United States v. Jason ( 2006 )

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
October 25, 2006
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 05-30971
Summary Calendar
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
MONIQUE JASON,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Louisiana
(04-CR-248)
Before DAVIS, BARKSDALE, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Monique Jason challenges the district court’s denial of her
motion to suppress evidence discovered pursuant to a postal
inspector’s consensual search of her vehicle. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Between November, 2003, and March, 2004, multiple customers
*
Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
complained to the United States Postal Service that gift cards
routed through New Orleans’ main office, where Monique Jason
worked, had been stolen. After discovering that one of the missing
gift cards had been used in conjunction with Ms. Jason’s bank card,
a postal inspector placed four test letters, containing gift cards
and cash, in a tray with other first class mail for Ms. Jason to
process.
The postal inspectors, observing and videotaping Ms. Jason
from a surveillance position, watched Ms. Jason remove the four
brightly colored test letters and an additional letter from the
tray, and exit the mail room toward the loading dock. Shortly
thereafter, an inspector saw Ms. Jason discard the letters, torn
open and without the cash and gift cards, in a dock trash can.
The postal inspectors placed Ms. Jason under arrest and
removed her to an office in an adjacent building. Ms. Jason
consented to a search of her purse, and inspectors recovered the
bank card that had been used in conjunction with the missing gift
cards. The inspector also asked Ms. Jason for permission to search
her automobile, parked in a nearby lot, “for any evidence of stolen
mail matter.” She signed a consent form that explicitly authorized
agents to search her car for “any letters, papers, materials, or
other property, which is contraband or evidence and any mail
matter.” Ms. Jason wrote the words “any mail matter” on the form
in her own handwriting.
During the search of the vehicle, which Ms. Jason watched
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without objection, the inspector noticed a Wal-Mart receipt in the
trunk. He noticed that the purchase had been made using multiple
gift cards, and recognized the receipt as potential evidence
related to the mail theft. After seizing the receipt, the
inspector traced the gift cards indicated on the receipt to the
original purchasers, and learned that the cards had been mailed
locally and processed through the main office where Ms. Jason
worked, but had never been received by the intended recipients.
The district court denied Ms. Jason’s motion to suppress the
receipt and a jury convicted her on multiple counts of possessing
stolen mail matter and unlawful delay of mail.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Whether the inspectors exceeded the scope of consent during
their search of Ms. Jason’s automobile is a question of law.
United States v. Mendoza-Gonzalez, 318 F.3d 663, 666 (5th Cir.
2003). We review a district court’s conclusions of law de novo.
United States v. Mendez, 431 F.3d 420, 425 (5th Cir. 2005).
III. DISCUSSION
Ms. Jason argues that postal inspectors exceeded the scope of
the consent she gave to search her vehicle when they read a Wal-
Mart receipt found in the trunk. Additionally, she argues that the
inspectors exceeded the scope of the plain view doctrine by moving
the receipt closer in order to read it.
When reviewing a consensual search, we consider (1) whether
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the consent was voluntarily given, and (2) whether the search was
within the scope of the consent granted. See United States v.
Rich, 992 F.2d 502, 505 (5th Cir. 1993). Given that Ms. Jason
previously stipulated that she gave consent voluntarily, we must
consider only whether the inspectors exceeded the scope of that
consent.
The scope of a consensual search is limited to the scope of
the consent granted. See Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251
(1991). Ms. Jason argues that the scope of her consent limited the
vehicle search to “stolen mail matter,” particularly mail items
stolen immediately before her arrest. She bases this argument on
her subjective belief that the inspectors were not looking for
other incriminating evidence. However, “[t]he question [of scope]
is not to be determined on the basis of the subjective intentions
of the consenting party or the subjective interpretation of the
searching officer.” Mendoza-Gonzalez, 318 F.3d at 667 (citation
omitted).
“Under the Fourth Amendment, ‘[t]he standard for measuring the
scope of a suspect’s consent . . . is that of ‘objective’
reasonableness — what would the typical reasonable person have
understood by the exchange between the officer and the suspect?”
Id. at 667 (citing Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 251). “Although objective
reasonableness is a question of law, the factual circumstances are
highly relevant when determining what the reasonable person would
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have believed to be the outer bounds of the consent that was
given.” Id. (citation omitted).
The postal inspector testified that he told Ms. Jason that he
was going to search “for any evidence of stolen mail matter.” The
consent form, which was read and explained to Ms. Jason, and which
she helped complete and signed, unambiguously authorized inspectors
to seize “any letters, papers, materials, or other property, which
is contraband or evidence . . . .” The form did not limit the
search to any specific object.
Given that the postal inspector had probable cause at the time
of the search to believe that Ms. Jason had stolen gift cards from
the mail and redeemed them at retail stores, a store receipt was
reasonably related to stolen mail. It certainly fell within the
description of “evidence” on the consent form that Ms. Jason
signed.1
Given that the inspectors did not exceed the scope of consent,
we need not reach Ms. Jason’s plain view argument.
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court.
1
Further, “the defendant, as the individual ‘knowing the
contents of the vehicle,’ has the ‘responsibility to limit the
scope of the consent.’” Id. (quoting United States v. McSween, 53
F.3d 684, 688 (5th Cir. 1995)(citations omitted)).
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