United States v. Denton ( 2023 )

Case: 22-40020 Document: 00516605438 Page: 1 Date Filed: 01/10/2023
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit
United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
No. 22-40020
FILED
Summary Calendar
January 10, 2023
Lyle W. Cayce
United States of America, Clerk
Plaintiff—Appellee,
versus
Clay Melton Denton,
Defendant—Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Texas
USDC No. 4:19-CR-241-1
Before Wiener, Elrod, and Engelhardt, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:*
Clay Melton Denton was found guilty by a jury of distribution of child
pornography, receipt of child pornography, and possession of child
pornography involving a prepubescent minor. He was sentenced within the
applicable guidelines range to 240 months of imprisonment, followed by
eight years of supervised release. On appeal, Denton challenges the district
*
This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
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No. 22-40020
court’s denial of his motion to dismiss his indictment and its rejection of his
requested spoliation jury instruction. He also contends that the district court
procedurally erred in its analysis of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6) and failed to
consider disparities among defendants nationwide in denying his request for
a downward sentencing variance.
We review a district court’s denial of a motion to dismiss an
indictment de novo and the underlying factual findings, including a bad faith
determination, for clear error. United States v. McNealy, 625 F.3d 858, 868-
69 (5th Cir. 2010). To prevail on his motion to dismiss his indictment,
Denton was required to show that potentially useful evidence was lost or
destroyed by the Government in bad faith. See Arizona v. Youngblood, 488
U.S. 51, 57–58 (1988) (government’s failure to preserve “material
exculpatory evidence” constitutes a denial of due process irrespective of
good or bad faith but “merely potentially useful evidence” requires a
showing of bad faith); McNealy, 625 F.3d at 868. There is no evidence that
law enforcement personnel intentionally lost or destroyed any digital
evidence in order to impede Denton’s defense. Rather, the record reflects
that the search team followed what they believed to be standard procedures
and conducted a risk analysis before powering down and seizing devices at
Denton’s home. Denton therefore has failed to show that the district court
clearly erred in determining there was no bad faith and denying his motion to
dismiss. See McNealy, 625 F.3d at 868-70.
Next, we review the district court’s denial of a spoliation jury
instruction for abuse of discretion. United States v. Valas, 822 F.3d 228, 239
(5th Cir. 2016). “[T]he party seeking the instruction must demonstrate bad
faith or bad conduct by the other party.” Id.; see United States v. Wise, 221
F.3d 140, 156 (5th Cir. 2000). “Bad faith, in the context of spoliation,
generally means destruction for the purpose of hiding adverse evidence.”
Guzman v. Jones, 804 F.3d 707, 713 (5th Cir. 2015) (addressing spoliation in
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the civil context). Although Denton urges this court to adopt a lesser
standard of culpability, such as negligence, we are bound by the rule of
orderliness. See United States v. Berry, 951 F.3d 632, 636 (5th Cir. 2020)
(later panel cannot overrule an earlier panel’s decision). Denton maintains
that the agents failed to properly power off his devices, seize all components
of his computer system, and map the system. Nothing in the record,
however, establishes that the agents intentionally failed to do these things for
the purpose of hiding exculpatory evidence. Thus, because Denton failed to
show bad faith, we find no abuse of discretion. See Valas, 822 F.3d at 239.
Because Denton did not preserve his claim of procedural error, our
review of his sentence is for plain error. See United States v. Mondragon-
Santiago, 564 F.3d 357, 361 (5th Cir. 2009). In support of his argument that
the district court improperly limited its analysis and construction of
§ 3553(a)(6), and failed to consider disparities among defendants nationwide,
Denton relies on the district court’s remarks that it had never granted a
downward variance in a child pornography case based on the nationwide
statistics submitted by Denton. This argument, however, fails to recognize
that the district court’s remarks were made in response to Denton’s
contentions—in support of his requested downward variance—that
inconsistencies in child pornography sentences exist across the federal
districts and that application of the Sentencing Guidelines in his case is
against public policy. Denton has not shown that the district court committed
a clear or obvious procedural error. See Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129,
135 (2009).
To the extent that Denton’s arguments may be viewed as a challenge
to the substantive reasonableness of his sentence, our review is for abuse of
discretion. See Holguin-Hernandez v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 762, 766–67
(2020); see also United States v. Douglas, 957 F.3d 602, 609 (5th Cir. 2020).
Denton’s argument that the district court erred by not considering the
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nationwide sentencing disparities among similarly situated defendants is
unpersuasive. See United States v. Waguespack, 935 F.3d 322, 337 (5th Cir.
2019); United States v. Hernandez, 633 F.3d 370, 379 (5th Cir. 2011). Denton
is essentially asking us to reweigh the § 3553(a) factors, which we will not do.
See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). Moreover, his argument
does not suffice to rebut the presumption of reasonableness that applies to
his within-guidelines sentence. See United States v. Ruiz, 621 F.3d 390, 398
(5th Cir. 2010).
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
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