United States v. Ana Muniz , 672 F. App'x 406 ( 2017 )


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  •      Case: 16-40026      Document: 00513819894         Page: 1    Date Filed: 01/03/2017
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    No. 16-40026                          January 3, 2017
    Summary Calendar
    Lyle W. Cayce
    Clerk
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee
    v.
    ANA LILIA MUNIZ,
    Defendant-Appellant
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Texas
    USDC No. 7:15-CR-1043-1
    Before HIGGINBOTHAM, PRADO, and HAYNES, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM: *
    Ana Lilia Muniz appeals the 18-month sentence she received following
    her guilty-plea conviction for transporting illegal aliens, in violation of 
    8 U.S.C. § 1324
    . She argues that (i) the district court erred by enhancing her sentence
    pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2L1.1(b)(6) based on a finding that she intentionally or
    recklessly created a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury to the
    aliens by transporting them in the trunk of the vehicle she was driving; (ii) the
    * Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not
    be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH
    CIR. R. 47.5.4.
    Case: 16-40026    Document: 00513819894      Page: 2    Date Filed: 01/03/2017
    No. 16-40026
    district court erred when it—in overruling her objection to the § 2L1.1(b)(6)
    enhancement—noted that driving slowly would not necessarily prevent an
    accident and could cause an accident; and (iii) the district court erred in
    applying a two-level enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3B1.4 based on a
    finding that she used her two minor children to assist in avoiding detection of
    the offense.
    The District Court’s Application of the § 2L1.1(b)(6) Enhancement
    We review a district court’s interpretation of the Guidelines de novo and
    review the district court’s fact findings relative to the § 2L1.1(b)(6)
    enhancement for clear error. United States v. Rodriguez, 
    630 F.3d 377
    , 380
    (5th Cir. 2011).   The transportation of aliens in the trunk of a vehicle is
    specifically listed in the comments to § 2L1.1(b)(6) as the type of conduct
    contemplated by the Sentencing Commission in drafting the guideline
    provision. § 2L1.1, comment. (n.3); see United States v. Mateo-Garza, 
    541 F.3d 290
    , 294 (5th Cir. 2008) (stating that transporting persons in a trunk or engine
    compartment of a vehicle per se creates a substantial risk of serious injury or
    death because those areas are not designed to hold human passengers).
    Accordingly, the district court did not err by enhancing Muniz’s sentence based
    on its finding that she transported aliens in the trunk of the vehicle she was
    driving.
    The District Court’s Comment Regarding Slow Driving
    In the district court, Muniz objected to the application of the § 2L1.1(b)(6)
    enhancement on the grounds that, inter alia, she was driving slow, which
    created a safe condition.    In overruling her objection to the § 2L1.1(b)(6)
    enhancement, the district court noted that driving slow on a highway does not
    necessarily prevent an accident, and, in fact, can cause an accident. Muniz did
    not object to the district court’s comment at the time, but argues on appeal that
    2
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    No. 16-40026
    nothing in her presentence report discusses whether slow driving can cause an
    accident, and, accordingly, she did not have sufficient notice and an
    opportunity to address the issue at sentencing. Because Muniz failed to raise
    an objection below, we review the issue for plain error. See United States v.
    Medina-Anicacio, 
    325 F.3d 638
    , 643 (5th Cir. 2003). To show plain error,
    Muniz must show a forfeited error that is clear or obvious and that affects her
    substantial rights. Puckett v. United States, 
    556 U.S. 129
    , 135 (2009).
    Because the comments to § 2L1.1(b)(6) specifically provide that
    transporting unlawful aliens in the trunk of a vehicle creates a risk of injury
    for the purposes of § 2L1.1(b)(6), Muniz cannot show how any purported error
    in the district court’s reasons for denying her objection to the § 2L1.1(b)(6)
    enhancement affected her substantial rights. See Puckett, 
    556 U.S. at 135
    ; see
    also Mateo-Garza, 
    541 F.3d at 294
    ; § 2L1.1, comment. (n.3).
    The District Court’s Application of the § 3B1.4 Enhancement
    A § 3B1.4 enhancement applies “when a defendant ‘makes a decision to
    bring a minor along during the commission of a previously planned crime as a
    diversionary tactic or in an effort to reduce suspicion . . . .’” United States v.
    Powell, 
    732 F.3d 361
    , 380 (5th Cir. 2013) (quoting United States v. Mata, 
    624 F.3d 170
    , 175 (5th Cir. 2010)). “To trigger the enhancement, a defendant must
    take some affirmative action to involve the minor in the offense because the
    mere presence of a minor at the scene of the crime is insufficient.” Powell, 732
    F.3d at 380 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).            “When a
    defendant’s crime is previously planned—when, for example, she leaves the
    house knowing she is on her way to smuggle drugs . . . the act of bringing the
    child along instead of leaving the child behind is an affirmative act” involving
    the minor. Mata, 
    624 F.3d at 176
    .
    3
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    No. 16-40026
    In this case, circumstantial evidence beyond mere presence supports a
    finding that Muniz used her two minor children to avoid detection of the
    offense. See 
    id.
     This was not a spur-of-the-moment crime. See 
    id.
     at 177
    & n.33. Rather, Muniz knew she would be transporting aliens before she
    committed the crime. To the extent that it was necessary for Muniz to ensure
    adult supervision of her minor children—which is far from clear given their
    ages of 13 and nine and the fact that no evidence was presented establishing
    as much—she chose not to do so. Because Muniz left her house knowing that
    she was going to commit the subject offense, “the act of bringing the [children]
    along instead of leaving [them] behind is an affirmative act that involves the
    minor in the offense.” 
    Id. at 176
    . Furthermore, Muniz’s presentence report
    states that, after her arrest, Muniz’s “minor daughters were released to their
    maternal aunt and uncle,” suggesting that Muniz did have options for child
    care. Given the foregoing, the district court did not err in applying the § 3B1.4
    enhancement.
    Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 16-40026 Summary Calendar

Citation Numbers: 672 F. App'x 406

Judges: Higginbotham, Prado, Haynes

Filed Date: 1/3/2017

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/6/2024