United States v. Randolph ( 2022 )

Case: 21-50809 Document: 00516359871 Page: 1 Date Filed: 06/16/2022
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
June 16, 2022
No. 21-50809
Lyle W. Cayce
Summary Calendar Clerk
United States of America,
Plaintiff—Appellee,
versus
Danielle Elyce Randolph,
Defendant—Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas
USDC No. 7:21-CR-68-1
Before Jolly, Willett, and Engelhardt, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:*
Danielle Elyce Randolph pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm by
a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). On appeal, she
challenges the procedural and substantive reasonableness of a special
condition of supervised release allowing searches of her person and property.
*
Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.
Case: 21-50809 Document: 00516359871 Page: 2 Date Filed: 06/16/2022
No. 21-50809
Because the search condition at issue was set out in the presentence
report (PSR) and referenced at sentencing, but Randolph did not object, we
review for plain error. See United States v. Dean, 940 F.3d 888, 890-91 (5th
Cir. 2019). To show plain error, Randolph must show (1) an error (2) that is
clear or obvious and (3) that affected her substantial rights. See Puckett
v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009). If she makes such a showing, this
court has the discretion to correct the error but only if it seriously affects the
fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Id.Randolph first argues that the district court procedurally erred by
failing to explain why it imposed this condition. A district court abuses its
discretion by not explaining how a special condition is reasonably related to
the relevant statutory factors. See United States v. Salazar, 743 F.3d 445, 451
(5th Cir. 2014). If a district court fails to set forth its reasons for imposing a
special condition, “a court of appeals may nevertheless affirm . . . where the
district court’s reasoning can be inferred after an examination of the record.”
United States v. Caravayo, 809 F.3d 269, 275 (5th Cir. 2015) (internal
quotation marks, brackets, and citation omitted).
Because neither the district court nor the PSR provided reasons, we
must determine if we can infer the district court’s reasoning. See Caravayo,
809 F.3d at 275. The PSR indicated that Randolph has an extensive criminal
record, including two convictions for theft, five convictions for drug
possession, one conviction for aiding and abetting possession with intent to
distribute crack cocaine, and one conviction for assault. In addition, at the
time she committed the instant offense, Randolph was on supervised release.
Thus, we infer that the district court found that the search condition would
be a “mechanism for enforcing other conditions prohibiting [Randolph’s]
possession of drugs or firearms by facilitating the detection of evidence of
other supervised release violations.” Dean, 940 F.3d at 891. In addition, in
light of her criminal history and her previous violations of the terms of her
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Case: 21-50809 Document: 00516359871 Page: 3 Date Filed: 06/16/2022
No. 21-50809
supervised release, Randolph has not shown an effect on her substantial
rights because she has not shown that an explanation would have changed the
sentence imposed. See id.
Randolph also argues this search condition is substantively
unreasonable because the need for it was not supported by the evidence, it is
overbroad, and it is a greater-than-necessary deprivation of her right to be
free from unreasonable searches. A district court may impose any condition
of supervision that it deems appropriate as long as the condition is reasonably
related to at least one of the relevant statutory factors. See United States
v. Weatherton, 567 F.3d 149, 153 (5th Cir. 2009); 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(1);
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), (2)(B)-(D). The condition also “must be narrowly
tailored such that it does not involve a greater deprivation of liberty than is
reasonably necessary to fulfill the purposes set forth in . . . § 3553(a).” United
States v. Scott, 821 F.3d 562, 570 (5th Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted); see § 3583(d)(2).
Again, because Randolph has an extensive criminal record, and she
previously violated the terms of her supervised release, we conclude that the
need for this search condition is supported by the record and it is not
overbroad. See Dean, 940 F.3d at 891. We also have previously concluded
that this condition is narrowly tailored because it contains limitations on a
probation officer’s authority to conduct searches. See id. at 892. In light of
Randolph’s criminal history, the “possibility of intermittent searches is not
too much of a burden on [her] already reduced liberty interest.” Id. (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted).
For the reasons discussed above, Randolph has not shown that the
district court plainly erred by imposing this search condition. Therefore, the
judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
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