Swartz v. First Worthing Mgmt ( 1995 )


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  •                IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    No. 95-10284
    (Summary Calendar)
    RICHARD ALLEN SWARTZ,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    versus
    FIRST WORTHING MGMT, COMPANY,
    ET AL.,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Texas
    (3:95-CV-167-R)
    (June 1, 1995)
    Before DUHÉ, WIENER and STEWART, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    Plaintiff-Appellant   Richard   Allen    Swartz,   a   Texas   inmate
    proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis (IFP), appeals from the
    *
    Local Rule 47.5 provides: "The publication of opinions that
    have no precedential value and merely decide particular cases on
    the basis of well-settled principles of law imposes needless
    expense on the public and burdens on the legal profession."
    Pursuant to that Rule, the Court has determined that this opinion
    should not be published.
    dismissal in district court pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) of
    his suit against Defendants-Appellees.     For the reasons set forth
    below, we affirm.
    I
    FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
    Swartz filed his complaint against four non-diverse parties,
    to-wit:    First Worthing Management Company (FWM), Jefferson Park
    Apartments, Lori Ann Turner, the on-site manager for FWM, and
    Debbie Liebman, regional supervisor for FWM.       Swartz noted in his
    complaint that he had five other lawsuits pending in federal
    district court, four filed two months prior to this complaint and
    one filed nine months earlier.
    Swartz alleged that on November 18, 1993, he was arrested and
    released on bond for misdemeanor assault.         On November 19th, at
    approximately 6:30 p.m., Swartz deposited his check, a "reletting
    fee," due by midnight on the 20th, in the Jefferson Park rent-
    deposit box.     The next day Turner came to Swartz's place of
    employment and returned the check to him.           She told him that
    Liebman had instructed her to serve Swartz with an eviction notice
    for failure to pay the reletting fee timely.       Swartz was asked to
    leave the apartment complex.
    Swartz claims that he attempted to find an apartment at other
    complexes, but was disapproved as a result of the information
    spread by Turner.     Swartz contended that his parole officer, Eric
    Trainer,    falsely   informed   Turner   of     Swartz's   offense   of
    2
    conviction.1    Swartz also alleged that before November 18th his
    credit rating was excellent.
    From these facts, Swartz asserted an action premised on
    discrimination and slander by Defendants-Appellees.
    The district court, without benefit of a questionnaire or a
    Spears2 hearing, viewed Swartz's allegations as asserting that the
    Defendants discriminated against him because he had been arrested.
    The court dismissed the complaint without prejudice for want of
    jurisdiction, concluding that the suit should be filed in state
    court.
    II
    ANALYSIS
    Although inartfully worded, Swartz's brief argues that the
    district court erred in concluding that it lacked jurisdiction over
    his claim of discrimination.        We review de novo a dismissal for
    want of subject matter jurisdiction.         EP Operating Ltd. v. Placid
    Oil Co., 
    26 F.3d 563
    , 566 (5th Cir. 1994).
    The district court viewed Swartz's allegations as claiming
    discrimination stemming from his arrest.           The complaint can also
    be construed, however, as alleging discrimination by Defendants-
    Appellees based on the false information given by Swartz's parole
    officer.       Trainer   informed   Turner    of   Swartz's   offense    of
    conviction, but in so doing stated the wrong offense.                   This
    1
    Before this court, Swartz alleges that Trainer spoke with
    Turner on November 20th.
    2
    Spears v. McCotter, 
    766 F.2d 179
    , 181 (5th Cir. 1985).
    3
    possibly led to the management decision wrongfully to evict Swartz
    and to spread the word of that for which he was convicted.
    Given   this   version   of   facts   presented   by   Swartz,   it   is
    possible that he has attempted to state a civil rights claim
    pursuant to 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
    .        See Daniel v. Ferguson, 
    839 F.2d 1124
    , 1128, 1130-31 (5th Cir. 1988).        Swartz did not name Trainer
    as a defendant, however, and the complaint does not indicate what
    federal right of Swartz has been impinged.              Moreover, on the
    limited facts presented in the record, it is unclear whether such
    a claim has even been raised.
    Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), a complaint must set forth the
    basis of the federal court's jurisdiction, a short and plain
    statement of the plaintiff's claim or claims, and the relief that
    the plaintiff seeks.    "Because there is no presumption in favor of
    federal court jurisdiction and that jurisdiction is limited, the
    basis for jurisdiction must be affirmatively shown."              Kirkland
    Masonry, Inc. v. Commissioner, 
    614 F.2d 532
    , 533 (5th Cir. 1980).
    "Procedural requirements established by Congress for gaining access
    to the federal courts are not to be disregarded by courts out of a
    vague sympathy for particular litigants."        Baldwin County Welcome
    Center v. Brown, 
    466 U.S. 147
    , 152 (1984).
    A review of Swartz's complaint and his appellate brief does
    not indicate, even under liberal construction, how Swartz properly
    attempted to invoke the district court's jurisdiction.3           The main
    3
    We note the difference in handwriting from the complaint
    and the appellate brief. Whoever is now assisting Swartz with his
    legal writings understands how to state appellate jurisdiction.
    4
    thrust of Swartz's complaint appears to concern state law claims of
    wrongful eviction, slander, and whatever type of discrimination he
    attempted to allege.      As discussed above, the liberally construed
    complaint's possible civil rights claim is unclear and latent.
    Even if the district court had provided Swartz an opportunity to
    flesh out the factual basis of the complaint, it remains doubtful
    whether federal jurisdiction would have become manifest.              But see
    Macias v. Raul A. (Unknown), Badge No. 153, 
    23 F.3d 94
    , 97
    (5th   Cir.)   (noting   that    this   court's    "license    to   engage    in
    speculation    as   to   the    existence   of    additional    facts"   to    a
    complaint, filed by a plaintiff proceeding IFP, is limited by the
    district court's use of hearings or questionnaires to flesh out
    those facts), cert. denied, 
    115 S. Ct. 220
     (1994).             Therefore, the
    district court did not err in dismissing, without prejudice,
    Swartz's complaint for lack of federal jurisdiction.
    AFFIRMED.
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