
    capacity; JOSEPH L. SHEA, JR., in his personal capacity; DONALD
    R. BROWN, in his personal capacity; E.J. CHAMPAGNE, in his
    personal capacity; LONNIE GRECO, in his personal capacity;
    ADMINISTRATORS OF THE TULANE EDUCATIONAL FUND, erroneously
    identified in the complaint as “the Tulane University of
    Louisiana,”
    Defendants-Appellees.
    --------------------
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of Louisiana
    USDC No. 2:02-CV-922-B
    --------------------
    Before HIGGINBOTHAM, BENAVIDES and OWEN, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    James A. Workman has appealed the dismissal of his civil
    RICO and civil rights claims against “the Tulane University of
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
    this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
    under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
    Louisiana”1 and various individuals, including: member justices
    of the Louisiana Supreme Court; members of the Louisiana Attorney
    Disciplinary Board; Disciplinary Counsel Charles Plattsmier;
    Tulane Law School professors and administrators Edward F.
    Sherman, Lawrence Ponoroff, and Wendy Brown-Scott; K. Dupaquier,
    the Director of Public Safety at Tulane University; and two John
    Does.
    The standards in ruling upon motions to dismiss for failure
    to state a claim, under FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6), and for judgment
    on the pleadings, under FED. R. CIV. P. 12(c), are the same.
    Bennett-Nelson v. Louisiana Bd. of Regents, 
    431 F.3d 448
    , 450 n.2
    (5th Cir. 2005).   The complaint may not be dismissed unless it
    appears certain that the plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts
    in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief.      
    Id. Although the
    plaintiff’s allegations are taken as true and are
    considered in the light most favorable to the plaintiff,
    conclusional allegations and legal conclusions masquerading as
    facts will not prevent dismissal or judgment on the pleadings.
    Taylor v. Books A Million, Inc., 
    296 F.3d 376
    , 378 (5th Cir.
    2002).   This court’s standard of review is de novo.   Bennett-
    
    Nelson, 431 F.3d at 450
    n.2.
    1
    The correct name of this entity is “Administrators of the
    Tulane Educational Fund” [hereinafter “Tulane University”].
    2
    Workman argues on appeal that the actions of the
    Disciplinary Board Members were purely ministerial and not
    judicial in nature.   He argues also that the Disciplinary Board
    Members, as members of the administrative committee, exceeded
    their authority in ruling on his petition for review.      The
    actions of the Disciplinary Board Members were judicial in nature
    because the decision whether to disqualify counsel is a judicial
    function.   See Rolleston v. Eldridge, 
    848 F.2d 163
    , 164 (11th
    Cir. 1988); see also Boyd v. Biggers, 
    31 F.3d 279
    , 284 (5th Cir.
    1994).   Because the administrative committee is not precluded
    from deciding requests for disqualification of disciplinary
    counsel and because that decision does not fall within the scope
    of the appellate review function, Workman cannot show that the
    Disciplinary Board Members exceeded the scope of their
    jurisdiction.   See LA. SUP. CT. RULE XIX, § 2(G)(1)(b).
    Workman contends that defendant disciplinary counsel
    Plattsmier was not entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity
    because he was not functioning as a prosecutor when he conducted
    pre-investigation screening of Workman’s complaint.    The
    screening procedures clearly fell within the prosecutorial duties
    and functions of the disciplinary counsel.    See SUP. CT. RULE XIX,
    § 4(B)(1), (2), & (3).   This court has held that decisions by a
    prosecutor to file or not file charges are acts protected by
    absolute immunity.    Oliver v. Collins, 
    904 F.2d 278
    , 281 (5th
    Cir. 1990).
    3
    Workman contends that the district court erred in granting
    Tulane University’s motion for judgment on the pleadings.
    Workman argues, without elaboration, that the district court
    erred in stating that his allegations of criminal conduct on the
    part of Tulane law professors Sherman and Ponoroff were
    conclusional.    Workman’s conclusional argument does not
    demonstrate that the district court erred.    Workman contends also
    that the district court erred in determining that Tulane
    University could not be held vicariously liable for its own
    participation in the alleged conspiracy.    Workman’s argument is
    conclusional and internally inconsistent.    Either liability is
    vicarious or it is not.
    Workman has not shown that the district court abused its
    discretion in refusing to permit him to amend his complaint.       See
    Duff-Smith v. Collins, 
    973 F.2d 1175
    , 1180 (5th Cir. 1992).
    AFFIRMED.
    4