Regalado v. Management and Training ( 2023 )

Case: 22-10034 Document: 00516604580 Page: 1 Date Filed: 01/10/2023
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit
United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
No. 22-10034
FILED
January 10, 2023
Summary Calendar
Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk
Rogelio Regalado,
Plaintiff—Appellant,
versus
Management and Training Corporation, A private
corporation,
Defendant—Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
USDC No. 4:21-CV-185
Before Jones, Haynes, and Oldham, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:*
Rogelio Regalado, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, appeals
the district court’s grant of Management and Training Corporation’s
(“MTC”) motion to dismiss and final judgment dismissing with prejudice
*
Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.
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No. 22-10034
all claims against MTC pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b). 1
In the amended complaint active before the court, Regalado avers that MTC
failed to properly implement social distancing measures and enforce
mitigation measures in light of the COVID-19 pandemic; negligently placed
a COVID-19 positive inmate in the general population; failed to properly staff
the John R. Lindsey State Jail in Jacksboro, Texas, where Regalado was
located; and conspired to violate Regalado’s constitutional rights to a safe
and secure environment for financial gain.
On appeal, Regalado argues that the district court erred when it:
(1) did not acknowledge Regalado’s indigent status; (2) failed to construe
Regalado’s “First Supplement to Amended Complaint” as a motion for
leave to supplement his amended complaint; (3) denied Regalado’s motion
for appointment of counsel; and (4) incorrectly applied the physical injury
requirement under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) in its grant
of MTC’s motion to dismiss. We address each point of error in turn,
reviewing Regalado’s pro se filings liberally and holding them to a less
stringent standard than we would otherwise apply to filings submitted by
lawyers. Coleman v. United States, 912 F.3d 824, 828 (5th Cir. 2019).
First, we reject Regalado’s contention that the district court failed to
acknowledge his indigent status. Rather, we note that the district court did
consider Regalado’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis. It ultimately
denied this motion as moot, reasoning that MTC had already paid the
applicable filing fee when it removed this case to federal court, and reaffirmed
this conclusion after Regalado moved for reconsideration. The district court
later granted Regalado’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal.
1
In his active complaint, Regalado asserted claims against other parties that
remained pending at the time of the 54(b) judgment here on appeal. Only the case against
MTC is before us on this appeal.
2
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No. 22-10034
That the district court denied Regalado’s initial motion to proceed in forma
pauperis does not change the fact that it acknowledged that motion and,
implicitly, Regalado’s indigent status. Thus, to the extent Regalado
challenges the district court’s denial of his first motion to proceed in forma
pauperis as moot, our review does not reveal any error that would merit
vacating the district court’s order.
Second, we turn to the issue of Regalado’s efforts to obtain leave to
amend his amended complaint. We review a district court’s denial of a pro
se plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend a complaint for abuse of discretion.
See McKinney v. Irving Indep. Sch. Dist., 309 F.3d 308, 312 (5th Cir. 2002);
Landavazo v. Toro Co., 301 F. App’x 333, 336 (5th Cir. 2008) (per curiam)
(unpublished). 2 Here, Regalado filed a “First Supplement to Amended
Complaint” simultaneous with his response to MTC’s motion to dismiss, as
well as a separate motion for leave to supplement his amended complaint.
Even assuming arguendo that both the responsive pleading and subsequent
request for leave constitute proper requests for leave to amend, the district
court did not err in denying these requests.
Although a pro se litigant should generally be offered an opportunity
to amend his complaint before it is dismissed, Brewster v. Dretke, 587 F.3d
764, 767–68 (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam), we have explained that a district
court need not provide litigants—even those proceeding pro se—multiple
chances to amend, particularly where they fail to identify “what new facts
they would allege nor attach a proposed amended complaint,” Burke v.
Ocwen Loan Servicing, L.L.C., 855 F. App’x 180, 187 (5th Cir. 2021) (per
2
Although Landavazo and other unpublished opinions (which are dated after
January 1, 1996) cited throughout this opinion are “not controlling precedent,” they “may
be [cited as] persuasive authority.” Ballard v. Burton, 444 F.3d 391, 401 n.7 (5th Cir. 2006)
(citing 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4).
3
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curiam) (unpublished); see also Goldstein v. MCI WorldCom, 340 F.3d 238,
254–55 (5th Cir. 2003).
Regalado was given permission by the district court to file an amended
complaint, but the district court instructed that this amended complaint must
“incorporat[e] all of his facts, allegations, and grounds for relief he seeks to
assert.” Regalado then sought to file a second amended complaint after
MTC filed a second motion to dismiss. Regalado was “aware” of MTC’s
arguments in favor of its motion to dismiss when he filed his amended
complaint, including its argument that he had not alleged a physical injury.
Goldstein, 340 F.3d at 254. However, he failed to include this allegation in
his first amended complaint. In addition, in his separate motion for leave to
supplement his amended complaint, Regalado neither explained what new
facts he would allege nor attached a proposed amended complaint. See Burke,
855 F. App’x at 187. Rather, Regalado submitted a one-page request for leave
to supplement and proposed additional exhibits without providing any
insight into what his amended complaint might allege. In this context, the
district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Regalado’s efforts to
submit a second amended complaint. 3
Finally, we turn to the district court’s grant of MTC’s motion to
dismiss. We review a district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss de novo.
Cuvillier v. Taylor, 503 F.3d 397, 401 (5th Cir. 2007). “To survive a Rule
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a complaint ‘does not need detailed factual
allegations,’ but must provide the plaintiff’s grounds for entitlement to
3
We also deny Regalado’s arguments regarding appointment of counsel, as he
failed to show an abuse of discretion in the district court’s determination that he did not
meet the requisite standards. See Cupit v. Jones, 835 F.2d 82, 86 (5th Cir. 1987) (abuse of
discretion is the standard of review); Akasike v. Fitzpatrick, 26 F.3d 510, 512 (5th Cir. 1994)
(per curiam) (pro se plaintiffs in civil suits are not entitled to the appointment of counsel
unless their case presents exceptional circumstances.).
4
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relief—including factual allegations that when assumed to be true ‘raise a
right to relief above the speculative level.’” Id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). We focus our review on Regalado’s
active amended complaint. See id.The PLRA precludes suits “brought by a prisoner confined in a jail,
prison, or other correctional facility, for mental or emotional injury suffered
while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 1997e(e). We have previously stated that “the application of this provision
turns on the relief sought by a prisoner.” Mayfield v. Texas Dep’t of Crim.
Just., 529 F.3d 599, 605 (5th Cir. 2008). Accordingly, a prisoner is generally
precluded from recovering compensatory damages “for violations of federal
law where no physical injury is alleged.” Id. However, prisoners can recover
punitive or nominal damages without a showing of a physical injury where
they assert a violation of their constitutional rights. Id. at 605–06. Here, as
the district court noted, Regalado seeks only compensatory damages. 4
Therefore, to the extent that Regalado fails to allege a physical injury, his
claims are barred by 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e).
We can easily determine that Regalado fails to plead in his amended
complaint that he suffered a physical injury as a result of MTC’s COVID-19-
related policies and the purported conspiracy to violate his constitutional
rights. Although Regalado also avers that he was physically assaulted,
4
While Regalado had previously made claims about punitive damages and nominal
damages, in the amend complaint that was the active complaint at the time of the 54(b)
judgment, he baldly stated that he is “seeking damages in the amount of $5,000,000.00
against Defendant[] MTC” and did not elaborate on the types of damages he sought, in
contrast with his earlier pleadings. This revision supports the district court’s conclusion
that he sought only compensatory damages. Moreover, while Regalado discusses the
PLRA’s physical injury requirement in his brief, he does not assert that the district court
erred when it concluded that he only sought compensatory damages in his amended
complaint. Accordingly, any appeal of that determination is waived.
5
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purportedly because of MTC’s lack of staffing, he does not allege any
physical injury flowing from this assault. Therefore, we conclude that the
district court did not err when it held that these claims are barred by 42
U.S.C. § 1997e(e). See Mayfield, 529 F.3d at 606 (“Mayfield has not alleged
any physical injury and his complaint seeks only compensatory damages. As
such, Mayfield’s claims for damages are barred by § 1997e(e).” (citations
omitted)); compare Jones v. United States Marshals Serv., 832 F. App’x 572,
572–73 (10th Cir. 2020) (concluding there was an absence of physical injury
where the plaintiff pled exposure to the risk of COVID-19 infection), and
Jones v. Greninger, 188 F.3d 322, 326 (5th Cir. 1999) (per curiam) (no physical
injury alleged where a prisoner merely contended that defendants failed to
protect him from other inmates), with Buchanan v. Harris, No. 20-20408,
2021 WL 4514694, at *2 (5th Cir. Oct. 1, 2021) (per curiam) (unpublished)
(concluding that a petitioner’s “alleg[ation] that due to the lack of an
accessible shower, he sustained skin sores on his leg” qualified as a physical
injury). Therefore, we conclude that the district court did not err when it
granted MTC’s motion to dismiss.
AFFIRMED.
6