United States v. Flores-Rosales , 260 F. App'x 729 ( 2007 )


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  •           IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    December 28, 2007
    No. 07-50828
    Summary Calendar              Charles R. Fulbruge III
    Clerk
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
    Plaintiff-Appellee
    v.
    EDUARDO FLORES-ROSALES, also known as Andres Franco-Valereano
    Defendant-Appellant
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Western District of Texas
    USDC No. 3:06-CR-1717-ALL
    Before KING, DAVIS, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    Eduardo Flores-Rosales (Flores) appeals the sentence imposed following
    his guilty-plea conviction for illegal reentry into the United States following
    removal. Flores argues that the district court erred by applying a 16-level
    enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii) for his being removed
    following a conviction for a crime of violence. He maintains that his prior
    Arizona conviction for aggravated assault was not a conviction for a crime of
    violence because the Arizona statute is broader than the generic definition of
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion
    should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
    circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
    No. 07-50828
    aggravated assault and because the statute does not require the use of force as
    an element of the offense. He further maintains that the sentencing order
    produced by the Government was not sufficient evidence of his prior conviction.
    As Flores did not produce rebuttal evidence, the sentencing order was
    sufficient evidence of his prior conviction. See United States v. Neri-Hernandes,
    
    504 F.3d 587
    , 590-92 (5th Cir. 2007). That order showed that Flores was
    convicted of violating ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-1204(A)(2) and 13-1203(A)(2).
    While the Arizona statute is slightly broader than the offense of aggravated
    assault in the Model Penal Code, these differences are minor, and a conviction
    under that statute is a conviction for the offense of aggravated assault as
    enumerated in § 2L1.2, comment. (n.1(B)(iii)). See United States v. Mungia-
    Portillo, 
    484 F.3d 813
    , 815-17 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 
    128 S. Ct. 320
     (2007);
    United States v. Guillen-Alvarez, 
    489 F.3d 197
    , 198-201 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
    
    128 S. Ct. 418
     (2007).
    Flores argues that his sentence was unreasonable because the district
    court employed impermissible double counting and, thus, improperly calculated
    his guidelines range by increasing both his offense level and criminal history
    points based on the same prior aggravated assault conviction. Citing United
    States v. Henry, 
    288 F.3d 657
     (5th Cir. 2002), Flores further contends that his
    criminal history should not have been increased based on his prior aggravated
    assault conviction because it was an element of the illegal reentry offense.
    The Guidelines do not prohibit double counting. See § 2L1.2, comment.
    (n.6); see also United States v. Gaytan, 
    74 F.3d 545
    , 560 (5th Cir. 1996). This
    court has approved of double counting under similar circumstances involving
    U.S.S.G. § 2K1.2. See United States v. Hawkins, 
    69 F.3d 11
    , 14-15 (5th Cir.
    1995). Flores’s reliance on Henry is misplaced as Henry is distinguishable from
    the instant case. See Henry, 
    288 F.3d at 659, 665
    . Accordingly, Flores has not
    shown that the district court erroneously calculated the guideline range of
    imprisonment.
    2
    No. 07-50828
    When the district court imposes a sentence within a properly calculated
    guidelines range, little explanation is required, and this court will infer that the
    district court considered all of the factors for a fair sentence set forth in the
    Guidelines. United States v. Mares, 
    402 F.3d 511
    , 519 (5th Cir. 2005). Flores
    has not demonstrated that the sentence imposed was unreasonable.
    In light of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 
    530 U.S. 466
     (2000), Flores challenges
    the constitutionality of 
    8 U.S.C. § 1326
    (b)’s treatment of prior felony and
    aggravated felony convictions as sentencing factors rather than elements of the
    offense that must be found by a jury. This court has held that this issue is “fully
    foreclosed from further debate.” United States v. Pineda-Arrellano, 
    492 F.3d 624
    , 625 (5th Cir. 2007), petition for cert. filed (Aug. 28, 2007) (No. 07-6202).
    AFFIRMED.
    3