Kemmerly v. United States Department of Interior ( 2011 )


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  •      Case: 10-31117     Document: 00511516733         Page: 1     Date Filed: 06/22/2011
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT  United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    June 22, 2011
    No. 10-31117
    Summary Calendar                        Lyle W. Cayce
    Clerk
    MCNEIL J. KEMMERLY,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.
    UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    Appeals from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of Louisiana
    USDC No. 2:07-CV-9794
    Before KING, BENAVIDES, and ELROD, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM * :
    Plaintiff McNeil Kemmerly sued the United States Department of the
    Interior (DOI) under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 
    5 U.S.C. § 552
    , and
    the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 
    5 U.S.C. § 701
    , for declaratory,
    injunctive, and other relief for damages allegedly caused by the defendant’s “on-
    going failure to process Plaintiff’s FOIA requests in accordance with the laws of
    the United States.” Kemmerly appeals from the district court’s order granting
    DOI’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction for failure to
    *
    Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not
    be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir.
    R. 47.5.4.
    Case: 10-31117       Document: 00511516733          Page: 2    Date Filed: 06/22/2011
    No. 10-31117
    exhaust administrative remedies. For the reasons that follow, we AFFIRM.
    Kemmerly filed two FOIA requests relevant here with the DOI in his own
    name on behalf of a commercial client.1 After reviewing the requests, DOI
    provided fee estimates of $20,000 and $7,840. Kemmerly refused to pay those
    costs, declined to narrow his requests, and did not pursue an administrative
    appeal. Instead, he filed suit. Because of the confusing state of the record, the
    district court ordered Kemmerly to file a memorandum and affidavit specifically
    identifying what records, if any, were requested but withheld for failure to pay
    the associated fees. Kemmerly complied, filing an affidavit from his client. After
    reviewing the affidavit, DOI construed it as a fifth request because it identified
    different and more specific information than what had been identified in the
    earlier requests. DOI estimated the cost of processing that request was $250,
    which Kemmerly agreed to pay, and fulfilled the request shortly thereafter. The
    DOI then filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, or in
    the alternative a motion for summary judgment, because Kemmerly had not
    exhausted his administrative remedies with respect to the remaining requests,
    and the district court granted the motion.
    We review de novo a district court’s order granting a motion to dismiss for
    lack of subject matter jurisdiction, applying the same standards as the district
    court. See Spotts v. United States, 
    613 F.3d 559
    , 565-66 (5th Cir. 2010). It is
    well established that a claimant must exhaust his administrative remedies prior
    to requesting judicial relief under FOIA. Voinche v. U.S. Dep’t of Air Force, 
    983 F.2d 667
    , 669 (5th Cir. 1993); Hedley v. United States, 
    594 F.2d 1043
    , 1044 (5th
    Cir. 1979). FOIA expressly conditions the agency’s obligation to process requests
    1
    Kemmerly has filed a total of five requests, but only three are relevant here.
    Kemmerly filed suit on the first two requests, but the same district court judge also dismissed
    that suit for a failure to exhaust administrative remedies because Kemmerly had not paid or
    promised to pay the fees. See Kemmerly v. United States Dep’t of Interior, No. 06-2386, 
    2006 WL 2990122
     (E.D. La. Oct. 17, 2006). Kemmerly did not appeal that judgment and filed this
    suit with respect to the remaining requests a year later.
    2
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    No. 10-31117
    on the requester’s compliance with “published rules stating the time, place, fees
    (if any), and procedures to be followed.” 
    5 U.S.C. § 552
    (a)(3)(A). DOI regulations
    provide that “[t]he bureau will not start processing your request until the fee
    issue has been resolved.” 
    43 C.F.R. § 2.18
    (d). The regulations also provide:
    If the bureau anticipates that the fees for processing your request
    exceed the amount you have indicated you are willing to pay, the
    bureau will notify you that it needs your assurance of payment of
    fees as high as are anticipated, or an advance payment. If the bureau
    does not hear from you within 20 workdays, it will assume that you
    are no longer interested in this matter and will close the file on your
    request.
    43 C.F.R. 2.8(b)(1) (emphasis added). Payment of fees is therefore necessary to
    exhaust administrative remedies. Voinche, 
    983 F.2d at 669
    ; see Pollack v. Dep’t
    of Justice, 
    49 F.3d 115
    , 119-20 (4th Cir. 1995); Oglesby v. U.S. Dep’t of Army, 
    920 F.2d 57
    , 66 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (“Exhaustion does not occur until the required fees
    are paid or an appeal is taken from the refusal to waive fees.”); see Trenerry v.
    Internal Revenue Serv., No. 95-5150, 
    1996 WL 88459
    , at *1 (10th Cir. Mar. 1,
    1996) (unpublished).
    Kemmerly admits that he refused to pay or commit to pay the required
    fees. Instead, Kemmerly primarily argues that he constructively exhausted his
    administrative remedies because the DOI’s responses and estimates were “not
    prepared in compliance with law” and were either untimely or arbitrary,
    capricious, excessive, and unreasonable. Constructive exhaustion is a narrow,
    statutory doctrine that deems a requester to have exhausted its administrative
    remedies if the agency does not act within the statutory deadlines. 
    5 U.S.C. § 552
    (a)(6)(C); Morrow v. Fed. Bureau of Investigation, 
    2 F.3d 642
    , 643 n.1 (5th
    Cir. 1993). “[W]here a requester has chosen to wait past the ten-day period until
    the agency has responded, Congress intended that the administrative route be
    pursued to its end. . . . Allowing a FOIA requester to proceed immediately to
    court to challenge an agency’s initial response would cut off the agency’s power
    3
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    to correct or rethink initial misjudgments or errors.” Taylor v. Appleton, 
    30 F.3d 1365
    , 1369 (11th Cir. 1994) (quoting Oglesby, 
    920 F.2d at 64-65
    ). Here, the DOI
    responded by providing Kemmerly with a cost estimate and the opportunity to
    revise his requests. Indeed, the DOI revised its cost estimate when Kemmerly
    filed an affidavit identifying the documents he requested more specifically.
    Kemmerly offers no support for his suggestion that we treat the DOI’s response
    as no response at all, and we decline to do so. As such, Kemmerly has not
    constructively exhausted his administrative remedies.
    Kemmerly is, of course, free to file another complaint after he exhausts
    his administrative remedies. To that extent, the district court should have
    dismissed his claims without prejudice. See Taylor v. U.S. Treasury Dep’t, 
    127 F.3d 470
    , 478 (5th Cir. 1997). For that reason, we AFFIRM the district court’s
    dismissal of Kemmerly’s claims, but REMAND with instructions that the district
    court modify its judgment to dismiss these claims without prejudice.
    4