B.W. v. Austin Indep School Dist ( 2023 )


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  • Case: 22-50158         Document: 00516602363              Page: 1     Date Filed: 01/09/2023
    United States Court of Appeals
    for the Fifth Circuit
    United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    January 9, 2023
    No. 22-50158                              Lyle W. Cayce
    Clerk
    B.W., a minor, by next friends M.W. and B.W., formerly known herein as
    Jon AISD Doe,
    Plaintiff—Appellant,
    versus
    Austin Independent School District,
    Defendant—Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Western District of Texas
    USDC No. 1:20-CV-750
    Before King, Stewart, and Haynes, Circuit Judges.*
    Per Curiam:**
    B.W., a white high school student, appeals the dismissal of his
    complaint against AISD alleging that he was subject to race-based harassment
    and retaliation once he reported the harassment. For the following reasons,
    we AFFIRM.
    *
    Judge Haynes concurs in the judgment only.
    **
    This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
    Case: 22-50158      Document: 00516602363          Page: 2    Date Filed: 01/09/2023
    No. 22-50158
    I.
    The events alleged below took place between Plaintiff-Appellant
    B.W.’s eighth- and tenth-grade years as a student in the Austin Independent
    School District (“AISD”), the Defendant-Appellee in this case. All of these
    allegations originate from B.W.’s fourth amended complaint (the
    “Complaint”), the operative complaint in this action.
    The Complaint alleges that B.W. first experienced harassment while
    he was in the eighth grade at O’Henry Middle School following a field trip in
    October 2017 where he wore a hat emblazoned with the slogan “Make
    America Great Again.” According to the Complaint, there was an almost
    immediate “attitudinal change by staff and other students from friendly and
    inviting to cold and hostile.” In November 2017, B.W.’s parents met with the
    middle school’s principal, Principal Malott, after a number of unspecified
    “incidents” in which B.W. had been treated “poorly” “to address concerns
    that B.W. was becoming an object of derision because of his political beliefs.”
    Yet, although Principal Malott promised that an action plan was forthcoming,
    B.W. was subject to verbal attacks “on almost a daily basis . . . because of his
    political allegiance to President Trump.” In January 2018, B.W.’s parents
    again met with Principal Malott to express their concerns for B.W.’s safety
    and the continued absence of the promised action plan; no action plan was
    put in place, though, after this second meeting.
    The Complaint alleges that the harassment escalated throughout the
    Spring 2018 semester. In February 2018, B.W. experienced “backlash and
    push back” after he refused to participate in a student walkout protesting gun
    violence. As the semester progressed, B.W. was “ostracized” for being a
    Republican, a supporter of former president Trump, white, and Christian.
    He was also “harassed” for being racist, anti-feminist, and anti-gay; B.W.
    asserts that he does not espouse these views. For example, the Complaint
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    alleges that B.W. was “made fun of . . . for being a Christian” in Latin class
    when another student said, “Ah, Christians should understand Latin.” And
    “[i]n band class, two students repeatedly harassed B.W. for being Caucasian
    by repeating the evils of the white race in American history.” The Complaint
    also alleges that Principal Malott participated in this “stereotypical think.”
    On one occasion, when B.W. was listening to music using his ear buds,
    Principal Malott “yanked one ear bud out of his ear and stated sarcastically,
    ‘Are you listening to Dixie?’” Principal Malott then walked away laughing to
    herself, and other students witnessed the entire incident.
    The Complaint alleges that B.W. “experienced more and more
    random derogatory comments” from students and teachers after Principal
    Malott’s remarks. One teacher, Ms. Morgan, told B.W. very loudly that she
    was “getting concerned about how many white people there are.” An aide in
    B.W.’s math class, Ms. Cathey, repeatedly called B.W. “Whitey” and said,
    “You need help Whitey?” or “Can’t figure this one out Whitey?” when he
    raised his hand. And Mr. Borders, a teacher, “was very hostile toward B.W.”
    for the entirety of a school field trip. On another occasion, a student pointed
    to the cross around B.W.’s neck and loudly stated, “I don’t like that your
    [sic] forcing your religion on me.” B.W. was left in tears following an incident
    involving his former friend and then-student council president, D.K. D.K.
    had created a meme of B.W. as a hooded Ku Klux Klansman, and later
    admitted to creating the meme because his father had told him not to be
    friends with anyone who was a conservative.
    In May 2018, B.W. wore his “Make America Great Again” hat while
    receiving his diploma at his middle school graduation. Mr. Borders
    responded by “meanly saying” to B.W.: “Ya know, we’re trying to create a
    safe environment here!” The Complaint alleges that there were “no
    apparent consequences for anyone at O’Henry . . . for the way B.W. had been
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    mistreated, simply because B.W. held a different political belief than other
    students and apparently met the harasser’s stereotypical prejudices.”
    The Complaint alleges that the animus toward B.W. continued into
    his freshman year at Austin High School. At the beginning of the Fall 2018
    semester, D.K. approached B.W. about the Ku Klux Klan meme he had
    created of B.W. during the previous school year. B.W. then filed for and
    received a “Stay Away Agreement” between himself and D.K. a few days
    later, but D.K. and his friends “continued to harass” B.W. after the Stay
    Away Agreement went into effect. On one occasion, D.K. approached B.W.
    in front of a group of students saying, “So you really said that? Gay people
    don’t exist?”; B.W., however had never made such a statement. The
    Complaint alleges that “Staff” then met with D.K. and his parents regarding
    his treatment of B.W., but D.K.’s behavior toward B.W. did not improve
    after this meeting.
    B.W. struggled with other members of the student body that semester
    as well. He was insulted and kicked for wearing a Ted Cruz shirt. In his ELA
    class, B.W. asked if he could write a paper on the Second Amendment; the
    other students in the class responded by chanting “School Shooter! School
    Shooter!” while the teacher, Mr. Meadows, looked on in silence. And later
    in the semester, another student “mockingly asked” B.W., “Why are you a
    racist?” That same day, the same student approached B.W. again, this time
    in front of other students as well, and stated that B.W. was a “[f]ucking
    racist.” Later in the semester, B.W. was the only student to rise in his home
    room class for the Pledge of Allegiance when it came on over the loudspeaker;
    a student then told B.W., “America is only for white people.”
    The Complaint also describes various interactions between B.W. and
    his teachers during the Fall 2018 semester. On B.W.’s birthday, his MAPS
    teacher, Mr. Mathney, walked into class and loudly stated, “Woke up this
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    morning to see all the stupid things Trump had done!” During debate class,
    the teacher, Ms. Cooney, loudly stated, “Trump is running [sic] our
    democracy and he is a liar.” A few days after Halloween, Mr. Meadows asked
    the ELA class if anyone had any Halloween candy. When B.W. offered some
    of his, Mr. Meadows responded, “Your candy would be filled with hate and
    oppression” in front of the entire class. And when a substitute teacher, Ms.
    Mauser, overheard B.W. and his friends having a conversation regarding a
    girlfriend during a MAPS class, she told B.W., “I will not have a white man
    talk to me about gender issues!”
    In September 2018, B.W. and his parents filed their first grievance
    with the school board describing their previous complaints regarding B.W.’s
    treatment and the lack of any investigation into those incidents. Two months
    later, after the family met with school officials, the high school assistant
    principal, Steven Maddox, was assigned to investigate B.W.’s parents’
    concerns. The Complaint alleges that B.W. began to suffer from retaliation
    shortly after the investigation was opened. A few days after the meeting with
    school officials, D.K. purposefully bumped into B.W. and said, “I don’t
    deserve what’s happening to me.” D.K.’s friends also approached B.W.
    asking, “Why he’s a homophobe?” and “Why he’s a racist?” In December
    2018, Assistant Principal Maddox provided a written response that
    summarized the conclusions from his investigation. In the written response,
    Assistant Principal Maddox determined that there was no teacher bias and
    harassment. He also concluded that D.K.’s treatment of B.W. qualified as
    bullying according to AISD’s policies and procedures. Assistant Principal
    Maddox then spoke with D.K. and his parents and had B.W. and D.K. sign
    another Stay Away Agreement.
    The Spring 2019 semester was no different for B.W. The Complaint
    alleges that the “verbal bullying and harassment” occurred multiple times a
    day and included B.W. being called a racist, “cussed at,” and “flicked off”
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    daily, often in front of teachers who never intervened. After B.W. had
    expressed his political opinion during a class discussion, the substitute
    teacher, Ms. Mosher, responded “When you are old enough to think for
    yourselves [sic], you will no longer be a conservative.” She then proceeded
    to kick B.W. out of the class and into the cold outside. The Complaint alleges
    that Ms. Mosher generally “verbally harasse[d]” B.W. in front of his
    classmates “because of his political support for Republican Ideology.”
    In February 2019, B.W. was attacked while helping a fellow student
    with a math assignment. B.W. was using his laptop, which had stickers
    supporting Donald Trump on its casing. The encounter began when another
    student, I.L., began tracing a swastika on the back of the student that was
    being helped by B.W. I.L. then told B.W., “I’m going to beat the shit out of
    you.” The next thing B.W. remembers is that he was lying on the ground
    bleeding after being struck multiple times. B.W. and his family reported this
    incident to the AISD police the next day, but the Complaint alleges that no
    action was taken. B.W. later discovered that I.L. had told others that I.L. had
    assaulted B.W. because B.W. was white; B.W. also heard that I.L.’s friends
    were “out to get [B.W.]” In March 2019, B.W. brought a poster of Justice
    Antonin Scalia to his debate class. The teacher, Ms. Cooney, was visibly
    irritated, yelled at B.W., and also told him, “You’re pissing me off!” in front
    of the entire class.
    The Complaint alleges that the harassment continued throughout
    B.W.’s sophomore year of high school as well. Like he was during the prior
    school year, B.W. was called a racist, “cussed at,” and “flicked off” daily.
    D.K. and his friends also “continued to harass and intimidate B.W.” I.L.’s
    friends did so as well and would try to trip B.W. as he would walk by. On one
    occasion, a student told B.W., “if you support Trump you must be stupid.”
    In September 2019, B.W. returned to his debate classroom to retrieve his
    poster of Justice Scalia, but the poster was no longer there. In November
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    2019, B.W. was “berated” while serving as an aide in the attendance office
    by Ms. Lindsay when she saw a Trump/Pence sticker on his new computer.
    And during the Fall 2019 semester, while B.W. was in the locker room after
    cross country practice, “a number of African American students came in and
    said ‘here are all the white boys!’” In March 2020, while B.W. was talking
    with some friends at lunch, a girl standing next to the group turned to look
    directly at B.W. and said very loudly, “Oh my Fucking [sic] God, I’m going
    to kill all Trump supporters, I don’t give a shit who hears it. I want to kill all
    of them.” After an investigation, the AISD police determined that they
    would be taking no further action because the student who had made the
    threat “did not have the means to kill all Trump supporters.”
    All AISD schools were shut down the day after the incident at lunch
    due to the COVID-19 outbreak. B.W. never returned to school and was
    homeschooled during the following 2021–22 school year. Throughout the
    period in question, B.W. and his family repeatedly submitted both formal and
    informal complaints to school administrators recounting the alleged bullying
    and harassment. The Complaint alleges, though, that school administrators
    never acted to remedy the bullying and harassment.
    On July 14, 2020, B.W. filed his initial complaint, asserting claims
    against AISD for violations of his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights
    pursuant to 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
     and for negligence. In its fifth iteration that was
    filed on May 27, 2021, the Complaint maintains the § 1983 claims and adds
    claims seeking redress under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and
    Chapters 106 and 110 of the Texas Civil Practices & Remedies Code. With
    respect to the Title VI claims, which are at issue before us, the Complaint
    alleges that AISD knew that B.W. was being harassed because of his race and
    race-based stereotypes, yet “failed to keep him safe from harm, and failed to
    provide him an environment that was not hostile,” i.e., that AISD acted with
    deliberate indifference. Additionally, the Complaint alleges that B.W. was a
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    victim of retaliation due to his reporting of the harassment subject to Title
    VI. On May 28, 2021, AISD moved to dismiss the Complaint.
    On January 28, 2022, the magistrate judge, who had been referred
    AISD’s motion, issued his report and recommendations and recommended
    that the Complaint be dismissed in its entirety. Regarding the Title VI claims,
    the magistrate judge reasoned that the Complaint was devoid of facts that
    would evince race-based harassment and that the few racially related
    allegations resembled “political statements about race made in B.W.’s
    presence.” Furthermore, the magistrate judge determined that the few
    racially related harassment allegations occurred too infrequently to meet the
    standard for a race-based harassment claim under Title VI. The magistrate
    judge also concluded that B.W. had inadequately pleaded his Title VI
    retaliation claim because the Complaint did not allege that B.W.’s harassers
    were aware that he had filed grievances with either school. On February 15,
    2022, the district court accepted and adopted the magistrate judge’s report
    and recommendations. On appeal, B.W. only challenges the dismissal of his
    Title VI claims.
    II.
    We review a district court’s grant or denial of a motion to dismiss for
    failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) de novo. Whitley v. BP, P.L.C., 
    838 F.3d 523
    , 526 (5th Cir. 2016). To survive such a motion, a complaint must
    allege enough facts, accepted as true, “to state a claim to relief that is
    plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 
    550 U.S. 544
    , 570 (2007).
    “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
    allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
    for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 
    556 U.S. 662
    , 678 (2009).
    Although “detailed factual allegations” are not required, the complaint must
    include “factual allegations that when assumed to be true ‘raise a right to
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    relief above the speculative level.’” Cuvillier v. Taylor, 
    503 F.3d 397
    , 401 (5th
    Cir. 2007) (quoting Twombly, 
    550 U.S. at 555
    ). Conclusory statements or
    “‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement’” are
    insufficient. Iqbal, 
    556 U.S. at 678
     (quoting Twombly, 
    550 U.S. at 557
    ). “The
    plausibility standard . . . asks for more than a sheer possibility that a
    defendant has acted unlawfully.” 
    Id.
     A complaint pleading facts “that are
    ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability . . . ‘stops short of the line
    between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.’” 
    Id.
     (quoting
    Twombly, 
    550 U.S. at 557
    ). Whether the plausibility standard has been met is
    a “context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its
    judicial experience and common sense.” 
    Id. at 679
    .
    A.
    Under Title VI, “[n]o person in the United States shall, on the ground
    of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied
    the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or
    activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000d. Title VI
    “prohibits only intentional discrimination.” Fennell v. Marion Indep. Sch.
    Dist., 
    804 F.3d 398
    , 407 (5th Cir. 2015) (emphasis omitted) (quoting
    Alexander v. Sandoval, 
    532 U.S. 275
    , 280 (2001)). A school district receiving
    federal funds may also be liable for student-on-student harassment under
    Title VI’s deliberate indifference standard if:
    (1) the harassment was “so severe, pervasive, and objectively
    offensive that it can be said to deprive the victims of access to
    educational opportunities or benefits provided by the school”
    (a racially hostile environment), and the district (2) had actual
    knowledge, (3) had “control over the harasser and the
    environment in which the harassment occurs,” and (4) was
    deliberately indifferent.
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    Id. at 408
     (quoting Davis ex rel. LaShonda D. v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 
    526 U.S. 629
    , 644, 650 (1999)). Harassment “must be more than the sort of
    teasing and bullying that generally takes place in schools.” Id. at 409 (quoting
    Sanches v. Carrollton-Farmers Branch Indep. Sch. Dist., 
    647 F.3d 156
    , 167 (5th
    Cir. 2011)); see also Davis, 
    526 U.S. at
    651–52 (“Indeed, at least early on,
    students are still learning how to interact appropriately with their peers. It is
    thus understandable that, in the school setting, students often engage in
    insults, banter, teasing, shoving, pushing, and gender-specific conduct that is
    upsetting to the students subjected to it. Damages are not available for simple
    acts of teasing and name-calling among school children, however, even where
    these comments target differences in gender.”).
    We first observe that the bulk of the Complaint’s allegations do not
    mention B.W.’s race at all. And the few that do are not “so severe, pervasive,
    and objectively offensive that [they] can be said to [have] deprive[d] [B.W.]
    of access to educational opportunities or benefits provided by [his]
    school[s].” See Fennell, 804 F.3d at 408. Indeed, each of these few incidents
    occurred within a period spanning over two-and-a-half years and was
    perpetrated by a different actor. Of these incidents, only one is truly severe—
    where I.L. made it known that he had assaulted B.W. because he was white.
    But this alone is not enough to establish harassment, even when considered
    alongside the few, less severe, race-based allegations. Accordingly, taken
    together, these few, relatively mild, and isolated incidents do not meet the
    standard for race-based harassment.
    Two cases from this circuit are illustrative of this point. In Fennell v.
    Marion Independent School District, three black sisters alleged that their school
    district was deliberately indifferent to a racially hostile educational
    environment. 804 F.3d at 402. The district court dismissed their case on
    summary judgment. Id. at 401–02. This court affirmed the judgment on
    appeal but held that, while there was no genuine dispute as to the school
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    district’s deliberate indifference, the plaintiffs had raised a genuine dispute
    that a racially hostile environment existed. Id. at 409–10. Specifically, there
    were multiple instances of nooses being left for black students (or their
    parents) to find, which on one occasion was accompanied by a note that was
    filled with racial animus and epithets, id. at 402; frequent use of the n-word
    and other epithets were directed at black students, id. at 403–04; one of the
    plaintiffs was “admonished” for her hairstyle by the athletic director who
    referred to it offensively and required her to cut and redye her hair, id. at 404;
    one of the plaintiffs received a text from a white classmate of an animation of
    Ku Klux Klan members chasing former president Barack Obama, id. at 405;
    a teacher told one of the plaintiff’s classes that “all black people [are] on
    welfare,” id. at 405; and another plaintiff was told by her peers that “[b]lack
    girls [aren’t] pretty enough to be cheerleaders” when she tried out for the
    cheerleading squad, id. at 406. The school district contended that the
    harassment was “too periodic and sporadic to constitute a racially hostile
    environment,” but we disagreed. Id. at 409. First, we reasoned that “[t]here
    is no question . . . that repeatedly being referred to by one’s peers by the most
    noxious racial epithet in the contemporary American lexicon, [and] being
    shamed and humiliated on the basis of one’s race is harassment far beyond
    normal schoolyard teasing and bullying.” Id. (internal quotations omitted).
    Relatedly, we also determined that the incident where a noose was
    accompanied “by a vitriolic and epithet-laden note . . . underscore[d] the
    severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive nature of the harassment.” Id.
    Second, although we recognized that racial epithets being directed at black
    students may have occurred more infrequently than on a biweekly basis, we
    were persuaded that the degree to which those remarks were offensive
    counseled finding that they amounted to racial hostility. See id.
    (“Furthermore, this court has held that racially offensive remarks made
    every few months over three years was sufficient to raise a genuine dispute of
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    whether a hostile environment exists under Title VII.” (citing Walker v.
    
    Thompson, 214
     F.3d 615, 626 (5th Cir. 2000), abrogated on other grounds by
    Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 
    548 U.S. 53
     (2006))).
    In Sewell v. Monroe City School Board, 
    974 F.3d 577
     (5th Cir. 2020), we
    revived Title VI and Title IX claims that had been dismissed in the district
    court. There, the plaintiff-student, Jaylon Sewell, had alleged that he had
    suffered harassment stemming from his wearing his hair in a hairstyle that
    purportedly violated the school board’s dress code. 
    Id.
     at 581–82. After
    Sewell was prohibited from attending the first day of school due to his
    hairstyle, the dean of students “ridiculed him every other day by calling him
    a thug and a fool,” and at one point asked him if he “was gay with that mess
    in his head.” 
    Id. at 581
     (internal quotations omitted). The dean also
    discouraged students from talking with Sewell and encouraged a female
    student to lie and accuse Sewell of sexual assault; the dean told Sewell that
    he “wouldn’t be getting in so much trouble if his hair were not that color.”
    
    Id.
     In reversing the case’s dismissal, we reasoned that it was plausible that
    the dean’s harassment of Sewell originated “from a discriminatory view that
    African American males should not have two-toned blonde hair.” 
    Id. at 584
    .
    We noted the many ways that the dean treated Sewell and other black male
    students differently from students who were not black males: only black
    males were sent to the dean’s office on the first day of school for not
    complying with the dress code, only Sewell was penalized for not adhering to
    the dress code despite other non-black and non-male students’ failure to
    comply as well, and the verbal abuse Sewell suffered could be directly tied to
    his race and sex. 
    Id.
     We therefore held that Sewell’s complaint had
    adequately pleaded that the alleged harassment was sufficiently severe,
    pervasive, and offensive to deprive him of an educational benefit. 
    Id. at 585
    .
    Of particular import to us were the dean’s ridiculing of Sewell every other
    day, his discouraging of other students from talking to Sewell, and his
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    encouraging of another student to “concoct an allegation that Sewell had
    sexually assaulted her.” 
    Id. at 585
    .
    Here, B.W. does not allege that any epithets akin to those used in
    Fennell were directed at him. Nor does he point to a frequency of racially
    motivated verbal harassment like that in Sewell. Instead, he argues that the
    “totality” or “constellation of surrounding circumstances” makes his case.
    In raising this argument, he points to a string of inapposite Title VI and Title
    IX cases. All of these cases describe events that either occurred with greater
    frequency or were more serious than what B.W. alleges. See Carmichael v.
    Galbraith, 574 F. App’x 286, 290 (5th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (“Depending
    on the evidence at trial or summary judgment, the series of incidents where
    Jon’s underwear was forcibly removed could plausibly constitute numerous
    acts of objectively offensive touching. Such acts plausibly fall outside the list
    of simple insults, banter, teasing, shoving, pushing, and gender-specific
    conduct which are understandable . . . in the school setting and are not
    actionable under Title IX.” (internal quotations and citation omitted)); Doe
    v. Bd. of Educ. of Prince George’s Cnty., 
    982 F. Supp. 2d 641
    , 652 (D. Md. 2013)
    (“Plaintiffs’ evidence supports the inference that Classmate subjected JD to
    a few instances of sex-charged conduct, including raunchy remarks, lewd
    gestures, self-exposure and, arguably, inappropriate touching.”), aff’d, 605
    F. App’x 159 (4th Cir. 2015); Patterson v. Hudson Area Schs., 
    551 F.3d 438
    ,
    448 (6th Cir. 2009) (“DP was repeatedly harassed over a number of years
    [more than 200 times in one school year]. . . . This pervasive harassment
    escalated to criminal sexual assault.”), abrogated on other grounds by Foster v.
    Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Michigan, 
    982 F.3d 960
     (6th Cir. 2020).
    Furthermore, the allegations that B.W. argues should be considered
    within the totality of the circumstances lie outside the scope of racial animus.
    For example, B.W. contends that “the use of a Klu [sic] Klux Klan meme and
    later being called a Nazi and racist over and over represents [sic] a type of
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    racial animus like no other.” But this is just one of his many flawed attempts
    to conflate political with racial animus. B.W. argues that we may infer that
    the political animus he suffered had racial undertones as well. By his
    reasoning, an attack on a white person because of his conservative or
    Republican views is necessarily an attack on him because of his race. But the
    inferences required to come to this conclusion are unreasonable as
    membership in either group is not foreclosed to those who are not white. And
    the Complaint itself belies this reasoning as it alleges that D.K.
    “admitted . . . that he made the KKK meme about B.W. because D.K.’s
    father told him not be [sic] friends with anyone who was a Conservative.”
    The Complaint is replete with examples demonstrating that most of the
    incidents B.W. experienced were due to his ideological beliefs. B.W. fails to
    connect this political animus to the racial animus that he must show for his
    Title VI claim. Therefore, this claim was appropriately dismissed. 1
    1
    B.W. references some of the incidents involving his teachers in arguing that he
    was subject to severe and pervasive harassment due to his race but cites no authority for
    the proposition that a cause of action exists under Title VI for teacher-on-student
    harassment. Indeed, B.W.’s claim is predicated on our holding in Fennell where we
    determined that a cause of action for student-on-student harassment may be brought under
    Title VI. 804 F.3d at 408–09. The bounds of our decision in Fennell, however, did not
    extend to claims for teacher-on-student harassment. B.W. has modeled his Title VI claim
    as one for harassment as opposed to one for intentional discrimination. And in his reply,
    for the first time B.W. argues that a cause of action for teacher-on-student harassment
    exists citing Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District, 
    524 U.S. 274
     (1998). In that
    case, the Supreme Court held that one may bring a deliberate indifference claim against a
    school district under Title IX for teacher-on-student harassment. 
    Id. at 290
    , 292–93. In
    Fennell, we applied the Supreme Court’s holding in Davis ex rel. LaShonda D. v. Monroe
    County Board of Education, 
    526 U.S. 629
    , 646–47 (1999), that a school district may be liable
    for student-on-student harassment based a deliberate indifference theory under Title IX,
    to Title VI due to the similarities between both legislative schemes. Fennell, 804 F.3d at
    408. It appears as if B.W. would have us extend the holding in Gebser to claims falling under
    Title VI as well by utilizing our reasoning in Fennell. While this argument is compelling,
    B.W. fails to raise it at all in his opening brief and devotes less than one sentence to it in his
    reply without any analysis. Therefore, we consider the argument forfeited and do not weigh
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    Case: 22-50158       Document: 00516602363              Page: 15       Date Filed: 01/09/2023
    No. 22-50158
    B.
    B.W. also challenges the district court’s dismissal of his Title VI
    retaliation claim. As this circuit has done in recent decisions, we will assume
    without deciding that Title VI includes a claim for retaliation. See Sewell v.
    Monroe City Sch. Bd., 
    974 F.3d 577
    , 586 n.4 (5th Cir. 2020) (“Title IX
    encompasses retaliation claims. So we assume without deciding that Title VI
    does too.” (citation omitted)); Jones v. S. Univ., 834 F. App’x 919, 923 n.3
    (5th Cir. 2020) (“We assume without deciding that Title VI encompasses a
    retaliation claim.”) (per curiam); Bhombal v. Irving Indep. Sch. Dist., 809 F.
    App’x 233, 238 (5th Cir. 2020) (“[a]ssuming, without deciding” that a Title
    VI retaliation claim “is available” for the purpose of ruling on its viability at
    the motion to dismiss stage) (per curiam). To successfully plead such a claim,
    a plaintiff must show “(1) that she engaged in a protected activity; (2) that
    the Defendants took a material action against her[;] and (3) that a causal
    connection existed between the protected activity and the adverse action.”
    Jones, 834 F. App’x at 923 (citing Peters v. Jenney, 
    327 F.3d 307
    , 320 (4th Cir.
    2003)); see also Sewell, 974 F.3d at 586 (“A retaliation plaintiff must show
    that the funding recipient or its representatives took an adverse action against
    him because he complained of discrimination. That typically means the
    funding recipient itself signed off on the adverse action.” (citation omitted)).
    “As in other civil rights contexts, to show protected activity, the
    plaintiff in a Title VI retaliation case need only . . . prove that he opposed an
    unlawful employment practice which he reasonably believed had occurred or
    the incidents involving B.W.’s teachers in determining that his Title VI harassment claim
    is not well pleaded. See Tharling v. City of Port Lavaca, 
    329 F.3d 422
    , 430 (5th Cir. 2003)
    (“issues not raised in the opening brief are deemed waived”); Cinel v. Connick, 
    15 F.3d 1338
    , 1345 (5th Cir. 1994) (“A party who inadequately briefs an issue is considered to have
    abandoned the claim.”).
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    No. 22-50158
    was occurring.” Peters, 
    327 F.3d at 320
     (internal quotations omitted); see also
    Bisong v. Univ. of Hous., 
    493 F. Supp. 2d 896
    , 911–12 (S.D. Tex. 2007)
    (applying same). In the educational context, it follows that the plaintiff must
    have been opposed to an unlawful educational practice. When describing the
    complaints to school administrators that B.W. raised in middle school, the
    Complaint provides scant detail as to their substance and only ever alleges
    that B.W. and his parents were concerned about diversity of thought and
    B.W. being harassed on account of his political ideology. The same can be
    said of most of the complaints B.W. filed in high school as well. Notably, the
    Complaint provides more detail regarding one particular grievance, the
    second formal grievance that B.W. filed. Specifically, the Complaint states
    that B.W. alleged violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments and
    Title IX, but it omits any mention of Title VI. There are no other factual
    allegations that could otherwise support a reasonable inference that B.W. and
    his parents engaged in a protected activity, i.e., that they complained to AISD
    that B.W. had been harassed on account of his race. Therefore, B.W. cannot
    satisfy the first prong of the test for a Title VI retaliation claim.
    III.
    The bullying as alleged in this case is a cause for concern. But while
    we do not condone bullying in any form, Title VI does not support a claim for
    bullying generally. A plaintiff like B.W. must allege that he was harassed
    because of his race, color, or national origin. B.W. has failed to do so.
    Likewise, because he cannot show that he was engaged in a protected activity
    when reporting the alleged harassment to school administrators, B.W.’s
    retaliation claim cannot overcome a motion to dismiss. Therefore, for the
    foregoing reasons, the district court’s dismissal of this action is
    AFFIRMED.
    16