Bonner v. Gayle ( 2022 )

Case: 22-20105 Document: 00516528224 Page: 1 Date Filed: 10/31/2022
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
October 31, 2022
No. 22-20105
Summary Calendar Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk
Charles Bonner,
Plaintiff—Appellant,
versus
Johnny Ray Gayle, III; Carroll E. Willborn, Jr.; Bryan
Collier, Executive Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice;
Texas Department of Criminal Justice Parole Division,
Defendants—Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
USDC No. 4:21-CV-3855
Before Wiener, Elrod, and Engelhardt, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:*
Plaintiff-Appellant Charles Bonner, a former Texas state prisoner,
proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, appeals the dismissal of his 42
*
Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.
Case: 22-20105 Document: 00516528224 Page: 2 Date Filed: 10/31/2022
No. 22-20105
U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights action and the denial of his Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 59(e) motion. We affirm both rulings.
Bonner first contends that, contrary to the district court’s ruling, Heck
v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486–87 (1994), does not bar him from challenging
his prior convictions and parole because he is no longer in prison and his prior
convictions and parole are void. This court has “routinely characterized a
Heck dismissal as one for failure to state a claim.” Colvin v. LeBlanc, 2 F.4th
494, 496–97 (5th Cir. 2021). Such dismissals are reviewed de novo, accepting
the factual allegations in the complaint as true, viewing the allegations in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff, and liberally construing pro se pleadings.
See id. at 497.
Here, it is unavailing for Bonner to assert that Heck does not apply
because he is no longer imprisoned. See Randell v. Johnson, 227 F.3d 300, 301
(5th Cir. 2000) (holding that a plaintiff’s incarceration status has no bearing
on Heck’s “unequivocal” requirement that the challenged conviction be
overturned or otherwise invalidated). Further, Bonner’s arguments do not
demonstrate that his convictions or the fact or duration of his parole were
reversed, expunged, declared invalid, or called into question by the issuance
of a writ of habeas corpus from a federal court. See Heck, 512 U.S. at 486–87.
Next, Bonner contends that the district court erred in dismissing his
conspiracy claim as time-barred because his cause of action did not accrue
until either he was aware of the errors in state court or when his false
imprisonment ended. We are unconvinced by this argument. Even if
Bonner’s conspiracy claim was not time-barred, it is precluded by Heck. See
Connors v. Graves, 538 F.3d 373, 378 (5th Cir. 2008). Bonner has failed to
show that his convictions or the fact or duration of his parole were reversed,
declared invalid, or called into question. We affirm the district court’s
dismissal of Bonner’s conspiracy claim on these grounds.
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Case: 22-20105 Document: 00516528224 Page: 3 Date Filed: 10/31/2022
No. 22-20105
Finally, Bonner contends that Rule 59(e) relief was warranted because
his state court judgments were void, and Heck thus did not bar his claims. We
review the denial of Bonner’s Rule 59(e) motion for abuse of discretion. See
Advocare Int’l LP v. Horizon Lab’ys, Inc., 524 F.3d 679, 690–91 (5th Cir.
2008). Again, Bonner has not demonstrated that his convictions or the fact
or duration of his parole were reversed, expunged, declared invalid, or called
into question by the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus from a federal court.
See Heck, 512 U.S. at 486–87. The district court therefore did not abuse its
discretion in denying Bonner’s Rule 59(e) motion.
For the foregoing reasons, the rulings of the district court dismissing
Bonner’s § 1983 action and denying his Rule 59(e) motion are AFFIRMED.
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