Roy Maynor v. Dow Chemical Company , 430 F. App'x 313 ( 2011 )


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  •      Case: 10-40771    Document: 00511516574          Page: 1    Date Filed: 06/22/2011
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT  United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    June 22, 2011
    No. 10-40771                         Lyle W. Cayce
    Clerk
    ROY MAYNOR
    Plaintiff - Appellant
    v.
    THE DOW CHEMICAL COMPANY
    Defendant - Appellee
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Texas
    USDC No. 3:07-CV-504
    Before GARWOOD, SMITH, and STEWART, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    Roy Maynor sued his former employer, the Dow Chemical Company, under
    the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 
    29 U.S.C. § 201
    , et seq. Maynor alleged,
    among other claims, that Dow had fired him in retaliation for complaining about
    Dow’s policy regarding training and skills assessments. The jury found that
    Maynor had been fired in retaliation for activity protected by the FLSA.
    Following the verdict, the district court granted Dow's motion for judgment as
    a matter of law on the retaliation claim, finding that there was insufficient
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR . R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not
    be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH
    CIR . R. 47.5.4.
    Case: 10-40771      Document: 00511516574         Page: 2     Date Filed: 06/22/2011
    No. 10-40771
    evidence for a reasonable jury to have found that Maynor had been fired because
    of his engagement in protected activity. Maynor appealed.
    We affirm the district court’s judgment as a matter of law, finding that
    Maynor failed to present a legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable
    jury to find retaliation, for the reasons essentially as stated in the district court’s
    thorough and well-considered July 19, 2010, Memorandum Opinion. While
    Maynor’s oral complaint constituted protected activity under the FLSA,1 the
    district court’s judgment as a matter of law was proper because the “facts and
    inferences point so strongly and overwhelmingly” in favor of Dow’s explanation
    of the reasons for Maynor’s termination that “reasonable men could not arrive
    at a contrary verdict.” Boeing Co. v. Shipman, 
    411 F.2d 365
    , 374-75 (5th Cir.
    1969) (en banc), overruled in other respects, Gautreaux v. Scurlock Marine, 
    107 F.3d 331
    , 336 (5th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (“A mere scintilla of evidence is
    insufficient to present a question for the jury.... There must be a conflict in
    substantial evidence to create a jury question.”); see also Bryant v. Compass
    Group USA, Inc., 
    413 F.3d 471
    , 475 (5th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 
    126 S.Ct. 1027
    (2006) (same).
    AFFIRMED
    1
    The reasoning of the district court on this point has since been confirmed by the
    United States Supreme Court in Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 
    131 S.Ct. 1325
    , 1329 (2011) (finding that the FLSA’s term "filed any complaint" does include
    oral as well as written complaints).
    2
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 10-40771

Citation Numbers: 430 F. App'x 313

Judges: Garwood, Per Curiam, Smith, Stewart

Filed Date: 6/22/2011

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/5/2024