United States v. Johnson ( 2022 )


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  • Case: 21-10454     Document: 00516340106          Page: 1    Date Filed: 06/01/2022
    United States Court of Appeals
    for the Fifth Circuit                            United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    June 1, 2022
    No. 21-10454
    Lyle W. Cayce
    Clerk
    United States of America,
    Plaintiff—Appellee,
    versus
    Michael Todd Johnson,
    Defendant—Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Texas
    USDC No. 4:20-CR-339-9
    Before Jolly, Elrod, and Haynes, Circuit Judges.
    Per Curiam:*
    Defendant-Appellant Michael Todd Johnson pleaded guilty to
    conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute fifty grams or more of
    methamphetamine.        The district court sentenced Johnson to an
    imprisonment term of 261 months. On appeal, Johnson contends that the
    district court erred in (1) determining that he was a manager or supervisor in
    *
    Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this
    opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
    circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.
    Case: 21-10454     Document: 00516340106              Page: 2   Date Filed: 06/01/2022
    No. 21-10454
    the conspiracy; (2) including cash found on Johnson’s person in the drug
    calculation; and (3) imposing an unreasonable sentence. For the reasons
    given below, we AFFIRM.
    I.     Background
    The presentence report (“PSR”) sets forth the following salient facts.
    In 2020, the Drug Enforcement Administration began an investigation into
    methamphetamine distribution in the Dallas-Fort Worth area by a drug
    trafficking   organization.          The     organization    head    distributed
    methamphetamine to a dealer named Derrick Fannin, who in turn distributed
    it to Johnson, who then       sold the methamphetamine to individuals in
    Midland, Texas. On one occasion, a woman named “Pam” picked up drugs
    for Johnson, and on another occasion, a man named Nathan Cook picked up
    drugs on Johnson’s behalf.
    In 2020, Johnson met with several other individuals to execute a deal.
    While driving, Johnson and the others were stopped by officers, who
    searched the vehicle and found a large amount of methamphetamine. The
    officers arrested Johnson and discovered cash in the amount of $2,838 in his
    pocket. Johnson claimed that he intended to use the cash to purchase a truck
    from one of the other individuals.
    After this arrest, Johnson pleaded guilty to conspiring to possess with
    intent to distribute a controlled substance. At sentencing, the district court
    relied on several conclusions articulated in the PSR.           First, the PSR
    concluded that Johnson was a manager or supervisor in the conspiracy. The
    PSR cited the two occasions when other individuals, Pam and Cook, picked
    up drugs on Johnson’s behalf. It accordingly recommended a three-level
    enhancement.
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    No. 21-10454
    Second, because the PSR concluded that the money the officers found
    in Johnson’s pocket was drug proceeds, the cash was converted into a
    quantity of actual methamphetamine.           This calculation made Johnson
    accountable for 1,472 grams of actual methamphetamine and six kilograms of
    a methamphetamine mixture—amounting to 41,433 kilograms in converted
    drug weight. Johnson thus earned a base offense level of 36.
    Johnson objected to both conclusions. The district court conducted a
    sentencing hearing, during which it overruled Johnson’s objections and
    adopted the PSR’s findings, which included a Guidelines range of 262–327
    months. The court heard testimony about Johnson’s prior criminal record
    and rehabilitative efforts. After consideration of the 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a)
    factors, the court decided to issue a downward variance by treating the
    methamphetamine as plain rather than actual, lowering the offense level by
    two points. As a result, the district court considered a “more reasonable
    guideline range of 210 to 262 months” and sentenced Johnson to 261 months
    of imprisonment. Johnson timely appealed.
    II.      Discussion
    Johnson maintains that the district court erred in (1) applying the
    manager or supervisor enhancement; (2) converting the $2,838 in cash into
    methamphetamine when calculating the total drug weight; and (3) imposing
    an unreasonable sentence. We address each argument in turn.
    A.     Manager/Supervisor Enhancement
    Whether a defendant exercised an aggravating role as a manager or
    supervisor for purposes of an adjustment under § 3B1.1 of the Sentencing
    Guidelines is a fact finding reviewed for clear error. United States v. Zuniga–
    Peralta, 
    442 F.3d 345
    , 347 (5th Cir. 2006). “A factual finding is not clearly
    erroneous if it is plausible in light of the record read as a whole.” United
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    No. 21-10454
    States v. Akins, 
    746 F.3d 590
    , 609 (5th Cir. 2014) (quotation omitted). In
    making such factual determinations, the district court may base its findings
    on “any information that has ‘sufficient indicia of reliability to support its
    probable accuracy.’” United States v. Valdez, 
    453 F.3d 252
    , 267 (5th Cir.
    2006) (quotation omitted). A PSR generally bears sufficient indicia of
    reliability for this purpose. See United States v. Harris, 
    702 F.3d 226
    , 230 (5th
    Cir. 2012) (per curiam).
    The Sentencing Guidelines permit a district court to increase a
    defendant’s offense level if he played an aggravating role in the offense at
    issue. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1. Relevant here, a court may impose a three-level
    enhancement if the defendant “was a manager or supervisor” and the
    “criminal activity involved five or more participants or was otherwise
    extensive.” Id. § 3B1.1(b).
    Johnson does not dispute that the criminal activity here was
    “extensive.” So, the only issue is whether the PSR supported a finding that
    Johnson was a “manager or supervisor.” The Guidelines themselves do not
    define “manager” or “supervisor.” However, we have upheld sentence
    enhancements where the defendant “exercised control over another
    participant in the offense” or “exercised management responsibility over the
    property, assets, or activities of a criminal organization.” See, e.g., United
    States v. Delgado, 
    672 F.3d 320
    , 345 (5th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (emphasis
    added) (quotation omitted).
    Applying this precedent, we conclude it was not clear error for the
    district court to conclude that Johnson was a “manager or supervisor.” First,
    the PSR supported a finding that Johnson exercised control over other
    participants in the criminal organization, namely Cook and Pam. According
    to the PSR, Cook worked as a courier for Johnson on at least one occasion
    and also met with Fannin to collect methamphetamine to deliver to Waco.
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    Indeed, Johnson confirmed in his interview with the DEA that Cook had
    picked up drugs for him. The PSR also indicated that Johnson directed Pam
    to pick up methamphetamine on his behalf on at least one occasion. As such,
    it’s clear that Johnson, at some point, exercised control over other
    participants in the criminal organization.      See Akins, 746 F.3d at 610
    (affirming application of § 3B1.1 enhancement where the defendant exercised
    authority over another individual by instructing him on “how much” to
    procure and “what to do with the drugs”).
    Second, according to the PSR, Johnson purchased drugs from Fannin,
    then sold those drugs to individuals in Midland. Thus, it was plausible to
    conclude that Johnson exercised control over the organization’s drug supply
    to some extent. See United States v. Hernandez, 451 F. App’x 402, 404 (5th
    Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (affirming application of § 3B1.1 enhancement where
    defendant exercised responsibility “over the drugs and drug proceeds”).
    To sum up: the facts as established in the PSR give rise to a plausible
    conclusion that Johnson acted in a managerial capacity, and therefore, we
    cannot conclude that the district court clearly erred in applying the three-
    level enhancement.
    B.     Drug Quantity Determination
    The district court’s drug quantity determinations are factual findings
    that we review for clear error. United States v. Betancourt, 
    422 F.3d 240
    , 246
    (5th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). Johnson argues that the district court
    clearly erred by converting the $2,838 in cash into a quantity of
    methamphetamine because there was no indication that he intended to
    purchase methamphetamine with the cash. However, we need not decide
    this question because even assuming arguendo that it was implausible for the
    court to find that the cash was drug proceeds, any such error was harmless.
    An error is harmless if “the proponent of the sentence proffer[s] sufficient
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    evidence to convince the appellate court that the district court would have
    imposed the same sentence, absent the error.” United States v. Ibarra-Luna,
    
    628 F.3d 712
    , 718 (5th Cir. 2010) (alteration in original) (internal quotation
    marks and citation omitted). In this context, we will not reverse if the base
    offense level would remain the same if the district court accepted Johnson’s
    improper cash conversion argument. See United States v. Oti, 
    872 F.3d 678
    ,
    700 (5th Cir. 2017).
    Such is the case here. The PSR’s calculation of the converted drug
    weight placed Johnson in the 30,000-to-90,000-kilogram range. 1 Thus, in
    order to have any effect on Johnson’s base offense level, the converted cash
    would have had to lower the drug weight significantly enough to place
    Johnson below that range. However, even excluding the converted cash,
    Johnson would still surpass the 30,000-kilogram threshold. Because Johnson
    would still land in the same baseline range, any error by the district court was
    harmless.
    C.      Substantively Unreasonable Sentence
    Finally, since we have concluded that the sentence was procedurally
    reasonable, we address Johnson’s argument that his sentence was
    substantively unreasonable. See United States v. Diehl, 
    775 F.3d 714
    , 722-23
    (5th Cir. 2015) (explaining that the reasonableness of a sentence is bifurcated
    1
    The PSR associated Johnson’s offense with 1,471.64 grams of actual
    methamphetamine and six kilograms of a methamphetamine mixture. In converted drug
    weight, this amounted to 41,432.8 kilograms of methamphetamine. This amount places
    Johnson’s offense within the 30,000-to-90,000-kilogram range, for a base offense level of
    36.
    The court converted the cash into 320 grams of methamphetamine, for a total drug
    weight of 6,398 kilograms. Even subtracting the 6,398 kilograms of converted drug weight,
    Johnson’s offense would fall to 35,034 kilograms; still within the 30,000-to-90,000-
    kilogram range.
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    into assessing procedural error and then assessing the substantive
    reasonableness for abuse of discretion). Per Johnson, his sentence was
    substantively unreasonable because the district court failed to adequately
    account for his efforts at rehabilitation.
    “We presume sentences within or below the calculated guidelines
    range are reasonable.” United States v. Simpson, 
    796 F.3d 548
    , 557 (5th Cir.
    2015). We conclude that Johnson did not rebut that presumption. The
    district court heard from counsel about Johnson’s rehabilitative efforts and
    also considered Johnson’s criminal history. On balance, it concluded that the
    sentence of 261 months was sufficient but not greater than necessary to
    comply with § 3553(a). We will not reweigh the district court’s calculus of
    the relevant factors. Instead, we conclude that the court did not abuse its
    discretion.
    AFFIRMED.
    7
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 21-10454

Filed Date: 6/1/2022

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 6/2/2022