Woolwine Ford Lincol v. Con Fincl Resrcs Inc ( 2001 )

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 00-60314
Summary Calendar
WOOLWINE FORD LINCOLN MERCURY,
Plaintiff - Counter Defendant - Appellee,
VERSUS
CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL RESOURCES, INC.; ET AL,
Defendants
CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL RESOURCES, INC.
Defendant - Counter Claimant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
For the Southern District of Mississippi
( 2:98-CV-148-PG )
December 27, 2000
Before EMILIO M. GARZA, STEWART, and PARKER, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Appellant Consolidated Financial Resources, Inc.
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under
the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
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(“Consolidated”) appeals from the district court’s final judgment
enforcing a settlement agreement between Consolidated and Woolwine
Ford Lincoln Mercury, Inc. (“Woolwine”). Appellant contests the
court’s subject matter jurisdiction to enforce the settlement
agreement. This Court has jurisdiction to review the final
judgment of the district court based on 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
I.
This diversity case involves a dispute over the sale of
automobiles by Woolwine under a lease purchase agreement.
Consolidated participated in the transaction as a broker and
financier. Before the district court ruled on the merits, Woolwine
and Consolidated reached a settlement. Pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 41(a)(2), the district court dismissed the case
with prejudice on January 12, 2000. The court incorporated the
settlement into its order and set out the terms and conditions of
its jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement. The court’s
order stated the following,
[T]he Court retains jurisdiction to enforce the
settlement agreement, and if any party fails to
consummate this settlement within twenty (20) days, any
aggrieved party may reopen the case for enforcement of
the settlement agreement within fifteen (15) days
thereafter . . ..
The court therefore retained jurisdiction over the settlement
agreement for thirty-five days.
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On February 25, Woolwine filed a motion to enforce the
settlement agreement. In its response, Consolidated erroneously
stated that Woolwine’s motion was filed within the court’s
jurisdictional time frame. At a hearing on March 15, 2000, the
court concluded that it retained jurisdiction. The district court
held that Consolidated stipulated that the motion was timely
submitted. The court entered its final judgment for the amount set
out in the settlement agreement. Counsel for Consolidated failed
to appear at the hearing.
II.
We review de novo the legal question of subject matter
jurisdiction. See Merideth v. Louisiana Federation of Teachers,
209 F.3d 398, 402 (5th Cir. 2000). “Enforcement of [a] settlement
agreement . . . is more than just a continuation or renewal of the
dismissed suit, and hence requires its own basis for jurisdiction.”
Kokkenen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 511 U.S. 375, 378
(1994). See also Langley v. Jackson State Univ., 14 F.3d 1070,
1074 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding that courts must have jurisdiction
independent of the original action to support enforcement of a
settlement agreement). In Kokkenen, the Supreme Court held that a
district court can retain jurisdiction over a settlement by either
embodying the settlement contract in an order or expressly
retaining jurisdiction to enforce the settlement. See id. at 381-
82. This court has held that a district court retains jurisdiction
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to enforce a settlement agreement within the terms and conditions
of jurisdiction set out in its dismissal order. See Bell v.
Schexnayder, 36 F.3d 447, 449 (5th Cir. 1994) (concluding that the
court retained jurisdiction to enforce a settlement agreement when
the defendants brought their motion to enforce within the sixty-day
limit set forth in the court’s dismissal order).
There is no dispute that the district court’s dismissal order
was entered on January 12 and that Woolwine filed its motion to
enforce on February 25. Pursuant to the terms and conditions set
out in the court’s order, either party had a maximum of thirty-five
days to file a motion to enforce the settlement agreement.
Woolwine’s motion was filed outside the jurisdictional limits set
by the court. However, Consolidated stipulated that the motion was
filed within the court’s jurisdictional limits. The district judge
relied on this concession to assert subject matter jurisdiction
over Woolwine’s motion. See Tr. at 20.
Litigants cannot stipulate or consent to a federal court’s
subject matter jurisdiction. See Insurance Corp. of Ireland, Ltd.
v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 (1982).
Parties can, however, stipulate to facts that form the basis of
subject matter jurisdiction. See Ferguson v. Neighborhood Housing
Serv. of Cleveland, Inc., 780 F.2d 549, 551 (6th Cir. 1986) (citing
Railway Co. v. Ramsey, 89 U.S. 322, 22 Wall. 322 (1874)).
Consolidated’s erroneous statement that February 25 was within the
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district court’s jurisdiction amounted to an admission that the
court retained jurisdiction over the settlement. As such, it
cannot serve as the basis for the court’s jurisdiction.
The district judge had discretion to set out the terms and
conditions of its jurisdiction over the parties’ settlement
agreement. See Kinneko, 511 U.S. at 381. Because Woolwine filed
its motion to enforce the settlement agreement outside the court’s
self-imposed jurisdictional limits, the district court did not have
subject matter jurisdiction to grant the relief sought. We
therefore vacate the trial court’s final judgment.
VACATED
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