United States v. Reynaldo Mata, Jr. ( 2020 )

Case: 20-40152 Document: 00515678556 Page: 1 Date Filed: 12/18/2020
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
No. 20-40152 December 18, 2020
Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk
United States of America,
Plaintiff—Appellee,
versus
Reynaldo Mata, Jr.,
Defendant—Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
USDC No. 2:19-CR-1160
Before Owen, Chief Judge, and King and Engelhardt, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:*
Defendant-appellant Reynaldo Mata, Jr. was convicted of
transporting illegal aliens within the United States in violation of 8 U.S.C.
§ 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii), (v)(II), and (B)(ii). Mata appeals his conviction and
argues that there was insufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict, that
the district court erred in admitting allegedly speculative testimony, and that
*
Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.
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the district court abused its discretion by instructing the jury on deliberate
ignorance. We AFFIRM.
I.
Reynaldo Mata, Jr. was charged in a two-count indictment with
transporting two aliens in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii), (v)(II),
and (B)(ii). Following a two-day jury trial, Mata was convicted on both
counts. Mata was sentenced to twenty-four months in the custody of the
Bureau of Prisons and a two-year term of supervised release.
A. Evidence at Trial
On July 2, 2019, Border Patrol Agent Robert Hankins was working
with his K-9, Kofi, at the Javier Vega Checkpoint in Sarita, Texas. At around
6:45 a.m., Kofi alerted to an F-150 truck hauling a black utility trailer. Mata
was driving the truck. At trial, Hankins explained that this was at the end of
a shift and described shift changes as the “peak” time for alien smuggling.
In response to questioning by agents, Mata stated that he was coming
from the south side of Harlingen and on his way to Corpus Christi. Mata
repeatedly told agents that the trailer belonged to a friend and that he was
hauling furniture. Mata said he had not loaded the furniture himself and had
not been inside the trailer. When asked how he knew that furniture was in the
trailer, Mata responded that he did not. After Kofi alerted to the trailer for a
second time, an agent opened the unlocked trailer door and found nine people
inside. Each was in the country illegally. Mata was then arrested.
Orlando Alba-Diaz—one of the aliens discovered in the trailer—
subsequently testified at Mata’s trial. Alba-Diaz testified that he is a citizen
of Mexico and had arranged to be smuggled into the United States for $7,500.
He was smuggled across the border and eventually ended up at a mobile
home, where he stayed three nights. At around 4:00 or 5:00 a.m. on July 2,
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Alba-Diaz and eight other individuals were loaded into a trailer that had been
backed up to the mobile home. They were loaded in by a person who
instructed them not to “make any noises” or “move around too much.”
Alba-Diaz further testified that, after he was loaded into the trailer, he
heard the following:
The person that got us into the trailer made a
call. You could hear a telephone ringing not too
far away from right there. You could hear that
somebody had picked it up. And he said the
trailer was ready.
Alba-Diaz was asked, “who do you think the person [was] that answered the
phone call?” Defense counsel objected on the basis of speculation and was
overruled. Alba-Diaz responded that he thought the person who answered
the phone call was the driver of the truck. Alba-Diaz further testified that the
caller stated that “the trailer was already ready” and the “driver” answered
that “he was already ready and that he was already there. And [the driver]
came close by and he set up the truck to hook it up.” Next, Alba-Diaz testified
that “[t]he person that got us into the trailer asked are you sure that you want
to take the risk?” The driver reportedly answered: “Yes. I am going to take
the risk. And that’s when he started driving.”
On cross-examination, Alba-Diaz admitted that, although he believed
Mata had been the recipient of the call, he did not know that for a fact. 1 He
made clear that he never talked to Mata on the day he was loaded onto the
trailer and never made arrangements with him. He never saw Mata until he
1
Mata’s cell phone data shows that he had several incoming and outgoing phone
calls from 4:08 through 6:18 a.m. on July 2, 2019. However, the Government did not
introduce evidence to identify the callers or recipients of these calls.
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was taken out of the trailer by agents. 2
Alba-Diaz further testified that the trip to the checkpoint took around
an hour and 45 minutes. However, Agent Carciaga testified that the drive
from Harlingen to the checkpoint typically takes 30 minutes. According to
Alba-Diaz, the truck made only routine stops while driving. He stated that
the truck door was never opened or closed during those short stops.
Alexander Perez-Simon—another alien in the trailer—also testified at
the trial. A friend had arranged for him to travel from Guatemala to Mexico
and to be smuggled into the United Sates for a $10,000 fee to be paid after he
arrived in the country. He also testified that he was loaded into the trailer at
around 4:30 or 5:00 a.m. Perez-Simon stated that he did not hear any voices
outside the trailer and was “hardly paying attention to anything from the
outside.” He did testify, however, that he heard the sounds of “chains that
were hooked up to the pickup” after he was loaded into the trailer, but
contended that the trailer was already hooked up to the truck when he was
loaded inside. According to Perez-Simon, it took about ten minutes “for the
trailer to take off,” and it took about an hour and a half to get to the
checkpoint. He stated that he never saw or met the driver of the truck prior
to being arrested.
B. Jury Charge
Defense counsel objected to the deliberate ignorance instruction that
was included in the court’s jury instructions, arguing that the charge
improperly reduced the burden of proof. The district court overruled the
objection.
2
On the day of Mata’s arrest, Border Patrol agents showed Alba-Diaz two “six-
pack” photo lineups, and he identified someone other than Mata as the driver of the truck.
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II.
First, the district court’s evidentiary rulings are reviewed for abuse of
discretion. United States v. Kinchen, 729 F.3d 466, 470 (5th Cir. 2013). “A
trial court abuses its discretion when its ruling is based on an erroneous view
of the law or a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence.” United States
v. Ragsdale, 426 F.3d 765, 774 (5th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). “If we find
an error in the admission or exclusion of evidence, we review for harmless
error.” United States v. Sumlin, 489 F.3d 683, 688 (5th Cir. 2007). “Any
error . . . that does not affect substantial rights must be disregarded.” Id.(quoting Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(a)).
Next, where, as in this case, a defendant preserves his challenge to a
verdict, we review the conviction de novo. United States v. Suarez, 879 F.3d
626, 634 (5th Cir. 2018). “On a sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge,
however, de novo review permits us to evaluate only the reasonableness of
the jury’s verdict, and not whether we believe that verdict was correct.” Id.Indeed, we review Mata’s claims “with substantial deference to the jury
verdict” and affirm “if a reasonable trier of fact could conclude . . . the
elements of the offense were established beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at
630 (citations omitted). In so doing, we view all evidence “in the light most
favorable to the government and all reasonable inferences made in support of
the verdict.” United States v. Lanier, 879 F.3d 141, 145–46 (5th Cir. 2018)
(citation omitted). Moreover, we must accept “all credibility choices and
reasonable inferences made by the trier of fact which tend to support the
verdict” and “any conflict in the evidence must be resolved in favor of the
jury’s verdict.” United States v. Moreno–Gonzalez, 662 F.3d 369, 372 (5th Cir.
2011) (citation omitted); see also United States v. Robinson, 700 F.2d 205, 209
(5th Cir. 1983) (“The jury [is] entitled to credit [one witness’s] testimony
over that of other witnesses.”). As such, we have held that “[a] defendant
seeking reversal on the basis of insufficient evidence swims upstream.”
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United States v. De Nieto, 922 F.3d 669, 677 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting United
States v. Mulderig, 120 F.3d 534, 546 (5th Cir. 1997)).
Finally, “[w]hen a challenge to jury instructions is properly preserved
for appeal, we review the challenged instructions for abuse of discretion.”
United States v. Daniels, 281 F.3d 168, 183 (5th Cir. 2002). Where the
defendant argues that a jury instruction was inappropriate, “we consider
whether the charge was both legally accurate and supported by fact.” United
States v. Demmitt, 706 F.3d 665, 675 (5th Cir. 2013) (citing United States v.
Mendoza-Medina, 346 F.3d 121, 132 (5th Cir. 2003)). “In deciding whether
the evidence reasonably supports the jury charge, the court ‘reviews the
evidence and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn therefrom in the
light most favorable to the government.’” United States v. Newell, 315 F.3d
510, 529 (5th Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v. Wise, 221 F.3d 140, 147 (5th
Cir. 2000)).
III.
On appeal, Mata challenges the admission of Alba-Diaz’s testimony
regarding the recipient of the phone call, the sufficiency of evidence
supporting his conviction, and the inclusion of the deliberate ignorance
instruction in the district court’s jury instructions. We address each
argument in turn.
A. Admission of Alba-Diaz’s Testimony
Mata argues that the district court abused its discretion by admitting
Alba-Diaz’s testimony identifying the recipient of the phone call as “the
driver” because Alba-Diaz was confined in the trailer and had no basis for
such an identification. Mata contends that the testimony was speculation and
inadmissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 602.
Rule 602 dictates that a “witness may testify to a matter only if
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evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that the witness has
personal knowledge of the matter.” Fed. R. Evid. 602. Critically,
“[p]ersonal knowledge can include inferences and opinions, so long as they
are grounded in personal observation and experience.” United States v.
Cantu, 167 F.3d 198, 204 (5th Cir. 1999) (quoting United States v. Neal, 36
F.3d 1190, 1206 (1st Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1012 (1996)). The
question therefore is whether Alba-Diaz’s inference regarding the call
recipient’s role in the smuggling operation was “grounded in [his] personal
observation and experience.” Id. We conclude that it was.
In United States v. Cantu, we considered whether a district court erred
in allowing a witness to testify as to the working relationship between two
men based only on her observations of the two. Id. Specifically, the witness
testified that she believed one of the men was the other’s boss because she
had “personally observed [him] giving [the other] orders while they were
unloading and storing marijuana in her house.” Id. We reasoned that the
mere fact that “her testimony consisted of a conclusion about the
relationship between [the two], rather than a simple description of a concrete
fact” did not render it inadmissible. Id. Her testimony remained “grounded
in her personal observations of the interaction of the[] two men” and was
thus admissible. Id. Similarly, in this case, Alba-Diaz made a reasonable
inference based on the conversation he heard between two individuals and
the sequence of events he experienced. According to Alba-Diaz, the call was
made immediately after the trailer was loaded. The call-recipient answered
that he was “ready.” The person who loaded the trailer asked “are you sure
that you want to take the risk,” to which the call-recipient answered: “Yes. I
am going to take the risk.” Alba-Diaz testified that it was after that statement
that the drive began. As in Cantu, Alba-Diaz reasonably inferred the role that
the call-recipient was playing in the operation—driver—based on his
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personal observations. 3
Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in
permitting Alba-Diaz to testify that the recipient of the call was the driver of
the truck.
B. Sufficiency of Evidence
Mata contends that the evidence in this case was insufficient to prove
the elements of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii) beyond a reasonable doubt. To
establish a violation of § 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii), the Government must prove that
(1) an alien “entered or remained in the United States in violation of the
law;” (2) that “the defendant knew or recklessly disregarded the fact that
said alien was in the United States in violation of the law;” and (3) that “the
defendant transported or attempted to transport said alien, within the United
States with the intent to further the alien’s unlawful presence.” United States
v. Sheridan, 838 F.3d 671, 672 (5th Cir. 2016). “A jury’s finding that a
defendant ‘knew or recklessly disregarded the fact that [an] alien was in the
United States in violation of the law’ requires the jury to find that the
defendant knows that a person, who is an alien, exists.” Id. at 673. Mata
argues that the Government’s evidence was insufficient to prove that he
knew of the aliens’ presence in the trailer, had the requisite mens rea of the
aliens’ illegal status, or acted willfully in furtherance of their violation of the
law.
We note from the outset that knowledge may be—and often must
be—shown by circumstantial evidence. See United States v. Statin, 367 F.
App’x 492, 496 (5th Cir. 2020); see also Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600,
3
By contrast, in the Fifth Circuit case relied on by Mata on this issue, the witness
testified as to what someone else had heard—a conclusion that was “entirely speculative.”
Doe on Behalf of Doe v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 153 F.3d 211, 218 n.7 (5th Cir. 1998).
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615 n.11 (1994) (explaining that “knowledge can be inferred from
circumstantial evidence”). Indeed, “[c]ircumstantial evidence alone can
establish a defendant’s knowledge or reckless disregard that the [aliens] are
illegally in the country.” United States v. De Jesus-Batres, 410 F.3d 154, 161
(5th Cir. 2005) (discussing identical knowledge requirement in 8 U.S.C.
§ 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii)). Accordingly, we may consider circumstantial evidence
that supports Mata’s knowledge of the aliens’ presence in the trailer. See,
e.g., United States v. Campos, 354 F. App’x 97, 98 (5th Cir. 2009) (finding
sufficient knowledge because a guide took the alien to a “particular gas
station,” knew that the alien could be hidden inside the defendant’s truck,
and the defendant “left [his] vehicle unlocked and returned outside shortly
after the alien was secured in the vehicle”).
For example, in United States v. Durant, we found sufficient evidence
that a driver knew illegal aliens were in her trailer based on the facts that she
was “the sole driver and occupant of the truck in the trailer of which the 20
illegal aliens were discovered,” took a longer than expected route, made
particular statements regarding the trip, and at least two of the aliens had
agreed to pay between $1,000 and $1,200 for the trip. 167 F. App’x 369, 370
(5th Cir. 2006). As in Durant, “the jury could have reasonably inferred that
[Mata] would not have been entrusted with such a valuable cargo if [he] had
not been knowledgeable and involved in the alien-smuggling scheme.” Id.Moreover, contrary to Mata’s contention on appeal, the Government’s
evidence “was not limited to the value of the contraband alone.” United
States v. Rojas Alvarez, 451 F.3d 320, 335 (5th Cir. 2006). The extended
length of the trip—compared to the expected length—further supports his
knowledge. See, e.g., United States v. Pennington, 20 F.3d 593, 598 (5th Cir.
1994); Durant, 167 F. App’x at 370. In addition, the jury could have
“reasonably inferred” that Mata was “referring to the illegal aliens” when
he agreed to take the “risk” of hauling the trailer. Durant, 167 F. App’x at
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370. 4 At bottom, “[t]he jury was free to choose among reasonable
constructions of the evidence.” Pennington, 20 F.3d at 598–99.
Moreover, the evidence also established that Mata knew—or at least
recklessly disregarded—that the aliens were in the country illegally. See 8
U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii). None of the aliens rode in the truck—all were
hidden in a windowless trailer and riding in complete silence. Mata attempted
to transport the concealed individuals through a border checkpoint at a time
known for smuggling. Such evidence is sufficient to establish this element of
the conviction. See, e.g., United States v. Romero-Cruz, 201 F.3d 374, 379 (5th
Cir. 2000) (considering in part that aliens were picked up by defendant in an
area “known for alien smuggling” and “were clearly in transit and
attempting to hide” to establish knowledge of illegal status); United States v.
Lira-Villareal, 102 F. App’x 406, 409–10 (5th Cir. 2004) (similarly
considering as “indicia of the aliens’ illegal presence establishing [the
defendant’s] knowledge” that the aliens hid from view).
With regard to the final element of § 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii)—willful
furtherance of the alien’s violation of the law—the jury is required to find a
“direct and substantial relationship between that transportation and its
furtherance of the alien’s presence in the United States.” Lira-Villareal, 102
F. App’x at 410. This element must be considered “‘under the totality of the
circumstances and after evaluating all of the evidence,’ including taking
proper consideration of ‘the mode of transportation used, the time of travel,
4
Mata argues that “a rational juror could not know as a matter of fact that Mr.
Mata was the person speaking on the phone.” However, as discussed supra, Alba-Diaz
reasonably inferred that the call-recipient was the driver of the vehicle. Mata was driving
the vehicle when it was stopped at the checkpoint and both aliens testified that the truck
only made routine stops before the checkpoint. Neither heard the truck door open and close
during any of the stops. Thus, the inference that Mata made the statements was not
unreasonable.
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the route chosen, . . . and the distance from the border at the time of
apprehension.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Merkt, 764 F.2d 266, 272 (5th
Cir. 1985)). Indeed, we have previously considered that the defendant “was
found to be transporting illegal aliens . . . further into the United States and
away from Border Patrol checkpoints, in a locale known for its alien
smuggling” and took a longer route than necessary. Id. at 411. In this case,
Mata was found to be attempting to drive aliens away from the border while
they were hidden in a trailer—passing through a Border Patrol checkpoint at
an hour described as a peak time for smuggling. In addition, the testimony
reflected that the route Mata took was approximately an hour longer than
expected. Based on the foregoing, this evidence was sufficient for the jury to
conclude that Mata knowingly transported illegal aliens in furtherance of
their violation of the law.
Accordingly, viewing all evidence in the light most favorable to the
Government and making all reasonable inferences in support of the verdict,
we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the jury’s verdict.
C. Deliberate Ignorance Instruction
Mata contends that the district court erred in giving the jury a
deliberate ignorance instruction because the Government “proceeded on a
theory of actual knowledge” and the evidence presented a binary choice—
either Mata knew of the aliens or did not. The deliberate ignorance
instruction is appropriate “where a defendant ‘claims a lack of guilty
knowledge and the proof at trial supports an inference of deliberate
indifference.’” United States v. Kuhrt, 788 F.3d 403, 417 (5th Cir. 2015)
(quoting United States v. Brooks, 681 F.3d 678, 701 (5th Cir. 2012)).
Accordingly, the evidence at trial “must raise two inferences: (1) the
defendant was subjectively aware of a high probability of the existence of the
illegal conduct; and (2) the defendant purposefully contrived to avoid
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learning of the illegal conduct.” Mendoza-Medina, 346 F.3d at 132–33; see also
United States v. Saucedo-Munoz, 307 F.3d 344, 348 (5th Cir. 2002) (“A
defendant’s contrivance to avoid learning the existence of illegal conduct
may be established by direct or circumstantial evidence.”). Conversely, “[i]t
is improper for a district court to instruct a jury on deliberate ignorance
‘when the evidence raises only the inferences that the defendant had actual
knowledge or no knowledge at all of the facts in question.’” Demmitt, 706
F.3d at 675 (quoting Mendoza-Medina, 346 F.3d at 134).
We have also expressly held, however, that a deliberate ignorance
instruction may still be proper even where the Government’s “primary
theory was that [the defendant] had actual knowledge” if the evidence also
“suggests a conscious attempt to avoid incriminating knowledge.” United
States v. Orji-Nwosu, 549 F.3d 1005, 1009 (5th Cir. 2008); see also Kuhrt, 788
F.3d at 417 (explaining that the instruction should not be used as “a backup
or supplement in a case that hinges on a defendant’s actual knowledge” and
is appropriate only where evidence supports the instruction). 5 Accordingly,
though the Government’s primary theory in this case appeared to be that
Mata had actual knowledge, the question remains whether the evidence at
trial raised the two inferences discussed above: (1) Mata was subjectively
aware of a high probability of the existence of illegal conduct, and (2) he
purposely contrived to avoid learning of the illegal conduct. Oti, 872 F.3d at
697.
Regarding the first inference, the same evidence that supports that
5
Mata relies on our explanation in United States v. Oti that, “[w]here the
government relies on evidence of actual knowledge, the deliberate ignorance instruction is
not appropriate.” 872 F.3d 678, 697–98 (5th Cir. 2017). However, in Oti, we nevertheless
conducted the basic inquiry of whether “the evidence raises only the inferences that the
defendant had actual knowledge or no knowledge at all of the facts in question.” Id. at 697(quoting Mendoza-Medina, 346 F.3d at 133–34).
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“the defendant had actual knowledge of the illegal conduct” may also “raise
the inference that the defendant was subjectively aware of a high probability
of the existence of illegal conduct.” United States v. Lara-Velasquez, 919 F.2d
946, 952 (5th Cir. 1990). As discussed supra, Alba-Diaz testified that the
driver, in conversation with the individual who loaded the trailer, agreed to
accept a “risk” in driving this trailer. This evidence does not necessarily
present a binary choice between Mata’s actual knowledge or lack of
knowledge. See id. at 951. The evidence that Mata, as the driver of the truck,
was aware of a “risk” in accepting the job could also establish that he was
“subjectively aware of a high probability of the existence of . . . illegal
conduct.” Id.
Moving to the second inference, a deliberate ignorance instruction is
appropriate if the circumstances of the case “were so overwhelmingly
suspicious that the defendants’ failure to conduct further inspection or
inquiry suggests a conscious effort to avoid incriminating knowledge.”
United States v. Nguyen, 493 F.3d 613, 621 (5th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted);
see also id. at 622 (“Not asking questions can be considered a purposeful
contrivance to avoid guilty knowledge.”). In this case, we find that “the
circumstances of the defendant’s involvement in the criminal offense [were]
so overwhelmingly suspicious” that the “failure to question the suspicious
circumstances” or conduct further inspections “establishes the defendant’s
purposeful contrivance to avoid guilty knowledge.” Lara-Velasquez, 919 F.2d
at 952. Mata agreed to transport a loaded trailer through a Border Patrol
checkpoint in the early morning hours. Mata was informed of a “risk”
associated with hauling the trailer but did not inspect the trailer and asked no
questions about the trailer of the individual who loaded it. The evidence thus
supports that Mata “consciously attempted to escape confirmation of
conditions or events he strongly suspected to exist.” United States v. Lee, 966
F.3d 310, 326 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting Mendoza-Medina, 346 F.3d at 133).
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We thus find that the district court did not abuse its discretion by
instructing the jury on deliberate ignorance.
IV.
Based on the foregoing, we AFFIRM Mata’s conviction, the district
court’s admission of Alba-Diaz’s testimony, and the district court’s
deliberate ignorance instruction.
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