Antonio Osorio Diaz v. William Barr, U. S. Atty Ge ( 2020 )


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  • Case: 20-60435     Document: 00515674918         Page: 1     Date Filed: 12/15/2020
    United States Court of Appeals
    for the Fifth Circuit
    United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    December 15, 2020
    No. 20-60435                         Lyle W. Cayce
    Summary Calendar                            Clerk
    Antonio Osorio Diaz, also known as Antonio Osorio Diaz,
    Petitioner,
    versus
    William P. Barr, U.S. Attorney General,
    Respondent.
    Petition for Review of an Order of the
    Board of Immigration Appeals
    BIA No. A219 074 544
    Before King, Smith, and Wilson, Circuit Judges.
    Per Curiam:*
    Antonio Osorio Diaz, a native and citizen of Mexico, seeks review of
    a Final Administrative Removal Order (“FARO”) issued pursuant to 
    8 U.S.C. § 1228
    (b), which “authorizes the Attorney General to expedite
    removal of an alien who is not a lawful permanent resident and who is
    *
    Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this
    opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
    circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.
    Case: 20-60435      Document: 00515674918          Page: 2    Date Filed: 12/15/2020
    No. 20-60435
    deportable for committing an aggravated felony.” Valdiviez-Hernandez v.
    Holder, 
    739 F.3d 184
    , 187 (5th Cir. 2013). Osorio Diaz does not dispute that
    he was removable under 
    8 U.S.C. § 1227
    (a)(2)(A)(iii) on account of his
    conviction under 
    18 U.S.C. § 922
    (g)(5), an aggravated felony. See 
    8 U.S.C. § 1101
    (a)(43)(E)(ii). He argues, however, that the agency violated statutes and
    regulations by failing to serve his counsel with the Notice of Intent to Issue a
    Final Administrative Removal Order (“NOI”) and by failing to timely serve
    his counsel with the FARO.
    To begin, the Attorney General (“AG”) contends that Osorio Diaz’s
    petition for review should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. And to be
    sure, we generally have jurisdiction to review “a final order of removal,” 
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
    (a), though we lack jurisdiction to review removal orders
    against aliens who have been convicted of an aggravated felony. 
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
    (a)(2)(C).
    An exception appears in § 1252(a)(2)(D), which provides that
    “[n]othing in subparagraph (B) or (C) . . . shall be construed as precluding
    review of constitutional claims or questions of law.” § 1252(a)(2)(D).
    Because Osorio Diaz’s claims are based on established facts reflected in the
    record provided by the agency and the attorney correspondence that this
    court permitted Osorio Diaz to file, we conclude that Osorio Diaz is raising
    “questions of law” within the meaning of § 1252(a)(2)(D). See Guerrero-
    Lasprilla v. Barr, 
    140 S. Ct. 1062
    , 1067 (2020) (concluding that the phrase
    “question of law” includes “the application of a legal standard to undisputed
    or established facts”). We therefore have jurisdiction to review his claims.
    As to the substance of these claims, the AG contends that Osorio
    Diaz’s purported counsel, Luke H. Abrusley, was not authorized to appear
    as his representative during the administrative removal proceedings, and
    hence, the agency’s alleged failure to serve counsel did not violate the law.
    2
    Case: 20-60435        Document: 00515674918              Page: 3       Date Filed: 12/15/2020
    No. 20-60435
    As a threshold matter, Osorio Diaz responds that this argument should be
    estopped, because the agency affirmatively misrepresented its requirements. 1
    But Osorio Diaz falls short of establishing an estoppel claim, as he has failed
    to show the agency intended for any claimed misconduct to be acted upon,
    nor has he demonstrated how he reasonably relied on such conduct to his
    substantial injury. See Moosa v. INS, 
    171 F.3d 994
    , 1004 (5th Cir. 1999)
    (“Valid assertions of equitable estoppel against the Government are rare
    indeed.”).
    Further, “[t]o prove that administrative proceedings should be
    invalidated for violation of regulations, an alien must show substantial
    prejudice.” Molina v. Sewell, 
    983 F.2d 676
    , 678 (5th Cir. 1993). Osorio Diaz
    disputes whether a showing of substantial prejudice is necessary to obtain
    relief in this case. But this argument is to no avail, as our caselaw makes clear
    that such a showing is necessary. See 
    id.
     (citing Ka Fung Chan v. INS, 
    634 F.2d 248
    , 258 (5th Cir. Jan. 1981)). And, Osorio Diaz has not made the
    required showing of substantial prejudice. We therefore need not decide
    whether there were any violations with respect to the alleged failure to serve
    Abrusley with the NOI and the alleged delay in serving Abrusley with the
    FARO.
    The petition for review is DENIED.
    1
    Typically, we do not look outside the administrative record in reviewing an
    agency’s decision. Goonsuwan v. Ashcroft, 
    252 F.3d 383
    , 390 n.15 (5th Cir. 2001) (“It is a
    bedrock principle of judicial review that a court reviewing an agency decision should not go
    outside of the administrative record.”). We conditionally granted Osorio Diaz’s motion
    seeking leave to supplement the record, and our consideration of the extra-record attorney
    correspondence leaves our conclusions unaffected.
    3