United States v. Hayden ( 2022 )

Case: 20-40585 Document: 00516158898 Page: 1 Date Filed: 01/07/2022
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
January 7, 2022
No. 20-40585 Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk
United States of America,
Plaintiff—Appellee,
versus
Collin Garrett Hayden,
Defendant—Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Texas
USDC No. 5:17-CR-00009-RWS-CMC-6
Before Jolly, Elrod, and Oldham, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:*
Collin Garrett Hayden appeals his conviction for obstruction of
justice. He argues that conducting his trial in the Eastern District of Texas
violated his constitutional right to be tried in the district in which his crime
occurred.1 We review this case under the plain error standard because
*
Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.
1
The Constitution provides that “[t]rial shall be held in the State where the said
Crimes shall have been committed; but when not committed within any State, the Trial
Case: 20-40585 Document: 00516158898 Page: 2 Date Filed: 01/07/2022
No. 20-40585
Hayden failed to object below to the issue he now raises. Under plain error
review, Hayden has failed to show any obvious error that affected his
substantial rights. Accordingly, his conviction for obstruction of justice is
AFFIRMED.
Hayden also contends he deserved a two-point acceptance of
responsibility reduction in criminal offense level at sentencing. But because
his conduct did not show he accepted responsibility for his crimes, his
sentence is also AFFIRMED.
I.
In 2016, federal special agents began investigating a drug conspiracy
in the Eastern District of Texas, using Paul Brown, a drug distributor, as an
undercover informant. Brown’s drug operations took place in the Eastern
and Northern Districts of Texas. Brown led agents to James McLemore, a
resident of Dallas, Texas. Shortly after learning that Brown had been arrested
and was now working with law enforcement, McLemore fled his Dallas
apartment and sublet it to Timothy Harper and appellant Hayden.
At McLemore’s apartment, special agents contacted Harper and
Hayden three different times using a confidential informant. At one
encounter, on February 9, 2017, Hayden offered to sell the informant drugs.
Agents later raided the apartment and arrested Harper, but Hayden had fled
to Miami.
shall be at such Place or Places as the Congress may by Law have directed.” U.S. Const.
art. III, § 2, cl. 3.
Hayden was charged with obstruction of justice, which has its own venue statute,
18 U.S.C. § 1512(i), which declares: “A prosecution under [section 1512 or 1503] may be
brought in the district in which the official proceeding (whether or not pending or about to
be instituted) was intended to be affected or in the district in which the conduct constituting
the alleged offense occurred.”
2
Case: 20-40585 Document: 00516158898 Page: 3 Date Filed: 01/07/2022
No. 20-40585
Nearly two months later, in early April, special agent Kelly attempted
to locate Hayden at his father’s house in Atlanta, Texas (which is in the
Eastern District). After discovering Hayden was not present, Kelly obtained
Hayden’s phone number and later called him. In this conversation, Kelly said
that Hayden’s case was pre-indictment and asked if Hayden would be
interested in becoming a confidential informant. Hayden refused to
cooperate.
After the phone call with Kelly, Hayden—apparently still in Miami—
made four Facebook posts on April 5th, 6th, 8th, and 9th to find Harper,
whom he now believed had been informing on him to the police. Hayden
offered mutual friends $2,000 for Harper’s location and directly threatened
Harper in the April 9th post.
Law enforcement eventually arrested Hayden in Miami for drug
possession. An Eastern District of Texas grand jury returned a superseding
indictment charging Hayden with drug conspiracy, using a firearm in a drug
trafficking crime, and obstruction of justice under section 1512. 2 Hayden
pleaded not guilty and was tried.
At trial, McLemore and Harper both testified against Hayden.
McLemore stated that he sold drugs to Hayden regularly. Harper testified
that he and Hayden had temporarily trafficked these drugs between Dallas,
Texas and Shreveport, Louisiana. In doing so, Harper, Hayden, and their
buyers traveled Interstate 20, which passes through the Eastern District of
Texas.
2
The government specifically charged Hayden under 18 U.S.C. § 1512(a)(2)(A),
which makes it a crime to use “physical force or the threat of physical force against any
person, or attempts to do so, with intent to influence, delay, or prevent the testimony of
any person in an official proceeding . . . .” The maximum sentence provided for Hayden’s
charge was twenty years. Id. § (a)(3)(C).
3
Case: 20-40585 Document: 00516158898 Page: 4 Date Filed: 01/07/2022
No. 20-40585
Hayden did not raise the venue claims, by motion or otherwise, until
after the government rested its case. In his Rule 29 motion, Hayden first
objected to venue, but with no mention of the Constitution. Indeed, in his
brief to this court, Hayden acknowledges that he made no objection based on
the Constitution. In response to Hayden’s venue objection for the
obstruction of justice charge, the government cited section 1512(i) and
argued venue was proper in the Eastern District because the official
proceeding had been filed there. The district court denied both the Rule 29
motion and the renewed Rule 29 motion. The district court also refused to
instruct the jury or require a special finding on venue for the obstruction
count. The jury returned a mixed verdict; it convicted Hayden of obstruction
of justice but acquitted him of the conspiracy and firearm offenses.
At sentencing, Hayden moved for a two-level acceptance of
responsibility reduction, claiming that he qualified for the reduction because
he had essentially admitted all elements of the obstruction offense in his trial
testimony. The court denied Hayden’s motion. Ultimately, the district court
sentenced Hayden to 180 months’ imprisonment.
Hayden now appeals, arguing that the denial of his Rule 29 motions
based upon improper venue and the denial of the two-point reduction for
acceptance of responsibility both constitute error.
II.
The primary question Hayden seeks to present to us is whether the
location of Hayden’s trial in the Eastern District of Texas was consistent with
the Constitution’s venue requirements. To answer this question, we will first
consider the standard of review.
4
Case: 20-40585 Document: 00516158898 Page: 5 Date Filed: 01/07/2022
No. 20-40585
A.
Hayden has presented us with a legal argument that his trial violated
his constitutional rights. We would ordinarily review such argument de novo.
United States v. Romans, 823 F.3d 299, 309 (5th Cir. 2016). Such alleged trial
errors, however, have procedural requirements: defendants must make
timely trial objections known to the trial court before bringing them to us. See
Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(3). If such an objection is lacking, however, the
plain error standard of review applies, which means generally that the error
must be plain and prejudicial. United States v. Stewart, 843 F. App’x 600, 604
(5th Cir. 2021) (citing United States v. Guzman, 739 F.3d 241, 246 n.8 (5th
Cir. 2014)).
As we have noted, Hayden concedes that he failed at trial to object to
the alleged error he now presents to us. Consequently, we will review
Hayden’s improper venue argument under the plain error standard of
review.
B.
We turn now to Hayden’s venue arguments. For Hayden to succeed
under plain error review, he must show that “(1) there is an error, (2) that is
clear or obvious, and (3) that affects [the defendant’s] substantial rights” and
then persuade the court that the “error seriously affect[s] the fairness,
integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” United States v. Rojas,
812 F.3d 382, 390–91 (5th Cir. 2016) (alterations in original) (citations
omitted).
The Constitution provides: “Trial shall be held in the State where the
said Crimes shall have been committed; but when not committed within any
State, the Trial shall be at such Place or Places as the Congress may by Law
have directed.” U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 3. The Sixth Amendment
further specifies that trial shall be in the “district wherein the crime shall
5
Case: 20-40585 Document: 00516158898 Page: 6 Date Filed: 01/07/2022
No. 20-40585
have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by
law.” U.S. Const. amend. VI (emphasis added). The Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure address the constitutional mandates by requiring the
government to “prosecute an offense in a district where the offense was
committed” unless a statute or rule provides otherwise. Fed. R. Crim. P.
18.
18 U.S.C. § 1512(i) provides: “A prosecution under this section or
section 1503 may be brought in the district in which the official proceeding
(whether or not pending or about to be instituted) was intended to be affected
or in the district in which the conduct constituting the alleged offense
occurred.”
Hayden argues that section 1512(i)’s venue-fitting provision
unconstitutionally conferred venue in the Eastern District of Texas for his
obstruction charge. Specifically, he argues that his obstructive acts did not
occur in the Eastern District of Texas, and that under the provisions of
Article 3 Section 2 of the Constitution, venue of his trial was improper.
Hayden cites no binding authority to support this “constitutionally
improper” argument and we are aware of none. We need not dwell on the
ultimate merits of the argument, however, because, lacking any cognizable
authority, Hayden cannot show that the error alleged was obvious. Although
there may be a facial difference between what the constitutional provisions
require and the words of section 1512(i), neither we nor our sister circuits
have addressed a constitutional issue.3 To be sure, it is a stretch to say that
section 1512(i) is unconstitutional given Congress’ constitutional power to
3
One federal district court we have found through our research did conclude
section 1512 was constitutional over a challenge that section 1512(i) “provides for venue in
a place other than the district where the crime was committed.” United States v. Trie, 21 F.
Supp. 2d 7, 17 (D.D.C 1998).
6
Case: 20-40585 Document: 00516158898 Page: 7 Date Filed: 01/07/2022
No. 20-40585
define where an offense occurs for purposes of a venue analysis. See, e.g., U.S.
Const. amend. VI (specifying that trial shall be in the “district wherein the
crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously
ascertained by law”); Fed. R. Crim. P. 18 (acknowledging a statute could
define place of venue); United States v. Johnson, 323 U.S. 273, 275 (1944)
(endorsing congressional power to define a continuing offense and the venue
thereunder).
Moreover, Hayden has not shown that any error that may have
occurred with venue affected his substantial rights. A defendant must show
that the error was “prejudicial” and that there is “a reasonable probability”
that the end result would have been different if the error had not occurred.
United States v. Reed, 974 F.3d 560, 562–63 (5th Cir. 2020). Hayden failed to
argue that he suffered prejudice by being tried in the Eastern District, let
alone that the result of his case would have been different if he had been tried
elsewhere. Similarly, there was no manifest injustice because Hayden had a
fair trial—in which he was even acquitted on certain charges—in the Eastern
District.
Consequently, under plain error review, Hayden’s alleged
constitutional claim fails and his conviction for obstruction of justice is
affirmed.
III.
Hayden also challenges his sentence. He specifically appeals the
district court’s refusal to grant a two-level reduction in offense level for
acceptance of responsibility. The sentencing guidelines provide: “If the
defendant clearly demonstrates acceptance of responsibility for his offense,
[the court can] decrease the offense level by 2 levels.” U.S. Sent’g
Guidelines Manual § 3E1.1(a) (U.S. Sent’g Comm’n 2021).
7
Case: 20-40585 Document: 00516158898 Page: 8 Date Filed: 01/07/2022
No. 20-40585
“A district court's refusal to reduce a sentence for acceptance of
responsibility is reviewed under a standard ‘even more deferential than a
pure clearly erroneous standard.’” United States v. Najera, 915 F.3d 997,
1002 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting United States v. Maldonado, 42 F.2d 906, 913
(5th Cir. 1995)). This standard will “nearly always sustain the judgment of
the district court . . . .” United States v. Thomas, 870 F.2d 174, 176 (5th Cir.
1989). The guidelines specify that “[t]he sentencing judge is in a unique
position to evaluate a defendant’s acceptance of responsibility. For this
reason, the determination of the sentencing judge is entitled to great
deference on review.” U.S. Sent’g Guidelines Manual § 3E1.1 cmt.
n.5 (U.S. Sent’g Cmm’n 2021).
Hayden contends that because he essentially admitted all the elements
of obstruction at trial, he qualifies for the two-level reduction in offense level.
Hayden’s conduct, however, tells a different story, that is, that he did not
accept responsibility for his crimes.
It is certainly true that exercising the right to trial does not foreclose
an acceptance of responsibility reduction, but the reduction “is not intended
to apply to a defendant who puts the government to its burden of proof at
trial by denying the essential factual elements of guilt . . . .” Id. § 3E1.1 cmt.
n.2.
Numerous facts support the district court’s denial of Hayden’s
request: he fled to Florida after the raid on his apartment and Harper’s arrest,
he admitted to lying to law enforcement while incarcerated before trial, and
there is some evidence that he committed perjury. Even after trial, Hayden
continued to commit criminal offenses, leading to his guilty plea for
possession of contraband in jail. This conduct runs counter to section 3E1.1’s
guidance for determining acceptance of responsibility. As such, the lower
court did not err in denying the reduction.
8
Case: 20-40585 Document: 00516158898 Page: 9 Date Filed: 01/07/2022
No. 20-40585
IV.
In sum, we have held, first, that Hayden’s argument of improper
venue does not survive the plain error standard of review as it failed to
demonstrate clear and obvious error. Second, we have held that the district
court did not abuse its discretion by denying Hayden’s request for an
acceptance of responsibility sentencing reduction. Accordingly, the
judgment is, in all respects,
AFFIRMED.
9