Sean Owens v. Neovia Logistics, L.L.C. ( 2020 )


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  •      Case: 19-10476      Document: 00515437144         Page: 1    Date Filed: 06/02/2020
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    United States Court of Appeals
    No. 19-10476
    Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    Summary Calendar                         June 2, 2020
    Lyle W. Cayce
    SEAN OWENS,                                                                   Clerk
    Plaintiff-Appellant
    v.
    NEOVIA LOGISTICS, L.L.C.,
    Defendant-Appellee
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Texas
    USDC No. 3:17-CV-1719
    Before JOLLY, JONES, and SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM: *
    Sean Owens appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment to
    the defendant in this Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) suit. He argues that
    certain exhibits should not have been considered and that he does not qualify
    as an exempt administrative employee for FLSA purposes. Finding no
    reversible error, we affirm.
    * Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not
    be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH
    CIR. R. 47.5.4.
    Case: 19-10476   Document: 00515437144    Page: 2   Date Filed: 06/02/2020
    No. 19-10476
    This court reviews the grant of a motion for summary judgment de novo.
    Xtreme Lashes, LLC v. Xtended Beauty, Inc., 
    576 F.3d 221
    , 226 (5th Cir. 2009).
    Summary judgment “shall” be entered “if the movant shows that there is no
    genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment
    as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). When reviewing a ruling on a motion
    for summary judgment, this court views all facts and evidence in the light most
    favorable to the nonmoving party. Xtreme Lashes, 
    LLC, 576 F.3d at 226
    .
    The FLSA provides that a covered employee shall be paid overtime
    compensation for every hour worked in excess of forty hours in a week, but
    administrative employees are exempt from this provision.               29 U.S.C.
    §§ 207(a)(1), 213(a)(1); Belt v. EmCare, Inc., 
    444 F.3d 403
    , 407 (5th Cir. 2006).
    One qualifies as an administrative employee if, inter alia, his main task
    involves both (1) “the performance of office or non-manual work directly
    related to the management or general business operations of the employer or
    the employer’s customers” and (2) “the exercise of discretion and independent
    judgment with respect to matters of significance.” 29 C.F.R. § 541.200(a)(2)–
    (3).
    The defendant bears the burden of persuasion as to whether its employee
    meets the criteria for the administrative exemption. The “ultimate decision
    whether an employee is exempt from the FLSA’s overtime compensation
    provisions is a question of law” that is reviewed de novo. Cheatham v. Allstate
    Ins. Co., 
    465 F.3d 578
    , 584 (5th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and
    citation omitted). Additionally, FLSA exemptions must be read fairly and
    should not be narrowly construed against the employer. Faludi v. U.S. Shale
    Solutions, L.L.C., 
    950 F.3d 269
    , 273 (5th Cir. 2020) (citing Encino Motorcars,
    L.L.C. v. Navarro, 
    138 S. Ct. 1134
    , 1142 (2018)).
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    No. 19-10476
    When considering Owens’s claims, the magistrate judge, whose report
    and recommendation was adopted by the district court, applied undisputed
    facts established by the summary judgment evidence to the pertinent law. The
    court granted Neovia’s motion for summary judgment and accordingly denied
    that filed by Owens. Owens’s pro se briefing in this court fails to create a
    genuine issue of material fact challenging the district court’s conclusion that
    Owens qualifies as an administrative employee.
    Neovia’s business is providing logistics services to clients, helping them
    to achieve cost savings through increased efficiency and productivity in their
    facilities. Owens was employed for about two years as a Continuous
    Improvement Supervisor.        With a bachelors’ degree and two decades
    experience in the field as required job qualifications, his duties were to lead
    workshops; travel to client facilities; analyze clients’ operations and report on
    how to improve them.
    Concerning the first part of the test, Owens argues that his job consisted
    primarily of manual labor in a warehouse, but the record citations he provides
    show only his physical locations and do not undermine the district court’s
    conclusions that his primary task was non-manual work related to Neovia’s
    management or general business operations and that he was able to exercise
    discretion while performing this task. Indeed, Owens explained his “primary
    duty was to be a trainer and assist facilities with becoming NOS compliant.”
    Moreover, “[p]erforming some manual work does not automatically remove an
    employee from exempt status so long as the manual work is ‘directly and
    closely related to the work requiring the exercise of discretion and independent
    judgment.’” Renfro v. Ind. Mich. Power Co., 
    370 F.3d 512
    , 519 (6th Cir. 2004)
    (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 541.203(b)). The manual work that Owens performed was
    for the purpose of inquiring how a facility worked and then advising the client
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    how it could improve. Accordingly, the district court fairly categorized that
    work as “collateral to his primary duty of making the facility more efficient.”
    See Dalheim v. KDFW-TV, 
    918 F.2d 1220
    , 1227 (5th Cir. 1990).
    The district court next correctly concluded that Owens exercised
    discretion and independent judgment.       The exercise of discretion involves
    comparing possible courses of conduct and deciding how to proceed after
    weighing the options. 29 C.F.R. § 541.202(a). The exercise of discretion and
    judgment need not be final, decision-making authority. Lott v. Howard Wilson
    Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 
    203 F.3d 326
    , 331 (5th Cir. 2000). The district relied
    heavily on Owens’s own affidavit, in addition to other portions of the record, in
    concluding that Owens exercised discretion when performing his primary duty
    of “improving operations and processes.”
    Owens’s primary arguments against the district court’s conclusion are
    that the court relied on unspecified falsehoods, that the court should not have
    considered the declarations of Neovia employees Maria Olson and Tim Wilson,
    and that questions asked during his deposition were designed to prove the
    defendant’s case.     As each allegation is highly conclusory, they are
    unpersuasive. Because Owens does not identify precisely the allegedly false
    statements or provide record evidence rebutting them, these assertions have
    no value. Carnaby v. City of Hous., 
    636 F.3d 183
    , 187 (5th Cir. 2011) (noting
    that conclusional allegations do not qualify as evidence in summary judgment
    proceedings). Among other things, Owens contends that Olson’s declaration
    falsely asserts that “she worked in [Owens’s] role,” but the record shows that
    Olson did not say that she held the same position as Owens. Finally, although
    he objects to how they were used, Owens does not dispute the statements he
    made under oath in his deposition, which were cited by the district court in
    denying relief. The deposition is competent summary judgment evidence, and
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    the district court did not err by considering it. See Nola Spice Designs, LLC v.
    Haydel Enters., Inc.,783 F.3d 527, 536 (5th Cir. 2015) (noting that depositions
    are competent summary judgment evidence).
    To the extent Olson continues to seek sanctions against the Appellee, his
    arguments are meritless and the motion is denied.
    AFFIRMED.
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