Landrum v. McKinney ( 2006 )


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  •                                                                                           United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    F I L E D
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    June 8, 2006
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    Charles R. Fulbruge III
    Clerk
    No. 04-11152
    Summary Calendar
    CHARLES LANDRUM,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    versus
    RECHELLE MCKINNEY; ET AL.,
    Defendants,
    RECHELLE MCKINNEY; NORMA HARRISON, Garment Factory;
    FNU PREWIT, Unit Infirmary; KAREN HORSELY, Unit Infirmary
    Defendants-
    Appellees.
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    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Texas
    USDC No. 1:02-CV-86
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    Before BARKSDALE, STEWART and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    Charles Landrum, Texas prisoner # 565417, appeals the grant of summary judgment for the
    defendants and the dismissal of his 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
     complaint. In his complaint, Landrum asserted
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be
    published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
    R. 47.5.4.
    that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs following his exposure to
    formaldehyde gas. The parties consented to proceed before a magistrate judge (MJ). The MJ found
    that the claims asserted by Landrum did not rise to the level of deliberate indifference, granted the
    defendants’ motion for summary judgment, and dismissed the complaint.
    We first address whether the Texas Department of Criminal Justice-Institutional Division
    (TDCJ-ID), which was originally named as a defendant, is a party to this appeal. Assuming arguendo
    that Landrum’s notice of appeal did include the separate dismissal of TDCJ-ID, we note that he has
    failed to address the basis for the dismissal of TDCJ-ID in his appellate briefs. Therefore, we decline
    to consider any claims against TDCJ-ID. See Brinkmann v. Dallas County Deputy Sheriff Abner,
    
    813 F.2d 744
    , 748 (5th Cir. 1987) (this court “will not raise and discuss legal issues that [the
    appellant] has failed to assert”). 
    Id.
    This court reviews the grant of a motion for summary judgment de novo. Guillory v. Domtar
    Indus., Inc., 
    95 F.3d 1320
    , 1326 (5th Cir. 1996). Our review of the record indicates that, for all
    defendants but one, the MJ did not err in determining that their actions did not rise to the level of
    deliberate indifference. See Farmer v. Brennan, 
    511 U.S. 825
    , 837 (1994) (to show deliberate
    indifference, official must know of and disregard risk to inmate); Mendoza v. Lynaugh, 
    989 F.2d 191
    ,
    195 (5th Cir. 1993) (delay in medical care must be due to deliberate indifference and result in
    substantial harm); Varnado v. Lynaugh, 
    920 F.2d 320
    , 321 (5th Cir. 1991) (unsuccessful treatment,
    negligence, or medical malpractice are insufficient to show unconstitutional denial of medical care);
    Hernandez v. Estelle, 
    788 F.2d 1154
    , 1158 (5th Cir. 1986) (failure to follow prison regulations is not
    a constitutional violation).
    -2-
    However, we conclude that the MJ erred by granting defendant Harrison’s motion for
    summary judgment. Landrum’s complaint, which he declared under penalty of perjury to be true and
    correct, generally alleges that he timely informed Harrison of his adverse reactions to the
    formaldehyde gas, but Harrison refused his requests for job change or protective equipment. See 
    28 U.S.C. § 1746
    ; Hart v. Hairston, 
    343 F.3d 762
    , 764 n.1 (5th Cir. 2003) (declaration under penalty
    of perjury is competent summary judgment evidence). In response, Harrison relies on her own
    unsigned affidavit and points out that several of Landrum’s assertions lack independent support in
    the record. Based on this record, we conclude that Landrum has demonstrated a genuine issue of
    material fact sufficient to defeat Harrison’s motion for summary judgment. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c).
    As Landrum has not alleged that Harrison was personally involved in his October 2001 reassignment
    to the garment factory, we affirm the grant of summary judgment as to that claim. See Thompson v.
    Steele, 
    709 F.2d 381
    , 382 (5th Cir. 1983) (“Personal involvement is an essential element of a civil
    rights cause of action.”). We also conclude that Landrum’s grievances were sufficient to exhaust his
    claims against Harrison.
    Therefore, with the exception of Landrum’s claim regarding his October reassignment to the
    garment factory, we vacate the MJ’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Harrison and remand for
    further proceedings. We affirm the grant of summary judgment for the remaining defendants.
    AFFIRMED IN PART; VACATED AND REMANDED IN PART.
    -3-