United States v. Jose Saenz , 431 F. App'x 343 ( 2011 )


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  •      Case: 10-20594     Document: 00511527848         Page: 1     Date Filed: 07/01/2011
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT  United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    July 1, 2011
    No. 10-20594
    Summary Calendar                        Lyle W. Cayce
    Clerk
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee
    v.
    JOSE MANUEL HINOJOSA SAENZ, also known as Jose Manuel Hinojosa, also
    known as Jesus Prado, also known as Rosbel Pena Hinojosa, also known as
    Armomndo Garcia Saenz, also known as Jose Hinojosa,
    Defendant-Appellant
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Texas
    USDC No. 4:10-CR-170-1
    Before REAVLEY, DENNIS, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    Jose Manuel Hinojosa Saenz (Saenz) pleaded guilty to a single count of
    illegal presence in the United States after deportation following an aggravated
    felony conviction. Based on a 1987 conviction for possession with intent to
    distribute marijuana, Saenz received an enhancement of 16 offense levels; as a
    result, the applicable guidelines sentencing range was 57 to 71 months of
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not
    be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
    R. 47.5.4.
    Case: 10-20594    Document: 00511527848      Page: 2   Date Filed: 07/01/2011
    No. 10-20594
    imprisonment. Saenz ultimately was sentenced to 70 months of imprisonment.
    On appeal, Saenz argues that both the 16-level enhancement and his 70-month
    sentence were substantively unreasonable.
    We review a sentence for reasonableness in light of the sentencing factors
    in 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a). See United States v. Mares, 
    402 F.3d 511
    , 519-20 (5th
    Cir. 2005). We consider “the substantive reasonableness of the sentence imposed
    under an abuse-of-discretion standard.” Gall v. United States, 
    552 U.S. 38
    , 51
    (2007).     “[A] sentence within a properly calculated Guideline range is
    presumptively reasonable.” United States v. Alonzo, 
    435 F.3d 551
    , 554 (5th Cir.
    2006); Rita v. United States, 
    551 U.S. 338
    , 347 (2007). “The presumption is
    rebutted only upon a showing that the sentence does not account for a factor that
    should receive significant weight, it gives significant weight to an irrelevant or
    improper factor, or it represents a clear error of judgment in balancing
    sentencing factors.” United States v. Cooks, 
    589 F.3d 173
    , 186 (5th Cir. 2009),
    cert. denied 
    130 S. Ct. 1930
     (2010).
    Saenz first argues that the imposition of the 16-level enhancement based
    on his 1987 conviction was unreasonable because he has not committed similar
    or serious crimes since that conviction. However, considering Saenz’s multiple
    criminal convictions since 1987, including one for marijuana possession in 2001
    for which he received a five-year sentence, we conclude that the district court did
    not abuse its discretion by imposing the 16-level enhancement and the 70-month
    sentence.
    To the extent Saenz argues that the U. S. Sentencing Commission has not
    sufficiently justified the 16-level enhancement, we have rejected similar
    arguments and continue to apply the appellate presumption of reasonableness
    to within guidelines sentences, even when the particular Guideline lacks an
    empirical basis. See United States v. Duarte, 
    569 F.3d 528
    , 529-31 (5th Cir.),
    cert. denied, 
    130 S. Ct. 378
     (2009). We also have rejected arguments that the
    lack of a “fast-track” program in a particular district produces unwarranted
    2
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    No. 10-20594
    sentencing disparities. See United States v. Gomez-Herrera, 
    523 F.3d 554
    , 563
    & n.4 (5th Cir. 2008).
    Saenz argues that the 16-level enhancement creates sentencing disparities
    and results in an equal protection issue.        Saenz has not shown that the
    enhancement creates unwarranted sentencing disparities, especially given that
    he received a within-guidelines sentence. See United States v. Willingham, 
    497 F.3d 541
    , 545 (5th Cir. 2007). Likewise, imposition of the enhancement does not
    raise equal protection concerns because it applies to all persons with prior drug
    trafficking convictions who have illegally reentered the United States. See
    United States v. Cardenas-Alvarez, 
    987 F.2d 1129
    , 1134 (5th Cir. 1993).
    Saenz argues that, as a result of the 16-level enhancement, his sentence
    is grossly disproportionate to the crime he committed and that the sentence
    constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.          When evaluating an Eighth
    Amendment challenge, this court makes a threshold comparison between the
    gravity of the charged offense and the severity of the sentence. McGruder v.
    Puckett, 
    954 F.2d 313
    , 316 (5th Cir. 1992). Only if the sentence is grossly
    disproportionate to the offense do we compare the sentence at issue with (1)
    sentences imposed for other crimes in the same jurisdiction and (2) sentences
    imposed for the same crime in other jurisdictions. 
    Id.
     We conclude that Saenz
    has not demonstrated that his 70-month sentence is grossly disproportionate to
    his offense or that it rises to the level of cruel and unusual punishment. See
    Cardenas-Alvarez, 
    987 F.2d at 1134
    .
    Finally, Saenz argues that the district court failed to consider all of the
    § 3553(a) factors when imposing sentence. The district court’s statements at
    sentencing indicate that it considered various § 3553(a) factors, including the
    nature and circumstances of the offense, the history and characteristics of the
    defendant, the need for the sentence to promote respect for the law, and the need
    to afford adequate deterrence. See § 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(A)-(B). The district court
    was not required to “engage in robotic incantations that each statutory factor
    3
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    has been considered.” United States v. Smith, 
    440 F.3d 704
    , 707 (5th Cir. 2006)
    (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
    For the reasons discussed above, we conclude that Saenz has failed to
    rebut the presumption that his within-guidelines sentence of 70 months was
    substantively reasonable. See Alonzo, 
    435 F.3d at 554
    . Therefore, his sentence
    is AFFIRMED.
    4