Meadows v. Odom ( 2006 )

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT August 1, 2006
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 05-30450
SANDY MEADOWS; ET AL.,
Plaintiffs,
SHAMILLE PETERS; BARBARA PEACOCK; KAYODE HOWELL,
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
v.
BOB ODOM; ET AL.,
Defendants,
BOB ODOM; VAN COX; WALTER IMAHARA; RANDY HARRIS; HAROLD
TANI; ROGER MAYES; STEPHEN HOOVER; MATTHEW KEPPINGER; PAUL
COREIL; EMILY STICH; ROB BARRY, III; DONALD KELLY; THOMAS
SPEDALE; RICHARD HEROMAN,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Louisiana
(03-CV-960)
Before JONES, Chief Judge, BARKSDALE, and BENAVIDES, Circuit
Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Appellants Shamille Peters, Barbara Peacock, and Kayode Howell
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, this Court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R.
47.5.4.
filed this suit contending that the State of Louisiana has violated
their constitutional rights by requiring retail florists to submit
to a licensing examination. The exam is administered by Appellees,
members of the Louisiana Horticulture Commission. We, however, do
not reach this substantive legal question. While this suit
progressed through the federal judicial system, an intervening
event, Hurricane Katrina, has changed the Appellants’ circumstances
in relation to their claims. Because of those changed
circumstances, the case is no longer justiciable. The case is
moot.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In Louisiana, state law requires at least one licensed retail
florist at any florist business establishment. See LA. REV. STAT.
§ 3:3808(B)(2). To engage in the profession of retail floristry,
an individual is required to obtain a license for that occupation
or to become engaged with an employer, employee, or supervisor who
has the required license or permit. See LA. REV. STAT.
§§ 3:3804(C),(D), 3:3809. To obtain that required license,
florists must pass an examination consisting of both written and
practical portions. See LA. REV. STAT. § 3:3807(A),(B)(2).
Appellants are applicants who have failed this examination.
Appellants challenge the power of Louisiana to regulate the
florist industry through a suit for equitable relief–both
2
declaratory and injunctive. They argue that the licensing
examination violates the substantive due process, equal protection,
and privileges or immunities clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment
because it is not rationally related to any legitimate governmental
purpose. Appellees filed a motion to dismiss the equal protection
and privileges or immunities claims. Shortly thereafter, the
parties filed cross motions for summary judgment on all of the
claims. The district court granted the motion to dismiss on the
privileges or immunities claim, granted Appellees’ summary judgment
on the remaining two claims, denied Appellants’ summary judgment
motion, and dismissed the action.
II. DISCUSSION
At oral argument on this case, held on May 1, 2006, it came to
the attention of this Court that, due to Hurricane Katrina and its
aftereffects, these Louisianan Appellants may no longer have
justiciable claims.1 To assist this Court in making this mootness
determination, we asked Appellants to submit a letter describing
the current circumstance of each Appellant. On May 11, Appellants
1
“Mootness goes to the heart of our jurisdiction under
Article III of the Constitution. Therefore, we must consider
mootness even if the parties do not raise it, because ‘resolution
of this question is essential if federal courts are to function
within their constitutional spheres of authority.’” Texas Office
of Pub. Util. Counsel v. FCC, 183 F.3d 393, 413 n.16 (5th Cir.
1999) (quoting North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244, 245 (1971)).
3
submitted that letter, giving a description of each individual
Appellant’s current status. Appellant Peters has relocated to
Mississippi and enrolled in a two-year medical program at a local
community college. She “has not made any specific plans” to return
to Louisiana. Appellant Peacock lives in Shreveport, Louisiana,
but she has retired and has “no specific plans to seek full-time
employment as a florist or to open a wedding chapel” (as she
previously had planned). Counsel has been unable to contact
Appellant Howell since the storm and does not have contact
information for her.
Appellants, in their letter, did not argue against mootness.
They only requested that, if this Court found the case moot, the
district court’s decision be vacated and remanded with instructions
to dismiss the case as moot. In response, Appellees, in their May
16 letter, argue that this Court should decide the case to avoid
“waste.” Appellees further contend, without citation, that the
parties have a continuing interest in the matter. Taking into
consideration the updated facts and arguments of the parties, we
turn to the issue of justiciability.
A. The Mootness Doctrine
The United States Constitution, Article III, section 2, clause
1, requires the existence of a case or controversy to support our
jurisdiction. Amar v. Whitley, 100 F.3d 22, 23 (5th Cir. 1996).
The case or controversy doctrine underpins both standing and
4
mootness. Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), 528
U.S. 167, 180 (2000). Mootness is “the doctrine of standing set in
a time frame: The requisite personal interest that must exist at
the commencement of litigation (standing) must continue throughout
its existence (mootness).” United States Parole Comm’n v.
Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 397 (1980). The mootness doctrine “ensures
that the litigant’s interest in the outcome continues to exist
throughout the life of the lawsuit . . . including the pendency of
the appeal.” McCorvey v. Hill, 385 F.3d 846, 848 (5th Cir. 2004).
Here, there is no live case or controversy and mootness
applies. We consider Appellants’ claim for injunctive relief
first. Appellants could not obtain relief through an injunction.
No Appellant has shown that she continues to seek employment as a
florist in Louisiana at this time. Therefore, no Appellant has
shown that she will be attempting to gain licensure from the state
to be in the florist business. Therefore, no Appellant has shown
that she will be prevented from gaining that chosen employment
because of the state’s licensing scheme. In other words, enjoining
Louisiana from administering the exam will not afford relief for
these Appellants. See Honig v. Students of Cal. Sch. for the
Blind, 471 U.S. 148, 149 (1985) (“No order of this Court could
affect the parties’ rights with respect to the injunction we are
called upon to review.”). Accordingly, Appellants’ claim for
injunctive relief is moot.
5
Second, we consider Appellants’ declaratory relief claim.
Meltzer v. Bd. of Pub. Instruction, 548 F.2d 559, 568 (5th Cir.
1977) (“[Because] appellants have asked for both declaratory and
injunctive relief . . . , we have the ‘duty to decide the
appropriateness and the merits of the declaratory request
irrespective of its conclusion as to the propriety of the issuance
of the injunction.’”) (quoting Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 254
(1967)). To determine whether the declaratory relief claim is
moot, we examine whether Appellants’ claim falls within a mootness
exception. The only possibly applicable exception for this case is
the “capable of repetition, yet evading review” exception. S. Pac.
Terminal v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 219 U.S. 498, 515 (1911).
Under this exception, “[a]lthough a case may be technically moot,
a federal court may nevertheless retain jurisdiction if a
continuing controversy exists or if the challenged problem is
likely to recur or is otherwise capable of repetition.” Vieux
Carre Prop. Owners v. Brown, 948 F.2d 1436, 1447 (5th Cir. 1991).
B. The “Capable of Repetition, yet Evading Review” Exception
Generally, the capable of repetition doctrine applies only in
“exceptional” situations where two circumstances simultaneously are
present: “(1) the challenged action [is] in its duration too short
to be fully litigated prior to cessation or expiration, and (2)
there [is] a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party
[will] be subject to the same action again.” Spencer v. Kemna, 523
6
U.S. 1, 17 (1998) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
As to the second element, Appellants have not shown a “reasonable
expectation” or a “demonstrated probability” that they will reenter
the florist business or retake the exam. See Oliver v. Scott, 276
F.3d 736, 741 (5th Cir. 2002). Appellants are retired, no longer
residing in the state, or of unknown whereabouts. They have no
current plans to apply for a florist license in Louisiana once
again. Thus, as to these particular Appellants, the allegedly
wrongful behavior by the state reasonably could not be expected to
recur. Yet, even if they demonstrated this reasonable expectation
of repeated state action, Appellants also fail to meet the other
requirement of the test.
The underlying event or condition is not of such short
duration that Appellants would be unable to obtain relief from
state action through litigation. We follow the Supreme Court’s
ruling in Super Tire Engineering Co. v. McCorkle, which examined
the capable of repetition, yet evading review doctrine as it
applies to declaratory actions. 416 U.S. 115 (1974). In that
case, the Supreme Court held that, where the exception applies, the
circumstances that gave rise to the injury no longer exist at some
point during litigation. See id. at 125–26. In other words, the
causal factor necessarily disappears. For example, in Super Tire,
the Supreme Court was reviewing the mootness of an employer’s
attack on a New Jersey statute that allowed striking workers to
7
obtain welfare benefits. Id. at 116. Before the case was
resolved, the strike ended. Id. Comparing the facts in Super Tire
to such cases as Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 166 (1973), and to
cases involving state election laws, the Court stated that
“[e]conomic strikes are of comparatively short duration.” Super
Tire, 416 U.S. at 126. The Court concluded that a strike’s
termination “like pregnancy at nine months and elections spaced at
year-long or biennial intervals, should not preclude challenge to
state policies that have had their impact and that continue in
force, unabated and unreviewed. The judiciary must not close the
door to the resolution of the important questions these concrete
disputes present.” Id. at 126–27.
In cases involving strikes, pregnancies, or elections, the
causal event or condition will terminate and preclude a challenge,
unless it is cured by the exception. Here, there is no underlying
event or condition that will cease before there can be judicial
intervention. The only thing that has changed in the instant case
is the desire of Appellants to seek employment as a florist in
Louisiana. That desire may have been dampened or changed because
of the uncontrollable aftereffects of a natural disaster, but each
Appellant has made her choice to no longer pursue a florist
license. Louisiana’s licensing requirement would apply to
Appellants in the same manner now as it did when they initiated the
challenge if they had not abandoned their pursuit of a career in
8
retail floristry. This is a highly different situation than that
presented in Super Tire. Therefore, the exception articulated in
Super Tire does not apply to the facts presented in the instant
case. In sum, Appellants fail to meet the mootness exception
applicable to cases capable of repetition, yet evading review.
C. Judicial Economy
Appellees, however, argue that the case should not be deemed
moot because “[t]o abandon the case at an advanced stage may prove
more wasteful than frugal.” Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at191–92. The Supreme Court, however, also limited that sentiment in
light of the constitutional limits of federal courts: “This
argument from sunk costs does not license courts to retain
jurisdiction over cases in which one or both of the parties plainly
lack a continuing interest . . . .” Id. at 192. As discussed
above, Appellants do not have a continuing interest in the
litigation. Therefore, sunk judicial costs are not a relevant
concern.
III. CONCLUSION
We deeply sympathize with Appellants for the disruption of
their lives caused by Hurricane Katrina. However, sympathy cannot
remedy the fatal infirmity of their case. Because this case is
moot, we vacate the district court’s ruling and direct the district
court to dismiss the action. See United States v. Munsingwear, 340
9
U.S. 36, 39 (1950) (“The established practice of the Court in
dealing with a civil case from a court in the federal system which
has become moot while on its way here or pending our decision on
the merits is to reverse or vacate the judgment below and remand
with a direction to dismiss.”); see also Harris v. City of Houston,
151 F.3d 186 (5th Cir. 1998) (vacating the district court’s
judgment on the basis of mootness and remanding the case with
instructions to dismiss as moot).
10