Patrick Wilson v. Louisiana State ( 2013 )


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  •      Case: 12-31283       Document: 00512376773         Page: 1     Date Filed: 09/17/2013
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT  United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    September 17, 2013
    No. 12-31283
    Lyle W. Cayce
    Clerk
    PATRICK L. WILSON,
    Plaintiff - Appellant
    v.
    ESPARROS PROPERTIES AIRLINE, L.L.C.;
    WHITNEY JOSEPH, JR., Assessor for the Parish of St. John the Baptist;
    PETE PETERS, Member of the Louisiana Tax Commission doing business in the
    Parish of East Baton Rouge;
    BELINDA B. HAZEL, Member of the Louisiana Tax Commission doing business
    in the Parish of East Baton Rouge;
    KENNETH P. NAQUIN, JR., Member of the Louisiana Tax Commission doing
    business in the Parish of East Baton Rouge;
    JOEY VERCHER, Member of the Louisiana Tax Commission doing business in
    the Parish of East Baton Rouge;
    PAUL HARGROVE, Member of the Louisiana Tax Commission doing business
    in the Parish of East Baton Rouge,
    Defendants - Appellees
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of Louisiana
    USDC No. 2:10-CV-3338
    Before JONES, SMITH, and GARZA, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not
    be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
    R. 47.5.4.
    Case: 12-31283      Document: 00512376773         Page: 2    Date Filed: 09/17/2013
    No. 12-31283
    Appellant Patrick Wilson brought suit under 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
    , claiming
    a deprivation of property without due process of law. Because process remained
    available to Wilson under Louisiana law, we AFFIRM.
    Wilson bought an immovable property improvement, a metal dance floor,
    at a tax sale in St. John the Baptist Parish in June of 2007. After purchasing
    the improvement, Wilson failed to pay taxes he owed on it for 2007, and the
    property was adjudicated back to St. John the Baptist in 2008. When the
    redemption window expired for the previous owner in 2010, Wilson brought a
    suit to quiet title on the property in June of that year.1 He notified Esparros
    Properties—owners of the property on which the improvement was located—but
    Esparros claimed the sale to Wilson was in error and that Esparros was the
    rightful owner. Appellant then sought a hearing from both the Parish Tax
    Assessor and the Sheriff on the issue. In the meantime, Esparros had informed
    the Assessor of the alleged mistake. Without offering Wilson a hearing, the
    Assessor asked the Louisiana Tax Commission to correct tax assessments from
    2006–09 retroactively, and the tax sale was retroactively cancelled.
    Wilson stopped pursuing the quiet title action and filed this § 1983 action
    against Esparros, the Assessor, and members of the Louisiana Tax Commission.
    The district court granted Appellees’ motion for summary judgment, holding that
    Wilson did not show a deprivation of a property interest. Citing Jamie Land Co.
    v. Touchstone, 
    965 So.2d 873
     (La. App. 1 Cir. 2007), the court held that due
    process is not violated when a party fails to pursue a quiet title action to
    challenge the cancellation of his tax sale title. See 
    id. at 877
    . Appellant’s motion
    to reconsider (treated as a Rule 59 motion) was also denied. The second time
    around, the court decided that because title here had vested in the Parish
    following Wilson’s nonpayment of taxes, and Wilson failed to redeem the
    1
    Louisiana provides owners with a three-year window to redeem property sold at a tax
    sale by repaying the buyer the amount for which it sold, costs, and interest. LA. CONST.
    art. VII, § 25(B)(1).
    2
    Case: 12-31283          Document: 00512376773         Page: 3     Date Filed: 09/17/2013
    No. 12-31283
    property, Wilson had no protectable property interest at the time the sale was
    cancelled. Wilson timely appealed.
    Motions for summary judgment are reviewed by this court de novo, and we
    apply the same standard as the district court.                 EEOC v. WC&M Enters.,
    
    496 F.3d 393
    , 297–98 (5th Cir. 2007). The moving party is entitled to summary
    judgment if there are no material facts in dispute and the movant is entitled to
    judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56.
    Under Louisiana law, Wilson had a property right following his tax sale
    purchase that, however, had to be confirmed by a quiet title action following the
    expiration of the prior owner’s redemption period. The district court concluded
    that Wilson lost any constitutionally protectable interest when, after he failed
    to pay the taxes he owed on the property, the title was adjudicated back to the
    Parish before he filed the quiet title suit. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47:2122
    (2009). This is incorrect. Wilson maintained a right to redeem for three years;2
    he never took possession of the property. To that extent, however tenuous his
    interest, he retained a right in the property.
    The case turns, then, on whether the processes afforded by Louisiana law
    were sufficient to protect his right in the face of the Assessor’s action to
    retroactively cancel the original tax sale and deprive Wilson of his remaining
    interest.      Wilson contends that the Assessor’s action resulted in an
    unconstitutional deprivation, and state post-deprivation procedures cannot cure
    the constitutional default or substitute for his federal § 1983 remedy. We
    disagree.
    There are two ways to view the process surrounding the Assessor’s action
    and Wilson’s response. One way is to conclude, as the district court did in its
    first summary judgment opinion, that state procedures are adequate to clear
    title to property bought and sold at tax sales. In its totality, Louisiana law
    2
    Virtocom Fin., Inc. v. Palo Verde Trading Co., 
    869 So. 2d 194
    , 197-98 (La. App. 2004).
    3
    Case: 12-31283       Document: 00512376773          Page: 4     Date Filed: 09/17/2013
    No. 12-31283
    accommodates the interests of both private parties in tax sale proceedings—the
    original owner and the purchaser—by affording to the former a requirement of
    notice prior to tax sale, coupled with a 3-year right of redemption, and to both
    parties a quiet title suit to settle the tax sale purchaser’s title.                  See 
    id.
    § 47:2266(A). Both parties are entitled to due process protections. The quiet
    title suit, far from being an insufficient post-“deprivation” remedy, is essential
    to clear title in the tax purchaser’s name. Under the circumstances, Wilson did
    not avail himself of state processes and cannot therefore claim to have been
    deprived.3
    A second way to view the case is to consider the Assessor’s actions as
    “random and unauthorized,” inasmuch as the Assessor did not heed Wilson’s
    request for a hearing before the Tax Commission was prevailed on to cancel his
    tax purchase retroactively. We may assume arguendo that this action alone
    “deprived” Wilson of his property.                It is well settled, however, that
    post-deprivation procedures are adequate to remedy this type of error, if error
    it was. Hudson v. Palmer, 
    468 U.S. 517
    , 521 n.2, 532, 
    104 S. Ct. 3194
    , 3197 n.2,
    3203 (1984). Here, not only was a quiet title suit available, Jamie Land Co.,
    965 So.2d at 877 (“[Land] exercise[d] its right to due process by bringing this
    action to quiet title the property.”), but equally significant, the Tax Commission
    has indicated its interest in revisiting the sale cancellation.
    Ultimately, because rights to real property must finally be adjudicated
    between private parties’ competing interests, the state courts had to furnish the
    key to due process with a quiet title action. Because Wilson did not utilize state
    procedures or pursue his complaint with the Tax Commission, he did not suffer
    a constitutional deprivation. The district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED.
    3
    “A § 1983 action may be brought for a violation of procedural due process, but here the
    existence of state remedies is relevant in a special sense. . . . The constitutional violation
    actionable under § 1983 is not complete when the deprivation occurs; it is not complete unless
    and until the State fails to provide due process.” Zinermon v. Burch, 
    494 U.S. 113
    , 125–26,
    
    110 S. Ct. 975
    , 983 (1990).
    4