Rogers v. United States Parole Commission , 288 F. App'x 132 ( 2008 )


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  •           IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    July 15, 2008
    No. 08-50206
    Summary Calendar                 Charles R. Fulbruge III
    Clerk
    GERALD LEO ROGERS
    Petitioner-Appellant
    v.
    UNITED STATES PAROLE COMMISSION
    Respondent-Appellee
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Western District of Texas
    USDC No. 5:07-CV-170
    Before HIGGINBOTHAM, BARKSDALE, and ELROD, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    Gerald Leo Rogers, federal prisoner # 12327-086, has moved to proceed in
    forma pauperis (IFP) in his appeal of the district court’s denial of relief on his 28
    U.S.C. § 2241 petition. By moving for IFP status, Rogers is challenging the
    district court’s certification that his appeal is not taken in good faith. See Baugh
    v. Taylor, 
    117 F.3d 197
    , 202 (5th Cir. 1997).
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion
    should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
    circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
    No. 08-50206
    Rogers filed the § 2241 petition to challenge the revocation of his parole on
    charges that he committed a criminal fraud violation. Rogers, who has two
    previous criminal convictions, first argues that those convictions are invalid
    because the courts in which he was convicted lacked jurisdiction and because the
    Government lacked standing. Because his previous convictions are invalid,
    Rogers contends, the United States Parole Commission (the Commission) lacks
    authority over him.
    A § 2241 petition that attacks errors that occurred at trial or sentencing
    may be considered under the “savings clause” of 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e) if the
    prisoner shows that the § 2255 remedy is “inadequate or ineffective to test the
    legality of his detention.” Rogers, however, has not met his burden to show that
    his claims satisfy the savings clause. See Wesson v. Penitentiary, Beaumont, TX,
    
    305 F.3d 343
    , 347 (5th Cir. 2002); Reyes-Requena v. United States, 
    243 F.3d 893
    ,
    904 (5th Cir. 2001).
    Rogers also contends that his due process rights were violated at his
    revocation hearing because he was denied the right to confront four adverse
    witnesses. He asserts that the witnesses, who are Government agents, were
    involved in the premature seizure of his company’s assets, and he alleges that
    the actions of these witness caused investors in his company to lose five million
    dollars.
    A parolee who was denied due process must show that he was prejudiced
    by the violation. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 
    507 U.S. 619
    , 637-39 (1993). He must
    show that the due process violation had a substantial and injurious effect or
    influence in determining the proceeding’s outcome. Williams v. Johnson, 
    171 F.3d 300
    , 307 (5th Cir. 1999).
    Rogers has not shown that the testimony of the four witnesses would have
    been relevant to the Commission’s determination that he committed investment
    fraud by, inter alia, making statements to investors that were misleading and
    by failing to disclose material facts in securing investments. Because he has not
    2
    No. 08-50206
    shown that the claimed due process violation had a substantial and injurious
    effect or influence in determining the proceeding’s outcome, Rogers has failed to
    make the required showing of prejudice.        See 
    Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637-39
    ;
    
    Williams, 171 F.3d at 307
    .
    Rogers has not shown that the district court’s determination that his
    appeal would be frivolous was incorrect. Accordingly, his appeal is dismissed as
    frivolous, and his request to proceed IFP is denied. See 
    Baugh, 117 F.3d at 202
    n.24; 5th Cir. R. 42.2.
    Rogers has filed a motion seeking a stay of incarceration under Rule 18 of
    the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. The Government has moved for leave
    to file an out-of-time response to Rogers’ motion. The Government’s motion is
    granted.
    Because this court is not the initial judicial tribunal to consider Rogers’
    claims regarding the Commission’s actions, he cannot obtain relief under FED.
    R. APP. P. 18. See Tesfamichael v. Gonzales, 
    411 F.3d 169
    , 174 (5th Cir. 2005).
    If Roger’s motion is instead considered as a motion for release pending appeal,
    he likewise is not entitled to relief because he fails to demonstrate the existence
    of exceptional circumstances. See United States v. Lacy, 
    643 F.2d 284
    , 285 (5th
    Cir. 1981). Accordingly, Rogers’ motion is denied.
    APPEAL DISMISSED; IFP MOTION DENIED; MOTION FOR LEAVE
    TO FILE AN OUT-OF-TIME RESPONSE GRANTED; MOTION FOR STAY OF
    INCARCERATION DENIED.
    3