Castro v. Anderson ( 2001 )


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  •                IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    No. 01-10052
    Summary Calendar
    JOE CASTRO,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    versus
    SCOTT A. ANDERSON; STONEWALL MEMORIAL HOSPITAL,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    - - - - - - - - - -
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Texas
    USDC No. 1:00-CV-76
    - - - - - - - - - -
    September 17, 2001
    Before DUHÉ, EMILIO M. GARZA, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:1
    Joe Castro, a Texas citizen, appeals from the district court’s
    denial of his “Motion to Enlarge Time and for New Trial,” which he
    filed under FED. R. CIV. P. 59(e) following the court’s granting of
    the defendants’ summary-judgment motion in this 42 U.S.C. § 1983
    civil rights action.     The court had granted summary judgment
    without considering Castro’s response, based on Castro’s having
    filed the response untimely under N.D. TEX. R. 7.1(e).
    1
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
    that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
    except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
    R. 47.5.4.
    Although Castro’s “Motion to Enlarge Time and for New Trial”
    was filed within 10 days after the entry of judgment and was thus
    sufficient to preserve an appeal of the underlying judgment, see
    Lockett v. Anderson, 
    230 F.3d 695
    , 700 (5th Cir. 2000), Castro has
    briefed no argument with respect to the merits of the district
    court’s summary-judgment ruling.       He has thus waived any challenge
    to the merits of such decision.        Yohey v. Collins, 
    985 F.2d 222
    ,
    224-25 (5th Cir. 1993); FED. R. APP. P. 28(a)(9).
    Castro argues only that the court should have reconsidered its
    summary-judgment ruling by considering his untimely response to the
    defendants’ summary-judgment motion. Castro was not entitled to an
    extra three days of time under FED. R. CIV. P. 6(e) because he was
    not acting “after the service of a notice or some other paper,” but
    after the “filing” of the defendants’ motion.          See Rule 6(e);
    Halicki v. Louisiana Casino Cruises, Inc., 
    151 F.3d 465
    , 468 (5th
    Cir. 1998); Lauzon v. Strachan Shipping Co., 
    782 F.2d 1217
    , 1220
    (5th Cir. 1985).    His response to the defendants’ motion was
    untimely by a full week, so the alleged malfunctioning of his
    attorney’s fax machine three days after the conclusion of the 20-
    day period for responding to the defendants’ motion could not
    constitute excusable neglect.
    AFFIRMED.
    2