Anderson v. Harrison County TX ( 2001 )

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
_________________________________
No. 00-40759
Civil Docket # 2-97-CV-170-TJW
_________________________________
FAYE ANDERSON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
HARRISON COUNTY, TX.; ET. AL.,
Defendants,
HARRISON COUNTY, TX.,
Defendant-Appellee.
_________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas
_________________________________________________________________
April 12, 2001
Before KING, Chief Judge, REAVLEY and JONES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Ms. Anderson, formerly the Chief Justice Court Clerk of
Harrison County, sued the County and Mary Edwards, former Justice
of the Peace, because of Anderson’s termination. The district
court granted summary judgment to both defendants. Finding no
error, we affirm.
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
First, Ms. Anderson’s counsel eloquently argued that a
jury should decide whether his client was fired for her well-
publicized views on the possible closing of a Justice of the Peace
office. The district court, however, found no evidence of causal
connection between Anderson’s public policy comments and her being
fired.
Nevertheless, and even assuming for present purposes,
that fact issues exist on causal connection, we are confronted by
the prong of the Mt. Healthy test which permits a defendant to show
that it would have taken the same action in the absence of
protected conduct. Gerhart v. Hayes, 217 F.3d 320, 321 (5th Cir.),
(opinion on rehearing) cert. denied, 121 S.Ct. 573 (2000) (citing
Mt. Healthy Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287, 97 S.Ct. 568(1977)). The evidence is undisputed that appellant was grossly
insubordinate to Justice of the Peace Edwards on more than one
occasion. Further, during appellant’s leave of absence, evidence
of Anderson’s chronic mismanagement of office appeared to Edwards.
For both of these reasons, Edwards’s stated intent to fire Ms.
Anderson no matter what her views on issues of public concern must
be credited. For purposes of qualified immunity, Edwards’s conduct
in terminating Anderson for her misconduct and office management
errors was objectively reasonable and entitled her to judgment.
Second, the district court properly granted summary
judgment for the County because there was no evidence that the
2
County maintained any unconstitutional policy that caused
Anderson’s termination.
Third, to the extent Anderson argues that her opportunity
for discovery was unreasonably restricted, we find no abuse of
discretion by the district court. A year passed between the
summary judgment rendered on immunity grounds for Edwards and the
grant of summary judgment to Harrison County. Ample opportunity
existed for discovery from Harrison County during that period, even
though discovery had been earlier limited to qualified immunity
issues. And the district court was following standard procedure by
limiting discovery initially to matters relevant to qualified
immunity.
For these reasons, the district court’s judgment is
AFFIRMED.
3