Lebedev v. Garland ( 2023 )


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  • Case: 22-60174     Document: 00516608977         Page: 1     Date Filed: 01/12/2023
    United States Court of Appeals
    for the Fifth Circuit
    United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    No. 22-60174
    FILED
    January 12, 2023
    Summary Calendar
    Lyle W. Cayce
    Clerk
    Ivan Lebedev,
    Petitioner,
    versus
    Merrick Garland, U.S. Attorney General,
    Respondent.
    Petition for Review of an Order of the
    Board of Immigration Appeals
    Agency No. A206 243 381
    Before Higginbotham, Graves, and Ho, Circuit Judges.
    Per Curiam:*
    Ivan Lebedev, a native and citizen of Russia, petitions for review of a
    decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissing his appeal
    and affirming the immigration judge’s (IJ’s) denial of his application for
    *
    Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this
    opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
    circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.
    Case: 22-60174        Document: 00516608977           Page: 2   Date Filed: 01/12/2023
    No. 22-60174
    asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention
    Against Torture (CAT).
    On review of an order of the BIA, this court examines “the BIA’s
    decision and only consider[s] the IJ’s decision to the extent that it influenced
    the BIA.” Shaikh v. Holder, 
    588 F.3d 861
    , 863 (5th Cir. 2009). Because the
    BIA agreed with the IJ’s analysis and conclusions, we review both decisions.
    See 
    id.
    This court reviews the BIA’s factual findings for substantial evidence,
    and it will not reverse such findings unless the petitioner shows that “the
    evidence was so compelling that no reasonable factfinder could conclude
    against it.” Wang v. Holder, 
    569 F.3d 531
    , 536-37 (5th Cir. 2009). Among
    the findings that this court reviews for substantial evidence are the factual
    conclusions that an alien is not eligible for asylum, withholding of removal,
    or relief under the CAT. Zhang v. Gonzales, 
    432 F.3d 339
    , 344 (5th Cir.
    2005).
    Lebedev first argues that the BIA erred in finding that he failed to
    show past persecution based on his religious beliefs. He points to his
    testimony about being ridiculed and physically abused by his classmates in
    Russia because he was Baptist.
    This court has previously held that substantial evidence supported a
    finding of no past persecution where the mistreatment described consisted of
    “mere denigration, harassment, and threats.” Eduard v. Ashcroft, 
    379 F.3d 182
    , 188 (5th Cir. 2004). As such, the BIA reasonably found that Lebedev
    had failed to demonstrate past persecution. See Wang, 
    569 F.3d at 537
    .
    Lebedev also argues that the BIA erred in adopting the IJ’s
    determination that his subjective fear of persecution, which was confirmed
    by the IJ’s credibility finding, was not objectively reasonable. See Zhao v.
    Gonzales, 
    404 F.3d 295
    , 307 (5th Cir. 2005). Citing INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca,
    2
    Case: 22-60174        Document: 00516608977             Page: 3      Date Filed: 01/12/2023
    No. 22-60174
    
    480 U.S. 421
    , 431 (1987), Lebedev argues that even a 10% chance of
    persecution in Russia is sufficient to establish the reasonableness of his fear.
    In this court’s post Cardoza-Fonseca decisions, however, we have
    “applied a reasonable person standard when making well-founded fear of
    persecution determinations.” Mikhael v. INS, 
    115 F.3d 299
    , 305 & nn.6-7
    (5th Cir. 1997); see also Qorane v. Barr, 
    919 F.3d 904
    , 910 n.2 (5th Cir. 2019)
    (reading Cardoza-Fonseca as stating simply that the requisite “reasonable
    possibility” of harm need not be “more likely than not”). In Lebedev’s case,
    the BIA reasonably concluded that Lebedev failed to show a “reasonable
    possibility” that he would suffer persecution in Russia based on his Baptist
    faith. See Qorane, 
    919 F.3d at
    910 n.2.
    Lebedev’s remaining arguments on the issue of his well-founded fear
    of future persecution are essentially a disagreement with how the BIA
    weighed the IJ’s factual findings. 1 “The BIA may not overturn an IJ’s factual
    findings simply because the Board would have weighed the evidence
    differently or decided the facts differently had it been the factfinder.”
    Alvarado de Rodriguez v. Holder, 
    585 F.3d 227
    , 234 (5th Cir. 2009) (internal
    quotation marks and citation omitted).
    The BIA’s determination that Lebedev is not eligible for asylum or
    withholding of removal because he did not establish past persecution or a
    well-founded fear of future persecution in Russia is supported by substantial
    1
    Lebedev also claims that the IJ violated his due process rights and substantially
    prejudiced his case by failing to make factual findings related to the prevalence of
    “dedovshchina” or hazing in the Russian military. Though the IJ did not specifically
    reference the term dedovshchina, the IJ acknowledged the existence of hazing in the
    Russian military, and it is clear from the IJ’s decision that he considered the relevant
    documentary evidence regarding the practice. Because the IJ’s decision reflects a
    “meaningful consideration” of Lebedev’s claims of hazing in the military, Lebedev’s due
    process argument is without merit. Abdel-Masieh v. INS, 
    73 F.3d 579
    , 585 (5th Cir. 1996).
    3
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    No. 22-60174
    evidence. See Wang, 
    569 F.3d at 536
    . Because those findings are dispositive,
    this court need not consider Lebedev’s remaining challenge to the BIA’s
    nexus analysis. See INS v. Bagamasbad, 
    429 U.S. 24
    , 25 (1976).
    Finally, Lebedev argues that this court should take into account the
    international condemnation of the Russian Army’s actions in its current war
    in Ukraine and its actions in eastern Ukraine since 2014, contending that his
    refusal to join such an army constitutes an exception to the general rule that
    military conscription cannot serve as the basis for an asylum claim. To the
    extent Lebedev seeks consideration of events occurring before the current,
    ongoing war, he did not exhaust his contention, and this court lacks
    jurisdiction to consider it. See Martinez-Guevara v. Garland, 
    27 F.4th 353
    ,
    359-60 (5th Cir. 2022). To the extent he relies on events during the current
    war, the proper vehicle for his argument is a motion for the BIA to reopen his
    proceedings. Faddoul v. INS, 
    37 F.3d 185
    , 190 (5th Cir. 1994).
    The petition for review is DENIED in part and DISMISSED in
    part.
    4