United States v. Elizar Madrid , 676 F. App'x 309 ( 2017 )


Menu:
  •      Case: 15-51146      Document: 00513849639         Page: 1    Date Filed: 01/25/2017
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    No. 15-51146                                FILED
    January 25, 2017
    Lyle W. Cayce
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                                                         Clerk
    Plaintiff - Appellee
    v.
    ELIZAR SAUCEDO MADRID; PEDRO SAUCEDO MADRID,
    Defendants - Appellants
    Appeals from the United States District Court
    for the Western District of Texas
    USDC No. 7:15-CR-122-2
    Before HIGGINBOTHAM, JONES, and HAYNES, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    A jury convicted two brothers of conspiring to possess controlled
    substances with intent to distribute, possessing firearms in furtherance of that
    drug crime, and felon in possession of a firearm. They challenge the sufficiency
    of the government’s evidence, and one additionally argues that the government
    violated its Brady duty. Because we find the evidence sufficient to support the
    convictions and the Brady argument without merit, we affirm.
    * Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not
    be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH
    CIR. R. 47.5.4.
    Case: 15-51146     Document: 00513849639     Page: 2   Date Filed: 01/25/2017
    No. 15-51146
    I.
    Pedro Saucedo Madrid, Elizar Saucedo Madrid, and Albert Prieto, Jr.,
    were indicted for conspiracy to possess controlled substances with intent to
    distribute. The Madrids were further indicted for possession of firearms in
    furtherance of that drug crime and felon in possession of a firearm. Prieto pled
    guilty and testified against the Madrids, hoping for sentencing leniency. The
    charges against the Madrids went to trial. The government’s trial evidence
    showed as follows:
    Before the events of this case, Prieto had been arrested for drug
    possession. As a result, he briefly acted as an informant for Homeland Security.
    The investigation into the Madrids began when Prieto was caught with drugs
    again and informed Homeland Security that he had gotten the drugs from the
    Madrid brothers. That tip led investigators to the defendants, eventually
    resulting in their arrest and trial.
    Pedro and Elizar Madrid were brothers who went by the names “Kiko”
    and “Chiquito,” respectively. They lived together at a trailer park on Big Valley
    Road in Odessa, Texas. Prieto testified that he initially met the defendants
    through Facebook, where he reached out to them seeking to act as their dealer.
    Elizar Madrid asked if Prieto “wanted to work,” which Prieto interpreted as
    asking whether he wanted to sell drugs. The government offered Facebook
    records reflecting this conversation. After that, Prieto would go to the Madrids’
    Big Valley trailer park approximately every other day to get meth from the
    defendants. Though Prieto himself was a heavy meth user, he primarily
    “distribute[d]” the meth that he bought throughout Pecos, Texas. He would
    purchase the meth from the defendants on a “front,” meaning that he would
    take the drugs without paying, then repay the defendants with the proceeds of
    his subsequent sales. When he would repay the front, he would give the money
    either to Pedro or Elizar Madrid. He started out buying only quarter ounces,
    2
    Case: 15-51146      Document: 00513849639        Page: 3     Date Filed: 01/25/2017
    No. 15-51146
    but later began to buy full ounces at a time—a distribution amount according
    to the government’s witness DEA Agent Hutchison.
    Prieto testified that when he would go to the Big Valley property, Elizar
    Madrid had guns with him “[m]ostly all the time,” and Pedro Madrid had a gun
    “24/7.” He described specific guns that each defendant carried. The defendants
    typically stashed their weapons under the bed in “trailer 3” of the Big Valley
    property, 1 the trailer out of which they always fronted meth to Prieto. Both
    Madrids had pictures on Facebook of themselves brandishing semiautomatic
    handguns, an assault rifle, and a shotgun. A search of the Big Valley property
    turned up a semiautomatic handgun and an assault rifle in trailer 3, and
    distribution amounts of cocaine, heroin, and meth in a nearby shed. When
    Pedro Madrid was arrested, he was a passenger in a vehicle where officers
    found three handguns and a sawed-off shotgun.
    The defendants were tried together, and the jury convicted them both on
    all counts. All issues on appeal were preserved in the district court. They timely
    appealed.
    II.
    We begin with Elizar Madrid’s contention that his convictions should be
    overturned because the government withheld exculpatory evidence from him.
    Under the rule established by Brady v. Maryland, 2 prosecutors have a
    constitutional duty to disclose exculpatory and impeachment evidence to
    criminal defendants even absent a request. 3 There are three elements of a
    Brady violation: “The evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either
    because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; that evidence must have
    1Here, we adopt the numbered labels of each trailer on the government’s exhibit 6, a
    diagram of the defendants’ trailer park.
    2 
    373 U.S. 83
    (1963).
    3 Strickler v. Greene, 
    527 U.S. 263
    , 280 (1999).
    3
    Case: 15-51146      Document: 00513849639         Page: 4    Date Filed: 01/25/2017
    No. 15-51146
    been suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and prejudice
    must have ensued.” 4 This court reviews alleged Brady violations de novo. 5
    The Brady violation that Madrid alleges was the government’s late
    disclosure of the fact that Prieto, the government’s key witness, had previously
    been arrested for possession of meth and cooperated with Homeland Security
    as a confidential informant as a result. Defense counsel learned this
    information on the first morning of trial during HSI Agent Carl’s testimony.
    Madrid used the information during his cross-examination of Prieto and
    closing argument. The government acknowledges that its late disclosure of this
    information was “suppression” of impeachment evidence within the meaning
    of the first two Brady elements. However, it argues that Madrid was not
    prejudiced at trial because it promptly corrected its oversight. Madrid contends
    that he was prejudiced by the late disclosure because he may have planned his
    trial strategy differently and may have used the information in his opening
    statement.
    We find that the government’s late disclosure of the impeachment
    evidence did not prejudice Madrid. Madrid “received the material in time to
    put it to effective use at trial” 6 by cross-examining Prieto about the prior arrest
    and cooperation with Homeland Security and then using the information in his
    closing argument. We are not persuaded that counsel would have done
    anything differently if the information were disclosed earlier; Madrid deferred
    his opening statement at the beginning of trial, then waived opening altogether
    at the start of his case-in-chief (when he had the information). It is not clear
    that he would have chosen to present an opening statement if he had the
    information prior to trial or that doing so would have been helpful to him. This
    4 
    Id. at 281-82.
          5 United States v. Edwards, 
    442 F.3d 258
    , 264 (5th Cir. 2006).
    6 United States v. McKinney, 
    758 F.2d 1036
    , 1050 (5th Cir. 1985).
    4
    Case: 15-51146      Document: 00513849639        Page: 5     Date Filed: 01/25/2017
    No. 15-51146
    demonstrates that Madrid suffered no prejudice as a result of the government’s
    late disclosure. Therefore, we reject Elizar Madrid’s Brady argument.
    III.
    We turn to the defendants’ challenges to the sufficiency of the
    government’s trial evidence. Both defendants challenge their convictions for
    conspiracy to possess controlled substances with intent to distribute and
    possession of firearms in furtherance of that drug crime. Pedro Madrid alone
    challenges his conviction for felon in possession of a firearm.
    This court reviews the denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal de
    novo. 7 If the evidence presented at trial, viewed in the light most favorable to
    the government, was sufficient to allow a reasonable jury to find all of the
    essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then the conviction must be
    affirmed. 8
    A.
    Both defendants argue that the government presented insufficient
    evidence to support their convictions for conspiracy to possess controlled
    substances with intent to distribute. To prove conspiracy to possess with intent
    to distribute, the government must establish three elements: “(1) the existence
    of an agreement between two or more persons to violate narcotics laws, (2)
    knowledge of the conspiracy and intent to join it, and (3) voluntary
    participation in the conspiracy.” 9
    Both defendants devote their entire argument to negating a conspiracy
    with Prieto, who was initially their co-defendant, but testified against them
    hoping for leniency. They ignore that the jury could have found them to have
    7United States v. Olguin, 
    643 F.3d 384
    , 393 (5th Cir. 2011).
    8United States v. Romans, 
    823 F.3d 299
    , 311 (5th Cir. 2016).
    9 United States v. Nieto, 
    721 F.3d 357
    , 367 (5th Cir. 2013) (quoting United States v.
    Turner, 
    319 F.3d 716
    , 721 (5th Cir. 2003)).
    5
    Case: 15-51146       Document: 00513849639         Page: 6     Date Filed: 01/25/2017
    No. 15-51146
    conspired with each other, a conclusion that would support a guilty finding, as
    the government notes. The evidence supports that conclusion: the defendants
    are brothers who worked together, routinely selling jointly from the same
    location. Tools associated with drug distribution were found in Pedro Madrid’s
    truck at the time of his arrest. Elizar Madrid continued to try to distribute
    drugs after his brother was arrested. That the jury could have rationally found
    them to have conspired with each other is an independent reason to reject both
    of their sufficiency challenges to this conviction.
    Even so, their argument that they did not conspire with Prieto fails as
    well. Both defendants contend that a mere buyer–seller relationship is
    insufficient to establish conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute, and
    they are correct. 10 However, the government’s evidence here showed that both
    defendants had more than a mere buyer–seller relationship with Prieto; they
    had a supplier–dealer relationship. Prieto described himself as a “drug-dealer.”
    Though he was a user himself, he would buy meth from the defendants on a
    “front,” resell it, then repay the defendants the proceeds. The first contact that
    Prieto ever had with the defendants was a Facebook message in which Prieto
    said that he needed to make money and meth was selling well. When Prieto
    would get meth from the defendants, he would get it in ounce quantities, which
    is a distribution amount. Prieto would resell the meth in Pecos, Texas. After a
    search of Prieto’s car resulted in the confiscation of an ounce of meth, Pedro
    Madrid went to Prieto’s home with a gun and demanded payment for that
    ounce. This court has found the fronting of drugs to establish more than a
    buyer–seller relationship. 11 Moreover, the fact that Prieto purchased from the
    10 United States v. Maseratti, 
    1 F.3d 330
    , 336 (5th Cir. 1993) (“[A] buyer-seller
    relationship, without more, will not prove a conspiracy.” (citing United States v. Hughes, 
    817 F.2d 268
    , 273 (5th Cir. 1987))).
    11 United States v. Thomas, 
    690 F.3d 358
    , 367 (5th Cir. 2012).
    6
    Case: 15-51146         Document: 00513849639          Page: 7       Date Filed: 01/25/2017
    No. 15-51146
    defendants every other day surely put the defendants on notice that Prieto was
    doing more than using the drugs personally.
    All of their stray arguments fail as well. Elizar Madrid points out that
    Prieto was an unreliable witness because he was a drug user and was dishonest
    with investigators. But this court does not weigh evidence or credibility on
    sufficiency review. 12 Arguments about what investigators did incorrectly or
    could have done better miss the point because they do not negate the evidence
    that the jury heard from which it could have inferred an agreement to possess
    with intent to distribute. The alternate narrative that Elizar Madrid advances
    in his brief: that his relationship with Prieto was limited to selling him chrome
    rims, was rejected by the jury by its guilty finding. Remaining arguments, such
    as the possibility that Prieto planted the drugs recovered in the search, are
    speculative.
    In sum, sufficient evidence supports both defendants’ convictions for
    conspiracy to possess controlled substances with intent to distribute.
    B.
    Both defendants also challenge their convictions for possessing firearms
    in furtherance of a drug crime. These charges are predicated on the drug crime
    discussed above: conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute. Both
    defendants’ only argument on this point is that if we reverse their convictions
    for the underlying drug crime, we must also reverse their convictions for
    possessing firearms in furtherance of it. Perhaps, but for the reasons discussed,
    we reject the defendants’ challenge to the underlying drug crime, so we reject
    this challenge as well.
    12   United States v. Tovar, 
    719 F.3d 376
    , 388 (5th Cir. 2013).
    7
    Case: 15-51146       Document: 00513849639          Page: 8     Date Filed: 01/25/2017
    No. 15-51146
    C.
    Finally, Pedro Madrid contends that the government presented
    insufficient evidence to support either of his convictions for felon in possession
    of a firearm. Madrid was charged with two counts of this crime: Count Five for
    December 5th and Count Seven for February 7th.
    To establish felon in possession of a firearm, the government must show
    “(1) that the defendant previously had been convicted of a felony; (2) that he
    possessed a firearm; and (3) that the firearm traveled in or affected interstate
    commerce.” 13 For both counts, Madrid does not dispute the convicted-felon or
    interstate-commerce elements, but disputes that he possessed the charged
    firearms. “[P]ossession can be established by (1) actual, physical possession of
    the firearm, (2) sole control and occupancy of a place where a firearm is found,
    or (3) joint occupancy of a place where a firearm is found, combined with some
    evidence of the defendant's access to and knowledge of the firearm.” 14 When a
    single count in an indictment charges possession of multiple firearms, the
    evidence need only be sufficient as to possession of one of the firearms charged
    to sustain the conviction. 15
    Count Five – December 5th Possession
    Count Five of the indictment charges Pedro Madrid with possessing “a
    Springfield .40 caliber semiautomatic handgun . . . and a Windham Weaponry
    .223 caliber semiautomatic assault rifle” on or about December 5, 2014. These
    were the weapons discovered in the search of the Big Valley property. The jury
    convicted.
    Madrid’s conviction under Count Five can be affirmed either under an
    actual-possession theory or constructive-possession theory. The government
    13 United States v. Guidry, 
    406 F.3d 314
    , 318 (5th Cir. 2005).
    14 United States v. Anderson, 
    559 F.3d 348
    , 353 (5th Cir.2009).
    15 See United States v. Fields, 
    72 F.3d 1200
    , 1212 (5th Cir. 1996).
    8
    Case: 15-51146       Document: 00513849639         Page: 9     Date Filed: 01/25/2017
    No. 15-51146
    presented evidence to the jury that Madrid actually possessed the weapons
    charged. Prieto testified that Madrid carried a handgun “24/7” and that Madrid
    showed him an assault rifle in trailer 3 (where the charged assault rifle was
    discovered). A reasonable jury could have found that Madrid actually
    possessed either of the weapons discovered in trailer 3 based on that testimony.
    Madrid’s conviction on Count Five is also sustainable on a constructive-
    possession theory. Prieto testified that he had meth fronted to him out of trailer
    3 roughly every two days and frequently saw the brothers in trailer 3—facts
    from which the jury could have inferred that Madrid had at least joint control
    over trailer 3 where the weapons were found. Prieto testified that he saw Pedro
    Madrid store drugs under the bed in trailer 3, where the handgun was found,
    so the jury could have inferred that he was aware of it. Madrid was also likely
    aware of the assault rifle, as he is pictured on Facebook standing next to his
    brother, who is holding it.
    Madrid’s arguments against the sufficiency of the government’s evidence
    are unavailing. He argues that the government cannot establish the “temporal
    limitation” in the indictment. But the date in the indictment, December 5,
    2014, was the date of the search that revealed the weapons, and is not an
    essential element of the crime. 16 Prieto observed Madrid possessing the
    firearms in question in the two-and-a-half months leading up to the day of the
    search referenced in the indictment. Moreover, a Facebook photo uploaded
    eight days before the search shows Madrid holding a handgun. The jury could
    have reasonably inferred that the photo was taken shortly before it was
    uploaded, and that the handgun in Madrid’s hand in the photo was the same
    16 United States v. Girod, 
    646 F.3d 304
    , 316 (5th Cir. 2011) (“In this Circuit, ‘an
    allegation as to the time of the offense is not an essential element of the offense charged in
    the indictment and, “within reasonable limits, proof of any date before the return of the
    indictment and within the statute of limitations is sufficient.”’” (quoting Russell v. United
    States, 
    429 F.2d 237
    , 238 (5th Cir. 1970))).
    9
    Case: 15-51146         Document: 00513849639          Page: 10     Date Filed: 01/25/2017
    No. 15-51146
    one that Prieto testified he always carried. Madrid further argues that his
    brother was the one who had control over the weapons in trailer 3. But
    “[constructive] possession may be joint, in that two or more persons can share
    [a firearm].” 17
    We find the trial evidence sufficient to support Madrid’s conviction under
    Count Five of the indictment.
    Count Seven – February 7th
    Count Seven of the indictment charges Pedro Madrid with possessing “a
    Ruger Model P89DC 9mm semiautomatic handgun . . . ; a Jiminez Arms Model
    J.A. Nin 9mm semiautomatic handgun . . . ; a KelTec Model PF9 9mm
    semiautomatic handgun . . . and a Winchester 12 gauge shotgun” on or about
    February 7, 2015. These were the weapons discovered in the truck that Madrid
    was riding in when he was arrested. The jury convicted.
    At the time of Madrid’s arrest, all of the weapons charged in Count Seven
    of the indictment were found in the truck with him, covered by a jacket. Madrid
    was the passenger at the time of the arrest, but the driver testified that Madrid
    had picked him up in the truck, then they swapped at Madrid’s request. This
    testimony gives rise to the inference that the weapons found the truck belonged
    to Madrid. Moreover, Madrid is featured in two different Facebook pictures
    holding a shotgun like the one recovered from the truck.
    We also find the evidence sufficient to support Madrid’s conviction under
    Count Seven of the indictment.
    IV.
    For the reasons described, the trial court’s judgments of conviction of
    both defendants are affirmed as to all counts.
    17   United States v. Virciglio, 
    441 F.2d 1295
    , 1298 (5th Cir. 1971).
    10