Matto v. Gonzales ( 2006 )

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT April 11, 2006
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 05-60284
Summary Calendar
CESAR MATTO,
Petitioner,
versus
ALBERTO R. GONZALES, U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondent.
--------------------
Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
BIA No. A78 131 579
--------------------
Before HIGGINBOTHAM, BENAVIDES, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Cesar Matto seeks review of the decision of the Board of
Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirming and dismissing his appeal
from the immigration judge’s (“IJ”) decision finding him
removable and denying his application for cancellation of
removal, and the BIA’s denial of his motion for reconsideration.
This court reviews the order of the BIA and will consider the
underlying decision of the IJ only if it influenced the
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
No. 05-60284
-2-
determination of the BIA. Mikhael v. INS, 115 F.3d 299, 302 (5th
Cir. 1997).
Matto, who admitted that he was removable, sought
cancellation of removal, arguing that his removal would create a
hardship for his daughter, who was born in the United States and
lives in Peru. Matto provides financial support for his
daughter, who attends a private school and has abnormalities of
the hands and feet. The BIA determined that Matto had not shown,
either through evidence presented in the immigration court, or
through evidence presented in his motion for reconsideration,
that his removal “would result in exceptional and extremely
unusual hardship” to his daughter. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b).
Matto contends that the IJ and the BIA did not correctly
apply the statutory provision governing the hardship
determination. He argues that the IJ and the BIA failed to place
sufficient weight on his testimony regarding his daughter’s
medical condition and his payment for his daughter’s medical
treatment.
We do not have jurisdiction to review the IJ’s discretionary
determination, in rejecting Matto’s application for cancellation
of removal, that Matto had not shown that his daughter would
suffer an “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship.” See
Rueda v. Ashcroft, 380 F.3d 831, 831 (5th Cir. 2004); 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(a)(2)(B)(i). Accordingly, Matto’s petition for review is
DISMISSED IN PART.
No. 05-60284
-3-
Matto also contends that the his substantive due process
rights were violated by what he maintains was an abuse of
discretion on the part of the IJ and the BIA in failing to
consider all the facts bearing on the hardship determination and
failing to articulate the reasons for denying relief.
Substantive due process “prevents the government from engaging in
conduct that ‘shocks the conscience,’ or interferes with rights
‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.’” United States v.
Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746 (1987)(citations omitted).
The BIA is not required to address evidentiary minutiae or
write a lengthy exegesis. See Abdel-Masieh v. U.S. INS, 73 F.3d
579, 585 (5th Cir. 1996). Here, the BIA’s decision “reflect[s]
meaningful consideration of the relevant substantial evidence
supporting the alien’s claims,” and therefore is sufficient. See
id. Matto has not shown that the BIA’s decision to deny his
application for cancellation of removal violated his right to
substantive due process. See Salerno, 481 U.S. at 746.
Accordingly, his petition for review is DENIED IN PART.
PETITION FOR REVIEW DISMISSED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.