United States v. Campos , 277 F. App'x 505 ( 2008 )


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  •            IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT  United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    May 8, 2008
    No. 07-40888
    Summary Calendar                   Charles R. Fulbruge III
    Clerk
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    v.
    JESUS CAMPOS,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Texas
    USDC No. 5:07-CR-500-1
    Before SMITH, BARKSDALE, and ELROD, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    Jesus Campos appeals his guilty-plea conviction and sentence for being
    unlawfully present in the United States after having been removed previously.
    He argues that the district court committed reversible plain error by entering a
    judgment reflecting that he was convicted of an offense under 8 U.S.C.
    § 1326(b)(2) because he did not have a prior conviction that qualified as an
    “aggravated felony.” He also challenges the constitutionality of § 1326(b) in light
    of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 
    530 U.S. 466
    (2000).
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not
    be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
    R. 47.5.4.
    No. 07-40888
    Campos correctly concedes that review of his first argument is for plain
    error. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b); United States v. Peltier, 
    505 F.3d 389
    , 392 (5th
    Cir. 2007), petition for cert. filed (Jan. 22, 2008) (No. 07-8978). To obtain relief,
    he must show that the district court committed (1) an error (2) that is clear or
    obvious and (3) that affects his substantial rights. See United States v. Olano,
    
    507 U.S. 725
    , 732–34 (1993). If Campos makes this showing, then the decision
    to correct the error is within this court’s discretion. 
    Id. The maximum
    penalty
    for unlawful reentry of an alien whose removal was subsequent to, inter alia, a
    prior felony conviction, is 10 years. § 1326(b)(1). The maximum penalty for
    unlawful reentry of an alien whose removal was subsequent to, inter alia, a prior
    aggravated felony conviction, is 20 years. § 1326(b)(2). An “aggravated felony”
    is defined in relevant part as a crime of violence for which the punishment is no
    less than one year of imprisonment. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F).
    The presentence report reflects that Campos has only one prior felony
    conviction—that being for attempted robbery. The trial court sentenced Campos
    to 75 days of imprisonment and five years of probation on the attempted robbery
    charge. Thus, Campos’s prior felony conviction is not a qualifying “aggravated
    felony” for purposes of § 1326(b)(2). See § 1101(a)(43)(F). Because Campos does
    not have a qualifying prior “aggravated felony” conviction, he cannot be
    convicted under § 1326(b)(2). Accordingly, the district court committed a clear
    or obvious error when it entered a judgment reflecting that Campos was
    convicted pursuant to § 1326(b)(2).
    Nevertheless, Campos is not entitled to resentencing because he cannot
    show that the district court’s error affected his substantial rights. See 
    Olano, 507 U.S. at 732
    –34. First, no record evidence exists to support the proposition
    that the district court’s sentence was influenced by an incorrect understanding
    of the statutory maximum sentence in this case. And second, the sentence
    imposed was within a properly calculated guidelines range—which Campos does
    not contest—and the sentence was below the statutory maximum of 10 years of
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    No. 07-40888
    imprisonment under the correct subsection of § 1326(b). As a result, the district
    court did not commit reversible plain error. See 
    Olano, 507 U.S. at 732
    –34. The
    judgment, however, is modified in accordance with this opinion to reflect a
    conviction pursuant to § 1326(b)(1). See United States v. Castro-Trevino, 
    464 F.3d 536
    , 543 n.16, 547 (5th Cir. 2006).
    In light of Apprendi, Campos also challenges the constitutionality of §
    1326(b)’s treatment of prior felony and aggravated felony convictions as
    sentencing factors rather than as elements of the offense that must be found by
    a jury. This argument is foreclosed by Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 
    523 U.S. 224
    , 235 (1998). United States v. Pineda-Arrellano, 
    492 F.3d 624
    , 625 (5th
    Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 
    128 S. Ct. 872
    (2008).
    Accordingly, the district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED, as modified.
    3