Meisner v. State of Texas ( 2001 )

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
For the Fifth Circuit
No. 00-11061
Summary Calendar
ROLAND D. MEISNER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
VERSUS
STATE OF TEXAS, Office of the Attorney General of Texas; VICTOR
MANTILLA,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
For the Northern District of Texas, Dallas
(3:97-CV-2616-G)
March 16, 2001
Before SMITH, BENAVIDES, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Appellant Roland D. Meisner appeals the grant of summary
judgment in favor of the Appellees, Office of the Attorney General
of Texas and Victor Mantilla. We affirm.
Meisner, a Caucasian male, was employed as an attorney by the
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under
the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
No. 00-11061
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Office of the Attorney General (OAG) from January 11, 1993, until
his resignation on August 1, 1997. Meisner alleged that he was not
evaluated for periodic raises and that he was deprived of human
resources as a result of discrimination. After he filed suit, the
court awarded the Appellees summary judgment on a § 1983 claim
against Mantilla in his individual capacity, a Title VII claim, and
an Equal Pay Act claim. This appeal ensued.
The review of summary judgment is de novo, applying the same
standards as the district court. Evans v. City of Bishop, 2000 WL
1946668, *1 (5th Cir. 2000). Summary judgment is appropriate if
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id.; Fed. R.
Civ. Pro. 56(c).
In order to prevail on a Title VII claim as well as a § 1983
claim based on discrimination, the plaintiff must make a prima
facie case: the plaintiff was a member of a protected class, he was
qualified for his position, he suffered an adverse employment
decision, and he was replaced by someone not in the protected
class. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 120 S. Ct.
2097, 2106 (2000). The burden then shifts to the defendant who
must show a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the decision.
Id. Meisner has both failed to present a prima facie case and to
rebut the Appellees’ legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons as
pretext. As the district court aptly noted, “Meisner has provided
No. 00-11061
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no evidence . . . of intentional discrimination, as opposed to
simply bureaucratic inertia.”
We also find that summary judgment on the Equal Pay Act was
proper. The Appellees have shown a legitimate reason other than
sex to have paid a female attorney more money than Meisner, i.e.
her credentials. See Chance v. Rice University, 984 F.2d 151 (5th
Cir. 1993) (citing evidence that plaintiff’s credentials were not
as impressive as her colleagues). See also Hofmister v. Ms. St.
Dep’t of Health, 53 F. Supp. 2d 884, 894 (S.D. Miss. March 9, 1999).
Finally, we find that the district court’s setting aside the
entry of default was not an abuse of discretion. Lacy v. Sitel
Corp., 227 F.3d 290, 291-92 (5th Cir. 2000).
AFFIRMED.