United States v. Flores ( 1999 )

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
_________________________________
No. 98-50579
_________________________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
CAROLINE HAGGARD FLORES, also known as Caroline Haggard,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas
(SA-96-CR-108-1)
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May 17, 1999
Before KING, Chief Judge, and REAVLEY and BENAVIDES, Circuit
Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Caroline Haggard Flores appeals from a decision of the
district court denying her motion to withdraw her guilty
plea to two counts of conspiracy to defraud the United
States. She argues both that the district court erred in
denying her motion and that she was denied her Sixth
Amendment rights during the court’s hearing on the motion.
We affirm the district court’s decision.
We review a district court’s denial of a motion to
withdraw a guilty plea for an abuse of discretion. See
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
R. 47.5.4.
United States v. Grant, 117 F.3d 788, 789 (5th Cir. 1997).
Here, we find that the district court properly considered
Flores’s motion with reference to all seven factors
enunciated by this Court in United States v. Carr, 740 F.2d
339, 343-44 (5th Cir. 1984), for evaluating motions to
withdraw guilty pleas. When Flores entered her guilty plea,
she was assisted by counsel and voluntarily attested to
facts that indicated her guilt. She then waited more than
six months before seeking to withdraw her guilty plea,
during which time the government conducted an expensive six-
week trial against Flores’s codefendants, which would need
to be duplicated if Flores’s withdrawal were accepted.
Based upon these facts, the district court did not abuse its
discretion in finding that the Carr factors supported
denying Flores’s motion to withdraw her plea.
We review de novo the district court’s determination
that the plea withdrawal hearing did not violate Flores’s
Sixth Amendment rights. See United States v. Walker, 148
F.3d 518, 528 (5th Cir. 1998). Flores argues that because
the district court required her to choose between using the
attorney who negotiated the plea agreement or representing
herself, she was denied both the right to representation
free from a conflict of interest, see Mitchell v. Maggio,
679 F.2d 77, 78-79 (5th Cir. 1982), and the right to an
attorney at a critical stage of her criminal proceedings,
see Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 134 (1967). We disagree.
2
In United States v. Henderson, 72 F.3d 463, 465-66 (5th Cir.
1995), we established that an attorney’s participation in a
plea negotiation is insufficient to render that attorney
ineffective at a plea withdrawal hearing. Because Flores’s
attorney did not testify against her at the withdrawal
hearing or otherwise render himself unable to effectively
represent Flores, she was not unconstitutionally denied
representation free from a conflict of interest. In
addition, even if we were to find that Flores was denied an
attorney at a critical stage of her criminal proceedings,
such a denial would have been harmless. See United States
v. Crowley, 529 F.2d 1066, 1071 (3d Cir. 1976). The court
permitted Flores an opportunity to present fully the factual
basis for withdrawal of her guilty plea and she failed to
present a compelling argument, either at the hearing or on
appeal. See id. Granting Flores an opportunity to obtain a
new attorney would not have affected the outcome of her
motion or this appeal.
AFFIRMED.
3