United States v. Whitelaw ( 2000 )

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
_____________________
No. 99-20665
_____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
ALAN WHITELAW,
Defendant-Appellant.
_________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Texas, Houston
USDC No. H-98-CR-450-1
_________________________________________________________________
December 21, 2000
Before JOLLY and DAVIS, Circuit Judges, and RESTANI, Judge.*
PER CURIAM**:
Alan Whitelaw appeals his conviction and sentence for various
federal criminal offenses related to a check counterfeiting scheme.
At a pretrial hearing, Whitelaw urged the district court to
suppress 84 incriminating tape recordings of conversations between
Whitelaw and John Irwin, a government informant. Whitelaw contends
that the government’s actions violated his rights under the Fifth
and Sixth Amendments. When the district court denied his motion to
*
Judge, U.S. Court of International Trade, sitting by
designation.
**
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
suppress, Whitelaw entered a conditional guilty plea. Whitelaw
also appeals the length of his sentence, arguing that the district
court miscalculated the amount of loss attributable to him and that
the amount of loss was an essential element of the offense and
should have been proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Finding no
error by the district court, we affirm the conviction and sentence.
I
Alan Whitelaw was involved in a check counterfeiting
operation. According to the district court, Whitelaw typically
would open a bank account using an alias, then deposit stolen or
forged checks into the new account, and withdraw funds from the new
account before the theft was detected. Whitelaw’s activities led
to both state and federal criminal charges.
Whitelaw was indicted on state charges in June 1998. The
indictment alleged that between October 6, 1996 and November 14,
1996, Whitelaw committed the offense of theft of money in an amount
exceeding $200,000. He was tried and convicted on July 16, 1998,
and was sentenced to 60 years in the Texas Department of Criminal
Justice.
While Whitelaw was in custody on the state charges, he
arranged additional fraudulent transactions. From July 2, 1998 to
September 5, 1998, Whitelaw made numerous telephone calls to John
Irwin, who had been involved with Whitelaw’s other schemes.
2
Unknown to Whitelaw, Irwin had become a government informant1 and
had agreed to record his telephone conversations with Whitelaw.
Because the Harris County, Texas prison does not accept incoming
calls to prisoners, all conversations were initiated by Whitelaw.
Whitelaw was indicted by a federal grand jury in November
1998. The federal indictment alleged bank fraud, possession of
counterfeit securities, and conspiracy. Whitelaw filed a motion to
suppress the recorded conversations on the grounds that the
government had violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel, his
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, and his Fifth
Amendment right to due process. After a suppression hearing, the
district court denied his motion. Whitelaw then entered a
conditional plea of guilty to one count of aiding and abetting bank
fraud. In return, the government agreed to dismiss the remaining
counts. The plea agreement expressly allows Whitelaw to appeal the
court’s denial of the motion to suppress as well as any sentencing
issues.
The Pre-Sentencing Report determined that the guideline range
of imprisonment was 46 to 57 months. This determination was based,
in part, on the assumption that Whitelaw’s criminal history
category was “III” and that Whitelaw was accountable for an
intended loss of $1,188,618. Whitelaw filed objections to the PSR.
At sentencing, the district court sustained Whitelaw’s objection to
1
Irwin entered into agreements with agents from both federal
and state governments.
3
the criminal history category and reduced it to “I”. However, the
court denied Whitelaw’s challenge to the calculation of
attributable intended loss. With a revised guideline range of 37
to 46 months, the district court sentenced Whitelaw to 46 months’
imprisonment, to run concurrently with his state sentence.
Whitelaw filed a timely notice of appeal, challenging the
district court’s decisions as to the motion to suppress and to the
intended loss calculation during sentencing. Whitelaw has also
raised an objection to his sentence based upon the Supreme Court’s
recent decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey. According to Whitelaw,
the amount of loss was an essential element of the offense and
should have been proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
II
We turn now to Whitelaw’s motion to suppress the recorded
conversations. In reviewing a district court’s ruling on a motion
to suppress, we review questions of law de novo and accept the
court’s findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. See
United States v. Castro, 166 F.3d 728, 731-33 (5th Cir. 1999) (en
banc); United States v. Muniz-Melchor, 894 F.2d 1430, 1433-34 (5th
Cir. 1990).
Whitelaw presents three arguments for suppressing his recorded
conversations with Irwin, the government informant. Whitelaw
argues that the government’s act of recording these conversations
violates his Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel, his
4
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, and his Fifth
Amendment right to due process. We address each argument in turn.
A
(1)
The Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches only when the
government initiates adversarial criminal proceedings. United
States v. Laury, 49 F.3d 145, 150 (5th Cir. 1995). Once
proceedings have been initiated, law enforcement officials may not
confront the accused or elicit incriminating information regarding
the charged offenses without counsel being present. Maine v.
Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 176 (1985). It must be emphasized, however,
that the Sixth Amendment is offense-specific; that is, the right to
counsel applies only “to the specific offense with which the
suspect has been charged.” United States v. Carpenter, 963 F.2d
736, 739 (5th Cir. 1992). Consequently, if a criminal defendant
makes incriminating statements pertaining to some other offense to
which the Sixth Amendment has not yet attached, then those
statements are admissible at a trial for that offense. Moulton,
474 U.S. at 180 & n.16 (“[T]o exclude evidence pertaining to
charges as to which the Sixth Amendment right to counsel had not
attached at the time the evidence was obtained, simply because
other charges were pending at that time, would unnecessarily
frustrate the public’s interest in the investigation of criminal
activities.”).
5
This circuit has carved out a narrow exception to the general
rule: “If the charged and uncharged offenses are ‘so inextricably
intertwined’ or ‘extremely closely related,’ then the Sixth
Amendment . . . prohibits interrogation about the uncharged
offense.” Carpenter, 963 F.2d at 740; see also United States v.
Cooper, 949 F.2d 737, 743-44 (5th Cir. 1991). To determine whether
criminal offenses are sufficiently intertwined, this circuit
focuses on the specific facts underlying the charged and uncharged
offenses. As this court recently explained, the relevant question
is “whether the conduct leading to each offense is the same.”
United States v. Walker, 148 F.3d 518, 529-30 (5th Cir. 1998)
(holding that firearms possession and subornation of perjury are
not inextricably intertwined charges because they were “distinctly
separate offenses . . . [that] did not occur within a close
temporal proximity”). The rule in this circuit is accurately
stated as follows: The right to counsel carries over “only where
the new charge arises from the same acts and factual predicates on
which the pending charges were based. In determining whether the
same acts and factual predicates underlie both the pending and the
new charges, courts have looked for similarities of time, place,
person and conduct.” United States v. Arnold, 106 F.3d 37, 41 (3d
Cir. 1997) (citing Carpenter, 963 F.2d at 740-41); see also Laury,
49 F.3d at 149-50; United States v. Williams, 993 F.2d 451, 456-57
(5th Cir. 1993); Cooper, 949 F.2d at 743-44.
6
If a court finds that two charges are inextricably intertwined
and, consequently, that the invocation of the Sixth Amendment right
on the pending charge is sufficient to invoke the right on the
subsequent charge, the court must then determine whether the
government’s actions violated the defendant’s right to counsel. It
is well established that the government may not circumvent the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel by having an informant
deliberately elicit and record incriminating conversations with a
suspect. See Moulton, 474 U.S. at 162; United States v. Henry, 447
U.S. 264, 265-68 (1980); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201,
202-03 (1964).
(2)
In the present case, federal proceedings had not been
initiated against Whitelaw at the time Irwin recorded their
telephone conversations. Therefore, Whitelaw’s Sixth Amendment
right to counsel had not yet attached to the federal charges unless
those federal charges were “inextricably intertwined” with or
“extremely closely related” to the pending state charges.
The district court concluded that the federal and state
charges were not so intertwined or closely related as to invoke the
right to counsel for the federal charges. The court reasoned as
follows:
While Whitelaw may have employed the same method or modus
operandi for defrauding the federal victims as he did
when he defrauded the state victims, he has not been
charged in the federal indictment for the same criminal
conduct alleged and proven at the state trial. As is
7
apparent from the state and federal indictments . . . ,
the criminal conduct charged in the federal indictment
was not charged or prosecuted in any of Whitelaw’s
previous state indictments, particularly the indictment
which ultimately led to his conviction. The conspiracy
charge in the federal indictment does not rely on or even
mention any of the criminal events covered by Whitelaw’s
state trial as acts in furtherance of the criminal
conspiracy. The bank fraud and possession of counterfeit
securities charges allege difference victims, events,
dates, and amounts stolen than those covered in
Whitelaw’s state case.
Our review of the law confirms that the district court clearly
understood and applied the proper standard by focusing on the
specific underlying conduct, the time frame for the criminal
offenses, and the identity of the perpetrators and victims. Our
review of the record also confirms that the factual bases of the
district court’s conclusion are sound.
Whitelaw does not argue that the district court erred in
finding that the charges involved different acts, done at different
times, in different places, with different perpetrators and
victims, and with different amounts stolen. Rather, he suggests
obliquely that the district court misconstrued the law. The
relevant issue, Whitelaw insists, is the “type of conduct”
underlying the charges. Viewed in this light, the acts underlying
the federal charges are part of a larger “ongoing scheme” of
fraudulent activities. He argues that the
alleged conduct is the same: steal a valid check or
account number, counterfeit a check, open an account,
deposit the counterfeit or stolen check, place the
proceeds into other accounts . . . , then proceed back to
step one. This is the scheme or relevant conduct in both
the state and federal case.
8
Whitelaw’s argument is based on a fundamental misreading of one
sentence in the Walker opinion.
As we explained above, the court in Walker insisted that the
correct question in this type of case is “whether the conduct
leading to each offense is the same.” Walker, 148 F.3d at 529.
The court then observed in passing that subornation of perjury and
possession of a firearm are “two distinct types of conduct, the one
not leading necessarily to the other.” Id. We do not question
Walker’s premise that two criminal charges are less likely to be
“inextricably intertwined” if they involve different “types of
conduct.” But nothing in the Walker court’s opinion suggests that
the general type of conduct involved (such as check counterfeiting,
for example) should be the primary factor in the analysis. To the
contrary, the Walker opinion places itself squarely within the
framework established in earlier cases. The Walker court,
therefore, relies heavily on two other considerations: The two
criminal charges were “distinctly separate offenses,” which means
that they involved different underlying facts; and the two offenses
“did not occur in a close temporal proximity.” Id. At most,
Walker throws additional light upon one factor--the general type of
activity involved--but it surely cannot be read to supersede or
overrule prior decisions addressing this issue of whether criminal
offenses are “inextricably intertwined” for the purposes of the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel.
(4)
9
For the reasons outlined above, we reject Whitelaw’s
contentions and adopt the reasoning of the district court. As the
district court explained, the criminal charges are not
“inextricably intertwined” because the specific conduct, victims,
and time frame are all very different. It is true, of course, that
both crimes involve the same type of fraudulent conduct (a check-
counterfeiting scheme). While the type of conduct is relevant to
the analysis, the fact that the criminal activities are similar in
nature cannot, by itself, establish that the charges are
intertwined.2
B
As an alternative ground for suppressing the tape-recorded
statements, Whitelaw argues that the government’s conduct violated
his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination under
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
The Supreme Court held in Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292,
294 (1990), that “Miranda warnings are not required when the
suspect is unaware that he is speaking to a law enforcement officer
and gives a voluntary statement.” The Court explained that
“[c]onversations between suspects and undercover agents do not
implicate the concerns underlying Miranda. The essential
2
Because we hold that Whitelaw’s right to counsel had not
attached to the federal charges, we do not reach the other question
addressed by the district court, namely, whether Irwin deliberately
elicited Whitelaw’s incriminating statments and thereby caused the
government to violate the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.
10
ingredients of a ‘police-dominated atmosphere’ and compulsion are
not present” in such cases. Id. at 296.
Whitelaw has not presented any evidence suggesting that his
conversations with Irwin were coerced. To the contrary, Whitelaw
spoke voluntarily with Irwin and, in fact, initiated every
telephone conversation. For these reasons, Whitelaw’s Miranda
argument fails.
C
As a third ground for suppressing the tape-recorded
conversations, Whitelaw argues that his Fifth Amendment right to
due process has been violated.
This question was not addressed by the district court. In his
briefs, Whitelaw’s only legal authority is Justice Brennan’s
concurring opinion in Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. at 300-03. In
Justice Brennan’s view, when the government obtains incriminating
information from suspects in custody, the government’s actions are
arguably incompatible with a system “‘that presumes innocence and
assured that a conviction will not be secured by inquisitorial
means.’” Id. at 303 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment)
(quoting Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 116 (1985)). Whatever the
merits of Justice Brennan’s argument, it is clear that a single-
Justice opinion is not binding precedent. See, e.g., Hopwood v.
State of Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 944 (5th Cir. 1996). Moreover, cases
such as Miller involve “forms of physical and psychological
torture,” Miller, 474 U.S. at 109, which plainly are not present in
11
Whitelaw’s case. Applying the law to the facts of this case, we
conclude that Whitelaw’s due process argument is without merit.
III
Whitelaw also appeals his sentence of 46 months’ imprisonment.
He contends that the district court erred in its loss calculation
under the Sentencing Guidelines and that his sentence was imposed
in violation of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 120 S.Ct. 2348 (2000).
A
Whitelaw argues that the district court erred in its
calculation of the loss attributable to his conduct under U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2F1.1(b). He asserts that the loss
from his state offenses should not be included in the loss
calculation because the district court found that his state and
federal offenses were not “inextricably intertwined” for Sixth
Amendment purposes.
The sentencing court’s calculation of loss is a factual
finding and is reviewed for clear error. The court’s methodology
by which losses are determined, however, involves an application of
the Sentencing Guidelines and is reviewed de novo. See United
States v. Saacks, 131 F.3d 540, 542-43 (5th Cir. 1997).
Under § 2F.1.1(b), the offense level of a defendant convicted
of crimes of fraud or deceit is increased in accordance with the
amount by which the loss attributable to the defendant exceeds
$2,000. If the loss is between $800,000 and $1.5 million, the
guidelines warrant an 11 level increase in the offense level.
12
U.S.S.G. § 2F.1.1(b)(1)(L) (2000). Under the guidelines, “if an
intended loss that the defendant was attempting to inflict can be
determined, this figure will be used if it is greater than the
actual loss.” U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1, comment n.8.
In the context of “a criminal plan, scheme, endeavor, or
enterprise undertaken by the defendant in concert with others,”
relevant conduct for sentencing includes “all reasonably
foreseeable acts and omissions of others in furtherance of the
jointly undertaken criminal activity.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B).
A district court’s finding that conduct was within the scope of
jointly undertaken criminal activity is a finding of fact and is
reviewed for clear error. See United States v. Smith, 13 F.3d 860,
865 (5th Cir. 1994). The district court held that Whitelaw was
accountable for $1,188,618.65 in intended and actual losses, that
all such losses resulted from jointly undertaken criminal activity,
and that the conduct of Whitelaw’s co-conspirators was reasonably
foreseeable.
Whitelaw’s argument that the district court erred in
calculating the loss attributable to him is without merit. First,
a review of the PSR reveals that the loss attributable to
Whitelaw’s state offenses was not included in the total loss
calculation. See PSR ¶ 22 (noting that Whitelaw had already been
sanctioned for the state offenses). Thus, it is evident that the
PSR’s calculated loss did not include the 1996 counterfeit checks
relied upon in the state court prosecutions. The sentencing court
13
fully recognized this, noting that Whitelaw “is responsible for all
of the checks listed on Attachment A, except the 1996 counterfeit
State of Texas checks.”
Moreover, even if the PSR’s $1,188,618.65 calculated loss does
include the $261,775 loss from the state offenses, Whitelaw is
still accountable for $926,843.65 in losses. Under
§ 2F1.1(b)(1)(L), he would still be subject to the same 11-level
offense level increase. Therefore, any error here is harmless in
that “the district court would have imposed the same sentence”
absent the error. United States v. Kay, 83 F.3d 98, 101 (5th Cir.
1996) (finding remand unnecessary where sentencing error was found
to be harmless by reviewing court).
Whitelaw’s primary argument is that the district court
contradicted itself by finding that (1) his state and federal
offenses were not inextricably intertwined, and (2) the loss from
both the state and federal offenses was attributable to him as
relevant conduct. Because, as noted above, the loss from his state
offenses was not attributed to him in the calculation of his
offense level, this argument is without merit.
B
Whitelaw further asserts that, under Apprendi v. New Jersey,
120 S.Ct. 2348 (2000), the amount of loss attributable to him was
an essential element of his offense and therefore should have been
submitted to a jury and established beyond a reasonable doubt.
Under Apprendi, “any fact [other than a prior conviction] that
14
increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory
maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable
doubt.” Apprendi, 120 S.Ct. at 2362-63 (emphasis added). The
prescribed statutory maximum sentence for bank fraud of $1 million
is 30 years’ imprisonment. 18 U.S.C. § 1344. The guideline
imprisonment range for Whitelaw’s offense, given the loss
attributable to him and his criminal history, was 37 to 46 months
imprisonment, and the guideline fine range was $7,500 to $1
million. See PSR ¶ 120. Because the amount of loss did not
increase the penalty for the offense beyond the applicable
statutory maximum, Apprendi is inapplicable to Whitelaw’s appeal.
IV
For the reasons set forth above, the district court did not
err in denying Whitelaw’s motion to suppress nor in sentencing him
to 46 months’ imprisonment. Whitelaw’s conviction and sentence are
therefore
A F F I R M E D.
15