Moore v. Fed Deposit Ins Corp ( 1999 )


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  •                IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    _____________________
    No. 98-11048
    Summary Calendar
    _____________________
    CHERYL A. MOORE,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    versus
    FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE
    CORPORATION c/o Andrew Hove, COB,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    _________________________________________________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Texas
    USDC No. 3:97-CV-3126-H
    _________________________________________________________________
    August 26, 1999
    Before JOLLY, JONES, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    Proceeding     pro   se,    Cheryl   A.    Moore   filed   an   employment
    discrimination complaint against the Federal Deposit Insurance
    Corporation (FDIC). The district court dismissed Moore’s complaint
    pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).           Subsequently, Moore filed a
    motion to file a supplemental pleading in the case, which the
    district court denied.      Moore filed a timely notice of appeal from
    that order.
    On   appeal,   Moore   reargues      the    underlying     merits   of   her
    complaint and challenges the district court’s dismissal of the
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
    this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
    under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
    complaint based on a lack of exhaustion.     However, because Moore
    did not file a timely notice of appeal of the district court’s
    judgment, this court does not have jurisdiction to review the
    propriety of the court’s dismissal.   See United States v. Carr, 
    979 F.2d 51
    , 55 (5th Cir. 1992).   Although Moore filed a motion seeking
    both permission to appeal and reconsideration by the district court
    within 60 days of the court’s dismissal, the district court did not
    construe such motion as a timely notice of appeal, presumably
    because the motion did not clearly evince an intent to appeal.   See
    Mosley v. Cozby, 
    813 F.2d 659
    , 660 (5th Cir. 1987).   Moore does not
    argue on appeal that this was error.    Further, because the motion
    was not filed within 10 days of the court’s order, it cannot be
    construed as a Fed. R. Civ. P. 59 motion, which would have
    suspended the time for filing an appeal.   See Huff v. International
    Longshoremen’s Ass’n, Local No. 24, 
    799 F.2d 1087
    , 1089-90 (5th
    Cir. 1986).
    This court does, however, have jurisdiction to review the
    district court’s denial of Moore’s motion to file a supplemental
    pleading.     Moore argues that by moving to file a supplemental
    pleading, she was attempting to put before the court information
    that she was not aware of at the time of her initial filing.   Moore
    has not shown that the district court abused its discretion by
    denying her motion to file a supplemental pleading.   See Latham v.
    Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 
    987 F.2d 1199
    , 1203 (5th Cir. 1993);
    2
    Southern Constructors Group v. Dynalectric Co., 
    2 F.3d 606
    , 611 &
    n.18 (5th Cir. 1993).
    The judgment of the district court is
    A F F I R M E D.1
    1
    All outstanding motions are DENIED.
    3