United States v. Fulgencio Loredo , 420 F. App'x 425 ( 2011 )


Menu:
  •       Case: 10-50099 Document: 00511432279 Page: 1 Date Filed: 04/01/2011
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT  United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    April 1, 2011
    No. 10-50099
    Summary Calendar                 Lyle W. Cayce
    Clerk
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee
    v.
    FULGENCIO RUBIO LOREDO, also known as Fulgencio Loredo-Rubio, also
    known as Charlie Loredo,
    Defendant-Appellant
    -------------------------------------------------
    Cons. w/ 10-50162
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee
    v.
    FULGENCIO LOREDO-RUBIO,
    Defendant-Appellant
    Appeals from the United States District Court
    for the Western District of Texas
    USDC No. 1:09-CR-35-1
    USDC No. 1:08-CR-290-7
    Case: 10-50099 Document: 00511432279 Page: 2 Date Filed: 04/01/2011
    No. 10-50099 c/w No. 10-50162
    Before REAVLEY, DENNIS, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    Fulgencio Rubio Loredo (Loredo), also known as Fulgencio Loredo-Rubio,
    was charged in two separate indictments with being a felon in possession of a
    firearm and conspiring to money launder, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2,
    922(g)(1), 1856(a)(1), and 1956(h). Loredo pleaded guilty as charged; however,
    after the district court accepted his guilty pleas, Loredo moved to withdraw
    them. Following a hearing, the district court denied those motions. The district
    court sentenced Loredo within the advisory guidelines range to 63 months of
    imprisonment on both counts, to be served concurrently, and to be followed by
    three years of supervised release.
    We review the district court’s denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea
    for abuse of discretion. United States v. McKnight, 
    570 F.3d 641
    , 645 (5th Cir.
    2009). Because Loredo did not seek to withdraw his guilty pleas before the
    district court accepted them, he had no absolute right to withdraw his pleas. See
    United States v. Arami, 
    536 F.3d 479
    , 483 (5th Cir. 2008); F ED. R. C RIM. P. 11(d).
    Before sentencing, a defendant may withdraw his guilty plea that the district
    court has accepted if “the defendant can show a fair and just reason for
    requesting the withdrawal.”          F ED. R. C RIM. P. 11(d)(2)(B).       “The burden of
    establishing a fair and just reason for withdrawing a guilty plea remains at all
    times on the defendant.” United States v. Still, 
    102 F.3d 118
    , 124 (5th Cir.
    1996).
    In reviewing the denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea, we consider
    whether (1) the defendant asserted his innocence, (2) withdrawal would
    prejudice the government, (3) the defendant delayed in filing the withdrawal
    motion, (4) withdrawal would inconvenience the court, (5) close assistance of
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR . R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not
    be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR .
    R. 47.5.4.
    2
    Case: 10-50099 Document: 00511432279 Page: 3 Date Filed: 04/01/2011
    No. 10-50099 c/w No. 10-50162
    counsel was available to the defendant, (6) the plea was knowing and voluntary,
    and (7) withdrawal would waste judicial resources. United States v. Carr, 
    740 F.2d 339
    , 343-44 (5th Cir. 1984). Because we must consider the totality of the
    circumstances in applying these factors, 
    id. at 344,
    “[n]o single factor or
    combination of factors mandates a particular result.” United States v. Badger,
    
    925 F.2d 101
    , 104 (5th Cir. 1991).
    Based on the totality of the circumstances, Loredo failed, both in the court
    below and in this court, to carry his burden of establishing a fair and just reason
    for the withdrawal of his guilty pleas. See 
    Still, 102 F.3d at 124
    . Our review of
    the record, Loredo’s arguments, and the district court’s consideration of the Carr
    factors shows that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying
    Loredo’s motions to withdraw his guilty pleas.
    Loredo contends that the sentence is procedurally unreasonable because
    the evidence did not support the district court’s finding that 100 or more aliens
    were involved in the money-laundering offense and its application of the nine-
    level increase for that number of aliens. The applicable Sentencing Guidelines
    provide that nine offense levels should be added if the offense involved the
    smuggling, transporting, or harboring of 100 or more unlawful aliens. U.S.S.G.
    § 2L1.1(b)(2)(C) (2009). A district court’s factual finding regarding the number
    of aliens transported is reviewed for clear error. United States v. Williams, 
    610 F.3d 271
    , 292 (5th Cir. 2010).
    Based on the unrebutted presentence report (PSR) and evidence presented
    by the Government at sentencing, the district court did not clearly err in finding
    that the offense involved at least 100 aliens.       Accordingly, there was no
    procedural error in the application of the nine-level enhancement.
    Loredo also contends that the evidence did not support the district court’s
    finding that he was an average, not a minor, participant in the offense, and he
    contends that the district court erred in denying him a two-level decrease
    pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2(b). The district court’s denial of a reduction for a
    3
    Case: 10-50099 Document: 00511432279 Page: 4 Date Filed: 04/01/2011
    No. 10-50099 c/w No. 10-50162
    mitigating role is a factual determination that is reviewed for clear error.
    United States v. Villanueva, 
    408 F.3d 193
    , 203 (5th Cir. 2005). The court’s
    determination whether to apply the minor role adjustment “is heavily dependent
    upon the facts of the particular case,” and “the court, in weighing the totality of
    the circumstances, is not required to find, based solely on the defendant’s bare
    assertion, that such a role adjustment is warranted.”         § 3B1.2, comment.
    (n.3(C)). It is the defendant’s burden to establish by a preponderance of the
    evidence that he was entitled to the minor role reduction. See United States v.
    Garcia, 
    242 F.3d 593
    , 597 (5th Cir. 2001). It is not sufficient for a defendant to
    show that he was less involved than other participants; rather, he must show
    that he was “peripheral to the advancement of the criminal activity.” United
    States v. Martinez-Larraga, 
    517 F.3d 258
    , 272 (5th Cir. 2008).
    Loredo offered nothing in response to the PSR and the Government’s
    evidence and argument that Loredo did not play a minor role. Accordingly,
    Loredo did not prove that his role in the offense was peripheral, and based on
    this record, the district court did not clearly err by not awarding him a
    minor-role adjustment. See 
    Villanueva, 408 F.3d at 203-04
    & n.9.
    Loredo’s argument, raised for the first time on appeal, that his sentence
    based on judge-found facts violated the Sixth Amendment is foreclosed by circuit
    precedent. See United States v. Lewis, 
    476 F.3d 369
    , 389 (5th Cir. 2007).
    The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
    4