Liggins v. Duncanville TX ( 2022 )

Case: 22-10100 Document: 00516536532 Page: 1 Date Filed: 11/07/2022
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
No. 22-10100 November 7, 2022
Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk
Lou Liggins,
Plaintiff—Appellant,
versus
Duncanville, Texas; Nathan Roach,
Defendants—Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
USDC No. 3:20-CV-654
Before Clement, Duncan, and Wilson, Circuit Judges.
Edith Brown Clement, Circuit Judge:
Four years ago, Lou Liggins was having a “severe mental health
episode” and voicing “suicidal ideations.” So, his mother called the police.
When the Chief of Police arrived, he ordered his officers to enter the
Liggins’s home and, in the mix-up, Liggins was shot. Because the Chief’s
decision to intervene wasn’t based on a deliberate indifference to any risk to
Liggins’s rights, we AFFIRM.
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No. 22-10100
I
On March 20, 2018, a Duncanville police officer shot Lou Liggins in
the stomach. Earlier that day, Liggins “stopped taking [his] medications”
and started having “a severe mental health episode.” After he “express[ed]
suicidal ideations,” Liggins’s mother called his health care providers. They
“advised [her] to call 911.” So, she did. Shortly after, Duncanville Chief of
Police Robert Brown arrived on the scene. There, he learned from Liggins’s
mother that her son, although “unarmed,” was having a mental breakdown
inside the home. Chief Brown then “assur[ed]” Liggins’s mother that a
“negotiating team” would be brought in and that the police “would not shoot
Lou.” Sometime later, and without negotiators, Chief Brown ordered his
officers to enter the Liggins’s home. Once inside, an officer shot Liggins after
he reached for a cell phone. Liggins was rushed to the hospital and, after
“emergency surgery,” survived.
Now, Liggins is suing the City of Duncanville for Chief Brown’s
decision, namely “order[ing] officers . . . into the house.” Liggins argues
Chief Brown was a “policymaker” who—with a “callous disregard for
individuals suffering from mental health episodes”—caused the
“deprivation” of Liggins’s Fourth Amendment rights. The district court
wasn’t convinced for two reasons. One, Chief Brown couldn’t be a
policymaker, per Monell v. Department of Social Services, because he didn’t
have “final authority to establish municipal policy.” 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
Two, Liggins couldn’t show that, when Chief Brown gave the order, he was
deliberately indifferent to the possible violation of Liggins’s constitutional
rights. Instead, Liggins relied exclusively on “conclusory” allegations.
Following a dismissal, Liggins appealed. Before us, he maintains that he
adequately pled facts to support Chief Brown’s policymaker status and, in
turn, Monell liability for the City of Duncanville. He also asks that we
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reconsider our application of the “relation back” doctrine to his “John Doe
pleadings.”
II
We review a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal de novo. Calogero v. Shows, Cali
& Walsh, L.L.P., 970 F.3d 576, 580 (5th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted). “To
survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). On review, we take all “well-pleaded
facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Calogero, 970 F.3d
at 580 (citation omitted).
A
To establish municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff
must prove that he was deprived of a federally protected right, including
constitutional protections, “pursuant to an official municipal policy.” Valle
v. City of Houston, 613 F.3d 536, 541 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting Monell, 436 U.S.
at 691). Per Monell, the plaintiff must target a “policy”—known by or created
by a “policymaker”—that was the “moving force” behind the plaintiff’s
harm. Id. at 541–42 (citations omitted). Because the other two requirements
are dispositive in this case, we don’t address the “policymaker” element any
further.
For the “moving force” element, a plaintiff must “show[] either that
the policy itself was unconstitutional” or that it “was adopted with deliberate
indifference to the known or obvious fact” that a specific constitutional
violation would follow. Webb v. Town of Saint Joseph, 925 F.3d 209, 219 (5th
Cir. 2019) (citation and quotations omitted). Under the deliberate
indifference framework, a party must prove there’s a “causal link” between
the policy and their harm, and that the defendant had the “requisite degree
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of culpability.” Bd. of the Cnty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404 (1997).
Culpability, in this context, is a complete disregard of “the risk that a
violation of a particular constitutional . . . right [would] follow the decision.”
Id. at 411. That’s a “high standard.” Valle, 613 F.3d at 542. A “showing of
simple or even heightened negligence will not suffice.” Id. (quoting Brown,
520 U.S. at 407).
As for the policy requirement, a party may point to a formal
declaration, an informal custom, or, sometimes, a “single decision.” Brown
v. Bryan County, 219 F.3d 450, 462 (5th Cir. 2000). But, the “single
decision” exception is “extremely narrow” and only applies in “rare
circumstances.” Valle, 613 F.3d at 542 (citation omitted); Webb v. Town of
Saint Joseph, 925 F.3d 209, 214 n.51 (5th Cir. 2019). To warrant application,
the constitutional harm in question must’ve been the “plainly obvious”
consequence of the actor’s single decision. See Brown, 219 F.3d at 461. In
practice, that means the decision must’ve been made despite a very “high
degree of predictability concerning the consequences of the challenged
decision.” Id. at 460 (emphasis added). That’s a “stringent standard[]”
which requires “unmistakable culpability and clearly connected causation.”
Id. at 461.
Here, Liggins argues that Chief Brown’s single decision—ordering his
officers to enter the Liggins’s home—was the “moving force” behind
Liggins’s injuries. Liggins admits Chief Brown’s order wasn’t patently
unconstitutional, so instead he contends that it was adopted with a deliberate
indifference to Liggins’s rights. But, Liggins’s claim doesn’t pass muster for
two reasons: predictability and culpability.
First, it wasn’t “highly predictable” that a Fourth Amendment
violation would result from Chief Brown’s order. The single decision
exception—especially when tied to deliberate indifference—applies in rare
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and narrow scenarios. See Valle, 613 F.3d at 542. We have only entertained
the theory in a few cases, including Brown, 219 F.3d 450. But, in Brown, the
outcome was the “highly predictable consequence[]” of the municipal
actor’s decision. 219 F.3d at 462–63. There, a sheriff failed to train an officer
known to have an “exuberant and reckless background” on and off the job.
Id. So, the sheriff was on clear “notice” that placing him on duty with “no
training” and “no supervision” could lead to an excessive force incident. Id.But, this case isn’t like Brown. Instead, it tracks closer to Valle v. City of
Houston. In Valle, a police officer ordered his agents to enter the home of a
mentally ill man. Id. at 539–40. After a brief scuffle, the man was shot and
killed. Id. There, we found there wasn’t evidence of deliberate indifference
because “at least some training” had been provided to the officers and, more
importantly, there wasn’t a “pattern of similar violations” to rely on. Id. at
547–48.
Although a “pattern of misconduct is not required” to prove
predictability, Brown, 219 F.3d at 460, “[w]e have stressed that a single
incident is usually insufficient to demonstrate deliberate indifference.”
Estate of Davis v. City of N. Richland Hills, 406 F.3d 375, 382 (5th Cir. 2005);
Burge v. St. Tammany Parish, 336 F.3d 363, 370 (5th Cir. 2003) (finding
deliberate indifference “generally requires that a plaintiff demonstrate at
least a pattern of similar violations”); Valle, 613 F.3d at 548–49 (finding no
deliberate indifference due to a lack of a “pattern of actual violations
sufficient to show deliberate indifference”). After all, repetition may be the
only thing that puts a policymaker on “sufficient notice” that a constitutional
violation may spring from their single decision. Brown, 219 F.3d at 460. Of
course, we don’t “suggest that a single incident, as opposed to a pattern of
violations, can never suffice to demonstrate deliberate indifference.” Davis,
406 F.3d at 385. Instead, we emphasize the difficulty of proving up such
claims without any evidence of a pattern.
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Here, Liggins provides no genuine evidence of a pattern or any other
kind of notice. Instead—to prove predictability—Liggins relies on “well-
known studies and literature” to argue Chief Brown’s intervention was
contrary to accepted police practices. But, bald factual assertions coupled
with informational literature isn’t enough to support a deliberate indifference
claim—even under Rule 12(b)(6). See Spiller v. City of Texas City, Police
Dep’t, 130 F.3d 162, 167 (5th Cir. 1997) (“The description of a policy or
custom and its relationship to the underlying constitutional violation,
moreover, cannot be conclusory; it must contain specific facts.”).
Second, Liggins can’t show that Chief Brown, at the time of his order,
had the “requisite degree of culpability,” namely that he completely
disregarded any risk to Liggins’s Fourth Amendment rights. Liggins had
stopped taking his prescription medication and was “suffering from a severe
mental health episode.” His own “health care providers advised [his mom]
to call 911.” Although Liggins’s mother told Chief Brown her son wasn’t
dangerous, Liggins “was expressing suicidal ideations.” So, Chief Brown—
for the safety of Liggins—intervened. While Chief Brown could’ve waited
for a “crisis intervention team,” failing to do so doesn’t show that Chief
Brown “disregarded” any of the “obvious consequence[s]” of his decision.
Brown, 219 F.3d at 457 (emphasis added). Difficult decisions—like sending
armed officers into the home of a person suffering from suicidal thoughts—
aren’t easy and must be made quickly. But, making them doesn’t evidence
an intentional ignorance of all the associated risks. At worst, failing to wait or
fully recognize the risk of harm to Liggins’s rights was negligent. But, mere
negligence isn’t enough to prove deliberate indifference.
In Webb, we found a single decision by a mayor—to “begin
undertaking efforts to collect on [a] judgment” against a city employee—
didn’t pass muster because the plaintiff couldn’t “establish[]” that the single
decision was the “moving force” behind his constitutional injury. 925 F.3d
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at 219–20. Instead, the plaintiff merely “painted a picture of poor decisions
and bureaucratic dysfunction.” Id. at 220. The same reasoning rings true
here. So, we AFFIRM. Considering our decision, we do not address the
remaining elements of Liggins’s Monell claim.
B
The district court also found Liggins’s amended filing—replacing
“John Doe” with a named officer—couldn’t “relate back” to the date of his
original complaint per our precedent. Liggins “recognizes” that his request
is “unavailable” under “the binding precedent of this Circuit,” but asks
anyway. Finding the argument foreclosed—and our precedent unchanged—
we AFFIRM.
* * *
Chief Brown ordered his officers to intervene in Liggins’s “mental
health episode.” As a result, Liggins was shot. But, that doesn’t mean Chief
Brown completely disregarded any risk to Liggins’s Fourth Amendment
rights. Because we agree with the district court—that this is not one of those
“extreme circumstances” in which a single decision suffices for Monell
liability—we AFFIRM.
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