Donald Davis v. Kroger Co. , 429 F. App'x 376 ( 2011 )


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  •      Case: 10-10454     Document: 00511513751           Page: 1     Date Filed: 06/20/2011
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT  United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    June 20, 2011
    No. 10-10454                         Lyle W. Cayce
    Clerk
    DONALD J. DAVIS,
    Plaintiff - Appellant
    v.
    KROGER TEXAS LP; THE KROGER CO.,
    Defendants - Appellees
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Texas
    USDC No. 3:07-CV-1130
    Before REAVLEY, JOLLY, and STEWART, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    Donald Davis, a long-time Kroger employee at various of its locations in
    Texas -- who was, until 2005, a union member covered by a collective bargaining
    agreement, and who was thereafter a member of management -- brings this
    appeal. He challenges the district court’s entry of summary judgment 1 rejecting
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR . R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not
    be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR .
    R. 47.5.4.
    1
    Although Davis challenges various evidentiary rulings of the district court, the district
    court did not abuse its discretion with respect to any of these rulings; furthermore, even if
    there was error, it was harmless because none of these rulings affected Davis’s substantial
    rights.
    Case: 10-10454     Document: 00511513751    Page: 2   Date Filed: 06/20/2011
    No. 10-10454
    his claims arising from mistaken seniority dates and from his ultimate
    discharge. We have thoroughly considered the briefs, the record, and the oral
    argument in this case, and have concluded that the district court committed no
    error in granting summary judgment in favor of Kroger. For the reasons stated
    below, we AFFIRM.
    I.
    A.
    The complaint in this case charges Kroger with negligence, fraud, and
    defamation on the ground that the company records do not accurately reflect
    Davis’s seniority dates. All of the complained-of events occurred while he was
    a member of the collective bargaining unit and covered by a collective bargaining
    agreement, which addresses seniority, termination, and leaves of absence. These
    claims are therefore preempted by the Labor Management Relations Act
    (“LMRA.”) See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Rawson, 
    495 U.S. 362
    , 368 (1990)
    (“State law is . . . preempted by Section 301 [of the LMRA] in that only the
    federal law . . . governs the interpretation and application of collective-
    bargaining agreements.”)
    Davis’s complaint also requests a declaration that he was employed by
    Kroger for eighteen years. This grievance -- just like the others -- challenges his
    seniority date, which we reiterate is a subject covered by the collective
    bargaining agreement. The claim is therefore preempted. 
    Id.
    B.
    Davis was discharged in 2006, at a time when he was a member of
    management and not covered by the collective bargaining agreement. He brings
    two state law claims stemming from his discharge: fraudulent nondisclosure and
    defamation. He argues that summary judgment was inappropriate on these
    claims because there is a factual dispute about whether he was given proper
    notice of his shift.
    2
    Case: 10-10454   Document: 00511513751      Page: 3   Date Filed: 06/20/2011
    No. 10-10454
    He admits that he was discharged for failing to show up to work as
    scheduled on May 20, 2006, but argues that Kroger did not tell him in advance
    that he was scheduled to work that day. He acknowledges, however, that he in
    fact was informed that he was on the schedule, and that he physically viewed the
    schedule. Consequently, there is no genuine issue of material fact regarding
    notice, and his fraudulent nondisclosure claim was properly subject to summary
    judgment.
    Similarly, the only evidence of Kroger’s “defamation” is that it told Davis’s
    fellow employees that he was fired for refusing to work his May 20 shift. Because
    truth is an absolute defense to defamation, see COC Servs. Ltd. v. CompUSA,
    Inc., 
    150 S.W.3d 654
    , 681 (Tex. Ct. App. 2004), the district court properly granted
    summary judgment on this claim.
    II.
    For the reasons set forth above, the summary judgment in favor of Kroger
    is
    AFFIRMED.
    3
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 10-10454

Citation Numbers: 429 F. App'x 376

Judges: Reavley, Jolly, Stewart

Filed Date: 6/20/2011

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/5/2024