Dab Bishwakarma v. Loretta Lynch ( 2016 )


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  •      Case: 14-60517      Document: 00513439155         Page: 1    Date Filed: 03/25/2016
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    No. 14-60517
    Summary Calendar
    United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    March 25, 2016
    DAB BAHADUR BISHWAKARMA,
    Lyle W. Cayce
    Clerk
    Petitioner
    v.
    LORETTA LYNCH, U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,
    Respondent
    Petition for Review of an Order of the
    Board of Immigration Appeals
    BIA No. A087 573 037
    Before DAVIS, JONES, and GRAVES, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM: *
    Dab Bahadur Bishwakarma, a native and citizen of Nepal, petitions for
    review of a decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissing his
    appeal of the immigration judge’s (IJ) denial of his application for asylum,
    withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture
    (CAT). He has abandoned any challenge to the denial of relief under the CAT
    by failing to brief that issue adequately. See Thuri v. Ashcroft, 
    380 F.3d 788
    ,
    * Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not
    be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH
    CIR. R. 47.5.4.
    Case: 14-60517     Document: 00513439155       Page: 2   Date Filed: 03/25/2016
    No. 14-60517
    793 (5th Cir. 2004) (noting that arguments not raised in the petition for review
    are considered waived); Brinkmann v. Dallas Cty. Deputy Sheriff Abner, 
    813 F.2d 744
    , 748 (5th Cir. 1987).
    Generally, we have authority to review only the decision of the BIA but
    will consider the IJ’s decision if it influenced the determination of the BIA.
    Zhu v. Gonzales, 
    493 F.3d 588
    , 593 (5th Cir. 2007). Because the BIA agreed
    with the IJ’s findings and conclusions, the IJ’s findings are reviewable. See Efe
    v. Ashcroft, 
    293 F.3d 899
    , 903 (5th Cir. 2002). We review the determination of
    an alien’s eligibility for asylum for substantial evidence. Zhang v. Gonzales,
    
    432 F.3d 339
    , 344-45 (5th Cir. 2005).
    Bishwakarma asserts that the BIA erred in concluding that his asylum
    application did not meet the one-year statutory deadline. Regardless of any
    error, we decline to reverse and remand on this issue because the IJ and the
    BIA     considered     the   merits    of   Bishwakarma’s      asylum    application.
    Cf. Nakimbugwe v. Gonzales, 
    475 F.3d 281
    , 284-85 (5th Cir. 2007) (reversing
    and remanding due to timeliness error, where the error resulted in the BIA
    failing to consider the merits of petitioner’s asylum application).
    Bishwakarma also argues that the IJ violated his due process rights by
    aggressively questioning him during his immigration hearings. We review
    constitutional claims de novo. See Sattani v. Holder, 
    749 F.3d 368
    , 370 (5th
    Cir. 2014). As the BIA concluded, the record reveals that the IJ appropriately
    asked questions in order to fully develop the record. See Calderon-Ontiveros v.
    INS, 
    809 F.2d 1050
    , 1052-53 & n.1 (5th Cir. 1986). Moreover, the questions
    asked by the IJ did not preclude Bishwakarma from presenting further
    testimony or evidence concerning his claims and did not “substantially
    prejudice” him. 
    Id. at 1052
    ; see Wang v. Holder, 
    569 F.3d 531
    , 541 (5th Cir.
    2009) (rejecting similar due process claim).
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    No. 14-60517
    Bishwakarma further asserts that the BIA erred in affirming the IJ’s
    findings on his credibility. In making an adverse credibility determination,
    the IJ noted that Bishwakarma provided testimony that was not only
    internally inconsistent, but also inconsistent with the documentary evidence,
    including the affidavit Bishwakarma submitted with his asylum application.
    The IJ cited to numerous inconsistencies upon which it had relied to reach its
    decision.   The BIA cited these same inconsistencies, noting that the IJ’s
    analysis was “cogent” and specifically citing (1) Bishwakarma’s lack of
    knowledge of the monarchy in Nepal, which was supported by his alleged
    political party, (2) Bishwakarma’s explanations regarding the date he and his
    family were first contacted by the Maoists, his alleged torturers, (3) the dates
    and circumstances of his family’s abduction by the Maoists, and (4) the dates
    and circumstances of the murders of his brother and sister. The BIA asserted
    that these inconsistencies were “material,” noting that Bishwakarma was
    unable to provide a coherent timeline of abuse. In light of Bishwakarma’s
    inconsistent and often vague testimony, neither the IJ nor the BIA erred by
    concluding that Bishwakarma was not a credible witness. See Wang, 
    569 F.3d at 537-38
    ; 
    8 U.S.C. § 1158
    (b)(1)(B)(iii).   Accordingly, substantial evidence
    supports the denial of his application for asylum. See Wang, 
    569 F.3d at
    536-
    37; Zhang, 432 F.3d at 344-45.
    In his final issue on appeal, Bishwakarma asserts that he is entitled to
    a fair consideration of his request for relief in the form of withholding of
    removal. An applicant for withholding of removal “must demonstrate ‘a clear
    probability’ of persecution upon return” to his native country. Roy v. Ashcroft,
    
    389 F.3d 132
    , 138 (5th Cir. 2004). “A clear probability means that it is more
    likely than not that the applicant’s life or freedom would be threatened by
    persecution on account of either his race, religion, nationality, membership in
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    No. 14-60517
    a particular social group, or political opinion.” Id.; see 
    8 C.F.R. § 1208.16
    (b); 
    8 U.S.C. § 1231
    (b)(3)(A); see also § 1208.16(b)(1)(i) (stating that a showing of past
    persecution gives rise to a rebuttable presumption that an applicant’s life or
    freedom will be threatened in the future). Because this standard is more
    stringent than the standard required to determine eligibility for asylum -- past
    persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution on account of an
    enumerated ground -- an applicant who fails to show a well-founded fear,
    without more, will necessarily fail to show a clear probability of persecution.
    See Chen v. Gonzales, 
    470 F.3d 1131
    , 1135, 1138 (5th Cir. 2006). Given the
    adverse credibility determination and Bishwakarma’s failure to satisfy his
    burden of proof regarding his eligibility for asylum, he, thus, fails to satisfy the
    higher objective burden required to show eligibility for withholding of removal.
    See 
    id. at 1138
    .
    Accordingly, Bishwakarma’s petition for review is DENIED.
    4