Seaton v. Goodwin ( 2022 )

Case: 20-30254 Document: 00516545966 Page: 1 Date Filed: 11/15/2022
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit
United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
No. 20-30254
FILED
November 15, 2022
Summary Calendar
Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk
Richard A. Seaton, Jr.,
Petitioner—Appellant,
versus
Jerry Goodwin, Warden, David Wade Correctional Center,
Respondent—Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Louisiana
USDC No. 5:17-CV-1556
Before King, Higginson, and Willett, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:*
Richard A. Seaton, Jr., Louisiana prisoner #595392, appeals the denial
of 28 U.S.C. § 2254 application challenging his convictions and sentences for
forcible rape and abusing his office as the Assistant Chief Administrator for
the City of Shreveport. He argues that (1) his trial counsel rendered
*
Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.
Case: 20-30254 Document: 00516545966 Page: 2 Date Filed: 11/15/2022
No. 20-30254
ineffective assistance by failing to cross-examine the victim, K.W., and her
mother, Kimberly Barnes, on several subjects and purported discrepancies,
and (2) the State violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and Giglio
v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972), by withholding (a) the report of Officer
Matthew Holloway of the Shreveport Police Department, (b) the recording
of the 911 call made by Barnes, and (c) the “Background Event Chronology”
(Chronology). To the extent that Seaton argues that his trial counsel
rendered ineffective assistance by failing to introduce video evidence
showing that he did not have time to dispose of certain items, his argument
exceeds the scope of the certificate of appealability such that we lack
jurisdiction to consider it. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c); Carty v. Thaler, 583 F.3d
244, 266 (5th Cir. 2009).
Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(AEDPA), we may not grant Seaton habeas corpus relief unless the state
court judgment rejecting his constitutional claims “was contrary to, or
involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States” or “was based on
an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented
in the State court proceeding.” § 2254(d). A state court’s application of
clearly established law is not unreasonable unless it is “so lacking in
justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in
existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.”
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011). This standard is intentionally
“difficult to meet,” and “even a strong case for relief does not mean the state
court’s contrary conclusion was unreasonable.” Id. at 102.
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Seaton must
show that (1) his counsel’s performance was deficient in that it fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness and (2) the deficient performance
prejudiced his defense. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689-94
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(1984). In reviewing an attorney’s performance, we “must indulge a strong
presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable
professional assistance.” Id. at 689. Under the prejudice prong, Seaton must
show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for his counsel’s deficient
performance, the result of the proceeding would have been different. See id.
at 694. “A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome.” Id. The standards created by Strickland and
§ 2254(d) are both highly deferential, and when the two apply in tandem,
review is doubly so.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 105 (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted).
Seaton’s ineffective assistance claims are all fundamentally based on
the premise that his trial counsel should have attempted to show that K.W.
consensually had sex with him and then lied about being raped in hopes of
gaining leverage over the City of Shreveport to get her boyfriend released
from jail, a theory which Seaton, himself, twice admitted on cross-
examination made no sense. Seaton does not explain why counsel should
have mounted such a defense when he identifies no evidence, including his
own testimony, indicating that K.W. ever requested that he get her boyfriend
out of jail or threatened him for refusing to do so. He fails to show that the
State court’s determination that counsel did not perform deficiently was
contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law
or was based upon an unreasonable determination of the facts. See Strickland,
466 U.S. at 689; § 2254(d). Further, although he asserts that the trial court
was entitled to have had the information that would have been gained from
cross-examining K.W. and Barnes on the identified subjects prior to making
its dispositive credibility determination, he offers no substantive argument
showing that such information would have altered the outcome of his trial
given the other, substantial record evidence supporting his conviction. See
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. Seaton fails to show that he is entitled to § 2254
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relief on his ineffective assistance of counsel claims. See Strickland, 466 U.S.
at 689-94; § 2254(d).
To establish a Brady violation, Seaton must demonstrate that (1) the
prosecution suppressed evidence that was (2) favorable to him and
(3) material to the issue of his guilt or punishment. See Smith v. Cain, 565
U.S. 73, 75 (2012). The prosecution’s duty to disclose extends to
information affecting the credibility of witnesses whose testimony “may well
be determinative of guilt or innocence.” Giglio, 405 U.S. at 154 (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). “[E]vidence is material only if there
is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the
defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” United
States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985). “A reasonable probability is one
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Pennsylvania v. Ritchie,
480 U.S. 39, 57 (1987) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Seaton did not claim that the State withheld Officer Holloway’s report
in violation of Brady until he filed his reply in the district court; because the
state courts did not adjudicate the merits of this claim, AEDPA deference
does not apply, and this court reviews the district court’s factual findings for
clear error and its rulings on questions of law de novo. See Miller v. Dretke,
431 F.3d 241, 244 (5th Cir. 2005).
The district court held that the Holloway report was not material
because the information contained therein was not sufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome of the trial in light of the record as a whole. See
Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 57. Although Seaton speculates as to how the report
could have been favorable to his defense, his speculation is insufficient to
undermine confidence in the verdict given the other evidence of his guilt
adduced at trial. See Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 57. He fails to show that the district
court erred by denying this claim. See Miller, 431 F.3d at 244.
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Likewise, while he speculates that the 911 recording and Chronology
might have aided his defense, Seaton offers no substantive argument
explaining how they would have been sufficient to undermine confidence in
the verdict given the other evidence of his guilt adduced at trial. See Ritchie,
480 U.S. at 57. Given the deference owed the state court, he fails to show
that he is entitled to habeas relief on these remaining Brady/Giglio claims.
See § 2254(d).
AFFIRMED.
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