Demarcus Chatmon v. City of La Marque, Texas, et a ( 2020 )


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  • Case: 19-40106     Document: 00515558936         Page: 1     Date Filed: 09/10/2020
    United States Court of Appeals
    for the Fifth Circuit
    United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    No. 19-40106              September 10, 2020
    Summary Calendar
    Lyle W. Cayce
    Clerk
    Demarcus Chatmon,
    Plaintiff—Appellant,
    versus
    City of La Marque, Texas; Richard Price; Mike Keleman;
    Jose Santos; Taser International, Incorporated,
    Defendants—Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Texas
    USDC No. 3:18-CV-163
    Before Clement, Elrod, and Haynes, Circuit Judges.
    Per Curiam:*
    Demarcus Chatmon, Texas prisoner # 2277172, moves for leave to
    proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) on appeal from the dismissal of his 42 U.S.C.
    § 1983 complaint in which he alleged that he was beaten and denied medical
    *
    Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this
    opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
    circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.
    Case: 19-40106      Document: 00515558936           Page: 2     Date Filed: 09/10/2020
    No. 19-40106
    attention by local police officers during a 2014 traffic stop. The district court
    determined that the § 1983 complaint was barred by the applicable statute of
    limitations and that Chatmon could not use this action to challenge the
    dismissal of a prior § 1983 complaint. The district court further found that,
    to the extent Chatmon’s action could be construed as requesting relief
    pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 60, he was not entitled to
    such relief.   Resultingly, the district court dismissed the complaint as
    frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
    Chatmon’s motion for leave to file a supplemental brief is
    GRANTED.
    By moving to appeal IFP, Chatmon challenges the district court’s
    certification that his appeal is not taken in good faith. See Baugh v. Taylor,
    
    117 F.3d 197
    , 202 (5th Cir. 1997). His IFP request “must be directed solely
    to the trial court’s reasons for the certification decision,”
    id., and our inquiry
       “is limited to whether the appeal involves legal points arguable on their
    merits (and therefore not frivolous).” Howard v. King, 
    707 F.2d 215
    , 220 (5th
    Cir. 1983) (internal quotation and citation omitted). We may dismiss the
    appeal if it is apparent that it would be meritless. 
    Baugh, 117 F.3d at 202
    &
    n.24; see 5th Cir. R. 42.2.
    Chatmon does not challenge the district court’s determination that
    his claims were time barred. Nor does he present any argument concerning
    the district court’s conclusions that he could not use this action to appeal a
    prior dismissal and that he was not entitled to relief under Federal Rule of
    Civil Procedure 60. By failing to address the district court’s reason for
    dismissal and certification, he has abandoned any issue crucial to his appeal
    and IFP motion. See Yohey v. Collins, 
    985 F.2d 222
    , 224-25 (5th Cir. 1993);
    see also Brinkmann v. Dallas County Deputy Sheriff Abner, 
    813 F.2d 744
    , 748
    (5th Cir. 1987).     Chatmon’s contentions regarding the withholding of
    2
    Case: 19-40106      Document: 00515558936           Page: 3    Date Filed: 09/10/2020
    No. 19-40106
    exculpatory evidence, insufficient evidence to support his plea, and the
    suppression of certain unspecified evidence are all raised for the first time on
    appeal and therefore will not be considered. See Leverette v. Louisville Ladder
    Co., 
    183 F.3d 339
    , 342 (5th Cir. 1999).
    Because Chatmon fails to show that his appeal involves any
    nonfrivolous issue, his motion for leave to proceed IFP is DENIED, and this
    appeal is DISMISSED AS FRIVOLOUS. See 
    Howard, 707 F.2d at 220
    ;
    
    Baugh, 117 F.3d at 202
    & n.24; 5TH CIR. R. 42.2. His motion for leave to
    file a supplemental brief is GRANTED, and his motion for the appointment
    of counsel is DENIED. See Cooper v. Sheriff, Lubbock Cty., Tex., 
    929 F.2d 1078
    , 1084 (5th Cir. 1991).
    The district court’s dismissal of Chatmon’s § 1983 complaint as
    frivolous and our dismissal of this appeal as frivolous both count as strikes for
    purposes of § 1915(g). See Coleman v. Tollefson, 
    135 S. Ct. 1759
    , 1763-64
    (2015); Adepegba v. Hammons, 
    103 F.3d 383
    , 388 (5th Cir. 1996), abrogated in
    part on other grounds by 
    Coleman, 135 S. Ct. at 1762-63
    .           Chatmon is
    WARNED that if he accumulates three strikes, he will not be able to proceed
    IFP in any civil action or appeal filed while he is incarcerated or detained in
    any facility unless he is under imminent danger of serious physical injury. See
    § 1915(g).
    3