United States v. Daniel , 178 F. App'x 345 ( 2006 )


Menu:
  •                                                         United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    F I L E D
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT                   April 25, 2006
    Charles R. Fulbruge III
    Clerk
    No. 05-50503
    Summary Calendar
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    versus
    STACY CARTER DANIEL,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    --------------------
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Western District of Texas
    USDC No. 6:04-CR-209-1
    --------------------
    Before JOLLY, DAVIS and OWEN, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    A jury convicted Stacy Carter Daniel of conspiracy to
    distribute methamphetamine, conspiracy to attempt to manufacture
    methamphetamine, and possession of a substance, pseudoephedrine,
    used to manufacture methamphetamine.   The court sentenced Daniel
    to 120 months on each count, below the 360-month guideline
    minimum and the 20-year statutory maximum for the conspiracy
    counts.   Daniel appeals her conviction and sentence.
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
    this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
    under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
    No. 05-50503
    -2-
    Daniel contends that the evidence was insufficient to
    convict her on any count.   Her challenge to the conspiracy counts
    is based on her assertion that the accomplices who testified
    against her were not credible.    We do not review of the weight of
    the evidence or the credibility of the witnesses.    United States
    v. Garcia, 
    995 F.2d 556
    , 561 (5th Cir. 1993).    There was ample
    evidence that, when viewed in the light favorable to the verdict,
    would allow any reasonable jury to find Daniel guilty beyond a
    reasonable doubt on each count.     United States v. Jaramillo, 
    42 F.3d 920
    , 922-23 (5th Cir. 1995).
    Daniel contends for the first time on appeal that we should
    grant a new trial under FED. R. CRIM. P. 33, based on the great
    weight of the evidence.   This argument might have been
    appropriate in the district court, but we do not reweigh the
    evidence on appeal.   See United States v. Arnold, 
    416 F.3d 349
    ,
    360-61 (5th Cir. 2005).
    Daniel contends that her sentence was improperly based on
    facts neither admitted by her nor proved to the jury beyond a
    reasonable doubt.   Under the advisory Sentencing Guidelines
    mandated by United States v. Booker, 
    543 U.S. 220
    (2005), the
    district court was entitled to find the facts to support the
    sentence in the same manner as before Booker.    See United States
    v. Alonzo, 
    435 F.3d 551
    , 553-54 (5th Cir. 2006); United States v.
    Mares, 
    402 F.3d 511
    , 519 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 
    126 S. Ct. 43
    (2005).   Because Daniel did not present evidence to rebut the
    No. 05-50503
    -3-
    facts in the pre-sentence report, the district court was entitled
    to rely on those facts, including facts pertaining to drug
    quantity, Daniel’s role in the conspiracy, and the risk of danger
    to her children.   See United States v Lopez-Urbina, 
    434 F.3d 750
    ,
    767 (5th Cir. 2005).   Daniel has failed to show that any of the
    district court’s factual findings were clearly erroneous.    See
    United States v. Gonzales, 
    436 F.3d 560
    , 584 (5th Cir. 2006)
    (post-Booker review of sentencing facts is for clear error).
    Daniel’s contention that judicial fact-finding under post-
    Booker advisory Guidelines violates the constitutional
    prohibition of ex post facto laws is foreclosed by United States
    v. Austin, 
    432 F.3d 598
    , 599 (5th Cir. 2005).
    Daniel’s contention that her criminal history score was
    invalid fails because, as she acknowledges, there is no authority
    for the proposition that criminal history facts must be alleged
    in an indictment and proved to a jury.    See Shepard v. United
    States, 
    544 U.S. 13
    , 
    125 S. Ct. 1254
    , 1264 (2004);
    Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 
    523 U.S. 224
    , 226 (1998).
    Daniel fails to show that her sentence below the properly
    calculated guideline range was unreasonable.    Cf. 
    Alonzo, 435 F.3d at 554
    (sentence within properly calculated guidelines range
    is presumed reasonable).
    The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.