Lair v. Purdy ( 2006 )


Menu:
  •                                                                 United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    F I L E D
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT                       July 6, 2006
    Charles R. Fulbruge III
    No. 04-41466                             Clerk
    Summary Calendar
    SCOTT MARK LAIR, ET AL.,
    Plaintiffs,
    SCOTT MARK LAIR,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    versus
    MIKE PURDY, etc., ET AL.,
    Defendants,
    MIKE PURDY, individually and as Warden of FCI-TRV; LARRY SANDSON;
    LIEUTENANT ROBERT SWAIN, individually and as Lieutenant FCI-TRV;
    MIKE CARVAJAL, individually and as Lieutenant FCI-TRV; BERNIE
    AYALA, individually and as Correction Officer FCI-TRV; MIKE RUIZ,
    individually and as Deputy Sheriff Live Oak County; John Doe #1;
    John Doe #2; John Doe #3; John Doe #4; John Doe #5; UNITED STATES
    OF AMERICA,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    --------------------
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Texas
    USDC No. 2:01-CV-381
    --------------------
    Before JONES, Chief Judge, and BARKSDALE and BENAVIDES, Circuit
    Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    Scott Mark Lair, federal prisoner # 76589-079, appeals the
    dismissal,     on    remand,   of   the   following   claims:     (1)    He   was
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this
    opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
    circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
    subjected to harsher visitation restrictions than other inmates, in
    violation    of    his    rights      under       the    First   Amendment;     (2)    his
    placement in the Special Housing Unit (SHU) violated his due
    process rights; and, (3) Lt. Swain and Officer Ayala retaliated
    against him for filing grievances and for writing letters regarding
    his treatment in prison.
    Lair argues that his claim based on visitation restrictions is
    not frivolous because prison officials used the visitation process
    as a “bargaining chip” to force him to submit to their authority.
    The    district    court       did   not    err    in    dismissing    this    claim    as
    frivolous and for failure to state a claim on which relief can be
    granted.    See Berry v. Brady, 
    192 F.3d 504
    , 508 (5th Cir. 1999);
    Thorne v. Jones, 
    765 F.2d 1270
    , 1274 (5th Cir. 1985).                         Because we
    affirm the dismissal of the claim based on visitation restrictions
    on the above grounds, we do not reach Lair’s argument that the
    district court erred in dismissing the claim as time barred.                           See
    Sojourner T v. Edwards, 
    974 F.2d 27
    , 30 (5th Cir. 1992).
    Lair contends that his 420-day confinement in the SHU was
    unconstitutional and that the reasons given for his placement in
    the SHU were “false.”            He maintains that the defendants violated
    regulations governing the Bureau of Prisons in confining him to the
    SHU.     Lair     has    not    shown      that    the    district    court    erred   in
    dismissing his due process claim regarding his placement in the SHU
    for failure to state a claim.              See Pichardo v. Kinker, 
    73 F.3d 612
    ,
    612 (5th Cir. 1996); Luken v. Scott, 
    71 F.3d 192
    , 193 (5th Cir.
    2
    1995).
    Lair contends that the district court erred in dismissing his
    retaliation claim against Lt. Swain and Officer Ayala. He contends
    that the grievances he filed on other matters were sufficient under
    the   circumstances      to     provide       notice    of     his    claims    and    to
    substantially comply with the exhaustion requirement. Lair has not
    shown that the district court erred in dismissing his retaliation
    claims against Lt. Swain and Officer Ayala for failure to exhaust
    administrative remedies. See Days v. Johnson, 
    322 F.3d 863
    , 866-68
    (5th Cir. 2003).
    It is unclear whether the district court’s dismissal of the
    retaliation     claims    was      with   prejudice          with    respect    to    the
    exhaustion requirement. The judgment of the district court will be
    affirmed   as    modified     to    reflect      that    the        dismissal   of    the
    retaliation claims against Lt. Swain and Officer Ayala is without
    prejudice.      See Wright v. Hollingsworth, 
    260 F.3d 357
    , 359 (5th
    Cir. 2001).      Because we affirm the dismissal of the retaliation
    claims for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, we do not
    reach Lair’s argument that the district court erred in dismissing
    the retaliation claims for failure to state a claim on which relief
    can be granted.     See Sojourner T, 
    974 F.2d at 30
    .
    AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED.
    3