Valley Const. Co. v. Marsh ( 1993 )


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  •                     UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    for the Fifth Circuit
    _____________________________________
    No. 92-7443
    Summary Calendar
    _____________________________________
    VALLEY CONSTRUCTION COMPANY,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    VERSUS
    JOHN MARSH, Secretary of the
    Army of the Unites States, ET AL.,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    ______________________________________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Mississippi
    (EC91-33-S-D)
    ______________________________________________________
    (January 14, 1993)
    Before JOLLY, DUHÉ, and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:1
    Valley Construction Co. appeals the district court's grant
    of summary judgment in favor of the United States Army Corps of
    Engineers.     Finding that no genuine issue of material fact
    exists, and that the Corps is entitled to judgment as a matter of
    law, we affirm.
    FACTS
    Valley Construction Co. (Appellant) bids competitively on
    1
    Local Rule 47.5 provides: "The publication of opinions that
    have no precedential value and merely decide particular cases on
    the basis of well-settled principles of law imposes needless
    expense on the public and burdens on the legal profession."
    Pursuant to that Rule, the Court has determined that this opinion
    should not be published.
    military and civil construction projects procured by the U.S.
    Army Corps of Engineers (Appellee) and other U.S. agencies.
    Appellant is a small business concern within the meaning of 
    15 U.S.C. § 632
    ,2 but is not a socially and economically
    disadvantaged small business concern as defined in 
    15 U.S.C. § 637
    (a).3   These disadvantaged small business concerns are known
    as "8(a)" contractors, and may bid on contracts that are
    exclusively designated for the Small Business Administration's
    8(a) Program.4
    Appellee sought to open bidding on a contract to build the
    Dewayne Hayes/Stinson Creek Project (the contract), a recreation
    park to be built in Mississippi.       Appellee offered the contract
    to the SBA and, after considering the factors enumerated in the
    Federal Acquisition Regulations, 
    48 C.F.R. § 19.804-1
    ,5 Appellee
    2
    
    15 U.S.C. § 632
    (a) states in part "[f]or the purposes of this
    chapter, a small business concern, . . . shall be deemed to be
    one which is independently owned and operated and which is not
    dominant in its field of operation."
    3
    
    15 U.S.C. § 637
    (a)(5) states "[s]ocially disadvantaged
    individuals are those who have been subjected to racial or ethnic
    prejudice or cultural bias because of their identity as a member
    of a group without regard to their individual qualities."
    
    15 U.S.C. § 637
    (a)(6)(A) states in part "[e]conomically
    disadvantaged individuals are those socially disadvantaged
    individuals whose ability to compete in the free enterprise
    system has been impaired due to diminished capital and credit
    opportunities as compared to others in the same business area who
    are not socially disadvantaged."
    4
    48 C.F.R. Subpart 19.8 sets forth the Federal Acquisition
    Regulations for contracting with the Small Business
    Administration (the 8(a) Program).
    5
    
    48 C.F.R. § 19.804-1
     provides:
    In determining the extent to which a requirement
    2
    designated the contract for exclusive bidding by 8(a)
    contractors.
    Appellant, desiring to bid on the contract, sued alleging
    that the Corps failed to conduct a required proportional impact
    analysis to determine any possible effect exclusion would have on
    small business non-8(a) contractors, such as Appellant.
    Appellant argued that this failure caused Appellee to designate
    the contract for 8(a) contractors in an arbitrary and capricious
    manner.   Appellant sought and was granted a temporary restraining
    order to prevent Appellee from awarding the contract.   Appellant
    then sought a preliminary injunction, which was denied.
    Thereafter both parties requested summary judgment, and the
    district court ruled in favor of Appellee.   Appellant appeals
    this ruling.
    DISCUSSION
    should be offered in support of the 8(a) Program, the
    agency should evaluate-
    (a) Its current and future plans to acquire the
    specific items or work that 8(a) contractors are
    seeking to provide, identified in terms of-
    (1) Quantities required or the number of
    construction projects planned; and
    (2) Performance or delivery requirements,
    including required monthly production rates, when
    applicable.
    (b) Its current and future plans to acquire items
    or work similar in nature and complexity to that
    specified in the business plan;
    (c) Problems encountered in previous acquisitions
    of the items or work from the 8(a) contractors and/or
    other contractors;
    (d) The impact of any delay in delivery;
    (e) Whether the items or work have previously been
    acquired using small business set-asides; and
    (f) Any other pertinent information . . . .
    3
    Standard of Review
    Summary judgment is appropriate if the record discloses "that
    there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
    moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."           Fed.
    R. Civ. P. 56(c).    In reviewing the summary judgment, we apply the
    same standard of review as did the district court.            Waltman v.
    International Paper Co., 
    875 F.2d 468
    , 474 (5th Cir. 1989); Moore
    v. Mississippi Valley State Univ., 
    871 F.2d 545
    , 548 (5th Cir.
    1989).   We must "review the facts drawing all inferences most
    favorable to the party opposing the motion."          Reid v. State Farm
    Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 
    784 F.2d 577
    , 578 (5th Cir. 1986).           If the
    record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to
    find for the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue for trial.
    Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 
    475 U.S. 574
    ,
    587 (1986); see Boeing Co. v. Shipman, 
    411 F.2d 365
    , 374-75 (5th
    Cir. 1969) (en banc).
    Impact Analysis Requirement
    No impact analysis was conducted for this contract. Appellant
    argues that 
    48 C.F.R. § 19.804-1
    (2)(e) requires Appellee to conduct
    an impact analysis prior to offering the contract into the SBA's
    8(a) Program.6      Appellee   responds   that   §   19.804-1(2)(e)   only
    requires Appellee to consider whether the work being set aside for
    the 8(a) Program has "previously been acquired using small business
    6
    Appellant relies upon Fordice Construction Co. v. Marsh, Civil
    Action No. W81-0028(W) (S.D. Miss. Mar. 14, 1990), an unpublished
    decision. Not only is Fordice factually distinguishable from
    this case, but it is non-binding on this court. We are not
    persuaded to follow the reasoning in Fordice.
    4
    set-asides."       Appellee has interpreted this regulation to require
    impact analysis only when a contract previously available to all
    small businesses is redesignated as an exclusive 8(a) contract,
    thereby causing a non-8(a) small business to lose the contract;
    such analysis does not apply to new, non-recurring construction
    contracts because "a business cannot be historically dependent on
    a contract that it has never in fact obtained or performed."
    It     is   well   settled    that      we   must    respect   Appellee's
    interpretation of § 19.804-1(2)(e) if it is reasonable, even if we
    may have interpreted the regulation differently.              Kinnet Dairies,
    Inc. v. Farrow, 
    580 F.2d 1260
    , 1270 (5th Cir. 1978) (quoting Udall
    v. Tallman, 
    380 U.S. 1
    , 4 (1965)).             Appellee's interpretation of
    the regulation to require impact analysis only when recurring
    contracts    are    redesignated   as       exclusively   available   to   8(a)
    contractors is well-reasoned.        Furthermore, it is consistent with
    the plain meaning of the regulation, which states that Appellee
    should consider whether "the items or work have previously been
    acquired using small business set-asides."                
    48 C.F.R. § 19.804
    -
    1(2)(e).    The district court properly granted summary judgment in
    favor of Appellee.
    Finding that Appellee is entitled to judgment as a matter of
    law, we AFFIRM the district court's grant of summary judgment.
    5