Iwenjiora v. Litchfield ( 1998 )

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
For the Fifth Circuit
No. 97-30536
Summary Calendar
PAUL O. IWENJIORA; CHRISTOPHER ERUCHALU;
GARRY LEE ROBERSON,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
VERSUS
ELMER LITCHFIELD, ET AL.,
Defendants,
ELMER LITCHFIELD, Sheriff, of East of Baton Rouge Parish,
JOE SABELLA, Warden, of East Baton Rouge Parish Prison;
ANN LEMOINE, Prison Health Care Manager,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
For the Middle District of Louisiana
(93-CV-278)
April 15, 1998
Before WISDOM, DUHÉ, and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Paul Iwenjiora, Christopher Eruchalu, and Garry Roberson, all
former inmates at the East Baton Rouge Parish Prison, filed a suit
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Sheriff Elmer Litchfield, Warden
Joseph Sabella, and several other corrections officials in which
they alleged various violations of their Eighth Amendment
protections against cruel and unusual punishment.2 Specifically,
they alleged that they contracted tuberculosis from a fellow inmate
because the prison’s screening and control procedures for
infectious disease were constitutionally inadequate. The
plaintiffs further alleged that after they tested positive for
tuberculosis, the defendants demonstrated deliberate indifference
to their medical needs by failing to dispense appropriate
medications and by ignoring their medical complaints. On
recommendation by the magistrate judge, the district court granted
summary judgment for the defendants and entered a final judgment in
their favor. The plaintiffs timely filed notice of appeal. We
affirm.
2
Litchfield and Sabella are the only defendants named in the
present appeal.
2
We review a grant of summary judgment de novo.3 Summary
judgment is proper only if the evidence shows that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.4 A thorough and
independent review of the record convinces us that Litchfield and
Sabella are entitled to summary judgment.
To have survived a motion for summary judgment, the plaintiffs
were required to proffer evidence that raised a genuine issue of
material fact as to whether the defendants were deliberately
indifferent to their serious medical needs.5 Much of the evidence
adduced by the plaintiffs in opposition to Litchfield’s and
Sabella’s motion, though, was unauthenticated and therefore
inadmissible.6 We have stated that “unauthenticated documents are
3
Fraire v. City of Arlington, 957 F.2d 1268, 1273 (5th Cir.
1992).
4
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
5
See Varnado v. Lynaugh, 920 F.2d 320, 321 (5th Cir. 1991).
6
Among the exhibits attached to the plaintiffs’ memorandum
were confidential prison investigation reports concerning
irregularities in the dispensation of medications to prisoners.
3
improper as summary judgment evidence.”7 Accordingly, we are
permitted to consider only competent evidence in reviewing the
propriety of the district court’s entry of summary judgment on the
defendants’ behalf. Considering only competent evidence, it is
clear to us that the plaintiffs have not met their burden of
raising a genuine issue of material fact.8 In simple terms, the
evidence does not demonstrate that either of the defendants knew of
and disregarded an excessive health risk to the plaintiffs.9 Any
other claims are considered abandoned by virtue of the plaintiffs’
failure adequately to brief and argue them on appeal.10 Litchfield
and Sabella were entitled to summary judgment.
None, however, were accompanied by authenticating certifications
from the custodian of records.
7
King v. Dogan, 31 F.3d 344, 346 (5th Cir. 1994).
8
Even if we were able to consider all of the plaintiffs’
evidence, it is doubtful that they could have survived summary
judgment.
9
See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). See also
Varnado at 321 (mere negligence, neglect, or medical malpractice do
not give rise to a § 1983 cause of action).
10
See Brinkmann v. Abner, 813 F.2d 744, 748 (5th Cir. 1987).
4
AFFIRMED.
5