Jackson v. Casterline ( 2000 )


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  •                IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    _____________________
    No. 99-30919
    _____________________
    WALTER THOMAS JACKSON,
    Petitioner-Appellant,
    versus
    CARL CASTERLINE,
    Respondent-Appellee.
    _________________________________________________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the
    Western District of Louisiana
    USDC No. 98-CV-1934
    _________________________________________________________________
    July 14, 2000
    Before JOLLY, SMITH, and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    Walter T. Jackson was transferred from state custody, where he
    was awaiting trial on state charges, to federal custody pursuant to
    a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum.         In the United States
    District Court for the Western District of Louisiana, he was
    sentenced to 78 months imprisonment, to be followed by 36 months of
    supervised release, for the crime of assisting offenders in order
    to hinder and prevent their apprehension by disposing of evidence
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
    this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
    under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
    in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 3.         The sentencing court did not
    specify     whether   this   federal   sentence   was   to   be   served
    consecutively to or concurrently with Jackson’s pending sentencing
    in state court on charges of robbery and of receiving stolen
    property.    He was returned to state custody and an Alabama state
    court subsequently sentenced Jackson to fifteen years’ imprisonment
    for receiving stolen property and two years for robbery, to run
    concurrently.    The state judge ordered that the state sentence be
    served concurrently with Jackson’s federal sentence.
    Imprisoned in a state penitentiary in 1992, Jackson was
    paroled in 1997.      He was then transferred to federal custody to
    begin serving his federal sentence.     Jackson petitioned the Bureau
    of Prisons to designate, nunc pro tunc, the Alabama state facility
    as a BOP-authorized facility so that the time he served in state
    custody could be credited toward service of his federal sentence.
    Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3584(a)-(b), this petition was rejected, on
    grounds that such a designation would not be consistent either with
    the intent of the federal sentencing court or the goals of the
    criminal justice system.      Jackson then filed this writ under 28
    U.S.C. § 2241 seeking review of this administrative denial.
    Upon de novo review, see Royal v. Tombone, 
    141 F.3d 596
    , 599
    (5th Cir. 1998), we conclude that the district court did not err in
    rejecting Jackson’s petition. Neither the federal sentence nor the
    2
    sentencing proceedings provided evidence that the sentencing court
    intended that Jackson’s federal sentence be served concurrently
    with Jackson’s pending state sentence.                     Because Jackson’s PSR
    identified the pending state charges, we can assume that the
    district       court    likely    was    aware    of   Jackson’s    pending   state
    proceeding. Indeed, the federal sentence imposed was at the top of
    the   guideline        range,    and    the   sentencing    judge   discussed   the
    possibility of an upward departure because Jackson’s criminal
    history category did not reflect adequately the seriousness of
    Jackson’s past criminal behavior.
    Given the absence of intent that his federal sentence should
    run concurrently (and evidence to the contrary), the BOP Regional
    Director was well within his discretion to deny Jackson’s request
    for a nunc pro tunc designation.                   See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3584(a),
    3585(a)-(b);1 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b); BOP Program Statement 5160.03
    ¶¶ 5-7.        The BOP’s conclusion that Jackson’s request would be
    inconsistent with the intent of the federal sentencing court or the
    1
    See United States v. Wilson, 
    503 U.S. 329
    , 331-32
    (1992)(holding that the Attorney General, through the Bureau of
    Prisons, determines if credit will be awarded to prisoners for time
    spent in custody prior to the commencement of their federal
    sentences).     “Credit [on a federal sentence] for state
    incarceration is given pursuant to 18 U.S.C. [3585(b)] only when it
    was exclusively the product of such action by federal law-
    enforcement officials as to justify treating the state jail as the
    practical equivalent of a federal one.” United States v. Dovalina,
    
    711 F.2d 737
    , 740 (5th Cir. 1983)(internal quotation and citation
    omitted).
    3
    goals of the criminal justice system appears well-founded in the
    record.    The state court’s intent that Jackson’s state sentence be
    served concurrent to his federal sentence is of no effect in this
    appeal.    See, e.g., Jake v. Herschberger, 
    173 F.3d 1059
    , 1065-66
    (7th Cir. 1999).
    Finally, Jackson argues that the BOP should have awarded him
    credit towards his federal sentence for time spent in state custody
    even though that time was counted towards his state sentence.
    Because he received credit on his state sentence for the time
    served    before   his    federal    sentence   commenced,   the    BOP    was
    prohibited from awarding Jackson this credit.                See 18 U.S.C.
    § 3585(b) (“A defendant shall be given credit toward the service of
    a term of imprisonment for any time he has spent in official
    detention prior to the date the sentence commences . . . that has
    not been    credited     against    another   sentence.”).    Due   to    this
    statutory preclusion, the district court did not err in rejecting
    Jackson’s § 2241 petition.2
    The judgment of the district court is
    2
    Because of inadequate briefing, Jackson has abandoned his
    equal protecting argument.     Even pro se litigants must brief
    arguments in order to preserve them. See Yohey v. Collins, 
    985 F.2d 222
    , 225 (5th Cir. 1993). Jackson merely quotes a Supreme
    Court case regarding the standard for reviewing equal protection
    claims. We therefore conclude that he has abandoned this claim.
    See Brinkmann v. Dallas County Deputy Sheriff Abner, 
    813 F.2d 744
    ,
    748 (5th Cir. 1987).
    4
    A F F I R M E D.
    5