Hansen v. Armstrong ( 2001 )

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 00-60293
TRACY ALAN HANSEN,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
ROBERT ARMSTRONG, Superintendent, Mississippi State
Penitentiary; ROBERT L. JOHNSON, Commissioner, Mississippi
Department of Corrections,
Respondents-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Mississippi
(1:96-CV-60)
November 6, 2001
Before SMITH, BARKSDALE, and PARKER, Circuit Judges.
RHESA HAWKINS BARKSDALE, Circuit Judge:1
At issue is whether Tracy Alan Hansen, a state prisoner
sentenced to death for capital murder, satisfies the standards
requisite to being allowed to appeal the district court’s denial of
28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas relief. Hansen requests the requisite
certificate of appealability (COA) for each of several issues,
concerning his conviction and sentence. DENIED.
1
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
I.
On 10 April 1987, having left Florida earlier that day, Hansen
and Anita Louise Krecic were traveling on Interstate 10 in Harrison
County, Mississippi, in a blue Lincoln (town car); Hansen was
driving. Observing erratic driving and speeding, Mississippi
Highway Safety Patrol Officer (State Trooper) David Bruce Ladner
signaled for Hansen to pull over. Officer Ladner requested to
search the vehicle. Hansen and Krecic, using fictitious names,
signed a consent to search form.
Subsequently, Hansen fired a .38 caliber pistol at Officer
Ladner. After the Officer took evasive action, Hansen fired twice
more at close range, each shot striking the Officer in the back.
The Officer managed to reach the median, and a passing motorist
took him to a hospital; he died approximately 31 hours later.
Because the Officer had taken the keys to their vehicle,
Hansen and Krecic took the Officer’s patrol car to an I-10 exit.
They immediately pulled over, and took, a Ford Ranger driven by
Daisy Morgan, leaving her there.
After unsuccessfully seeking transportation to New Orleans,
Louisiana, Hansen and Krecic reached a home in Hancock County,
Mississippi. Persons there agreed to take Hansen and Krecic to
Waveland, Mississippi; en route, they were stopped by State
Troopers. Hansen and Krecic were taken into custody. A further
2
description concerning the incident, including other witnesses,
appears infra in part II.E. (Confrontation Clause claim).
In 1987, Hansen was found guilty in a capital murder trial.
After the penalty hearing, he was sentenced to death because the
jury found: the capital offense was especially heinous, atrocious,
or cruel, and was committed for the purpose of avoiding or
preventing lawful arrest, or effecting an escape from custody; and
these aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating. See
MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-19-101(3) (jury must find sufficient aggravating
circumstances, enumerated in subsection (5) of statute, not
outweighed by mitigating circumstances, subsection (6)).
Through an extremely comprehensive opinion covering the
approximately 45 issues raised on direct appeal, the Mississippi
Supreme Court affirmed. Hansen v. State, 592 So. 2d 114 (Miss.
1991). Review was denied by the Supreme Court of the United
States. Hansen v. Mississippi, 504 U.S. 921 (1992).
Hansen sought post-conviction relief in the Mississippi
Supreme Court; relief was denied, except for one issue concerning
the method of execution. Hansen v. State, 649 So. 2d 1256 (Miss.
1994). Hansen had been sentenced erroneously to death by lethal
gas; the case was remanded to the circuit court for modification of
the sentence to death by lethal injection. Id. at 1260. Review
was again denied by the Supreme Court of the United States. Hansen
v. Mississippi, 516 U.S. 986 (1995).
3
Hansen presented 17 issues in his July 1996 federal habeas
petition, adding another by supplement in early 1997. In its
detailed opinion, the district court concluded five claims were
procedurally barred; in addition, it considered, and rejected, each
claim on the merits. Hansen v. Puckett, No. 1:96cv60BrR (S.D.
Miss. 5 Aug. 1999) (unpublished) (Hansen-USDC).
II.
Hansen having filed his federal habeas petition after the 24
April 1996 effective date of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act (AEDPA), that Act applies. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S.
320, 336 (1997). Accordingly, Hansen must obtain a COA in order to
appeal the denial of habeas relief. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A). To
obtain a COA, he must make “a substantial showing of the denial of
a constitutional right”. Id. § 2253(c)(2). In general, Hansen
must demonstrate “reasonable jurists could debate whether (or, for
that matter, agree that) the petition should have been resolved in
a different manner or that the issues presented were adequate to
deserve encouragement to proceed further”. Slack v. McDaniel, 529
U.S. 473, 484 (2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). Restated,
for claims denied on the merits, Hansen must show “reasonable
jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the
constitutional claims debatable or wrong”. Id. But, for relief
denied on procedural grounds, Hansen must not only make the showing
described above concerning the merits of a claim, but also must
4
show “jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the
district court was correct in its procedural ruling”. Id.
Obviously, “the determination of whether a COA should issue
must be made by viewing [Hansen]’s arguments through the lens of
the deferential scheme laid out in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)”.
Barrientes v. Johnson, 221 F.3d 741, 772 (5th Cir. 2000), cert.
dismissed, 121 S. Ct. 902 (2001). In that regard, concerning §
2254(d), when a claim has been adjudicated on the merits in state
court, a federal habeas court must defer to that decision unless it
“[is] contrary to, or involve[s] an unreasonable application of,
clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court
of the United States; or ... [is] based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in [the] light of the evidence presented
in the State court proceeding”. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) & (2)
(emphasis added).
For the § 2254 “contrary to” prong, a decision is “contrary to
[] clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme
Court ... if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to
that reached by th[e] Court on a question of law or if the state
court decides a case differently than th[e] Court has on a set of
materially indistinguishable facts”. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S.
362, 412-13 (2000). And, for the § 2254 “unreasonable application
of” prong, a decision “involve[s] an unreasonable application of []
clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court
5
... if the state court identifies the correct governing legal
principle from th[e] Court’s decisions but unreasonably applies
that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case”. Id. A state
court’s findings of fact are presumed correct unless the petitioner
rebuts that presumption by “clear and convincing evidence”. 28
U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).
Hansen seeks a COA for each of six claims. He maintains the
district court: (1) applied the wrong standard of review; (2)
erred in holding he was not denied effective assistance of counsel
at the penalty phase; (3) erred in concluding his Brady claim and
concomitant claim for resulting ineffective assistance of counsel
were procedurally barred and, in the alternative, without merit;
(4) misapplied Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1 (1986), in
upholding the exclusion of a social worker’s testimony at the
penalty phase; and (5) applied the wrong legal standard in
concluding a Confrontation Clause violation was harmless error.
For his sixth claim, Hansen contends he was entitled to an
evidentiary hearing in district court.
A.
Hansen asserts that, in two respects, the district court
applied erroneous standards of review.
1.
First, Hansen contends the court erred by applying the
“reasonable jurists” standard of review announced in Drinkard v.
6
Johnson, 97 F.3d 751, 769 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S.
1107 (1997), a standard later rejected in Williams, 529 U.S. at
410.
The district court referred in a footnote to the Drinkard
“reasonable jurists” standard. Hansen-USDC, at 7 n.1. That
standard, however, was not mentioned again or made part of the
court’s analysis. Therefore, although the district court erred by
citing Drinkard, the error was harmless, and, thus, not a
sufficient basis upon which to grant a COA. Moore v. Johnson, 225
F.3d 495, 500 n.1 (5th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 1420
(2001).
2.
Hansen contends the district court also erred by applying §
2254(d)(1) to his ineffective assistance claims because, according
to Hansen, the Mississippi Supreme Court did not adjudicate those
claims on the merits, but summarily denied them, erroneously
applying the rule of collateral estoppel and failing to remand for
an evidentiary hearing or to make findings of fact.
“‘Resolution on the merits’ is a term of art in the habeas
context that refers not to the quality of a court’s review of
claims, but rather to the court’s disposition of the case — whether
substantive or procedural.” Green v. Johnson, 116 F.3d 1115, 1121
(5th Cir. 1997). To determine whether a resolution was on the
merits, we consider: what the state court has done in similar
7
cases; whether the history of the case suggests the state court was
aware of any procedural grounds; and whether the state court’s
opinion suggests reliance upon procedural grounds. Id.
The Mississippi Supreme Court found Hansen’s ineffective
assistance claims meritless. Hansen, 649 So. 2d at 1257. The
court stated the issue was raised and rejected on direct appeal
(there, the issue concerned an ineffective assistance claim
premised on claimed inadequate statutory attorney’s fees); it then
agreed with, and quoted, the ruling on direct appeal that “counsel
have pulled out all the stops, well exceeding the Strickland
standards”. Id. at 1259 (quoting Hansen, 592 So. 2d at 153;
emphasis omitted). Next, the court stated: “Again, we conclude
there is no merit to these issues”. Id. (emphasis added).
Hansen’s ineffective assistance claims were resolved on the
merits by the state court. Therefore, the district court did not
err by applying § 2254(d)(1) to them.
B.
Hansen maintains his trial counsel was ineffective by failing
at the penalty phase: to investigate mitigating evidence; and to
present psychological evidence concerning statutory mitigating
circumstances. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-19-101(6).
To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, Hansen must
satisfy the well known two prong standard: counsel’s performance
was deficient, falling below an objective standard of
8
reasonableness; and this deficient performance prejudiced the
defense, such that there is a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel’s unprofessional errors, the outcome of the trial would
have been different. E.g., Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
687-88, 694 (1984).
1.
Regarding the claimed failure to investigate mitigating
evidence, Hansen maintains counsel failed to prepare witnesses and
to conduct an adequate investigation that would have uncovered
evidence of the mental and physical abuse inflicted on Hansen
during his childhood (childhood abuse).2
The district court found counsel’s investigation was not
deficient; affording the required “heavy measure of deference” to
counsel’s strategic choices, it concluded: “even if he made a less
than complete investigation, the attorney’s reasonable professional
judgments support the limitations on investigation”. Hansen-USDC,
at 19. The court explained: most of the seven mitigating
witnesses testified about Hansen’s childhood abuse; and any missing
2
Hansen also asserts such an investigation could have
uncovered additional mitigating evidence; in the district court,
however, he contended only that the investigation would reveal
evidence of his childhood abuse. We do not have jurisdiction to
consider aspects not presented in district court. See, e.g.,
Goodwin v. Johnson, 224 F.3d 450, 459 n.6 (5th Cir. 2000) (“before
we may consider a petitioner’s application for a COA on a
particular issue, that petitioner must first submit his request to
the district court and have that request denied”), cert. denied,
121 S. Ct. 874 (2001).
9
details were not sufficient to render counsel’s investigation
unreasonable. Id. at 20.
The district court also concluded that Hansen failed to show
his counsel did not adequately interview these witnesses. Id. It
explained: although, in his affidavit, Fred Weist (a social worker
from a Florida prison where Hansen had been incarcerated) stated he
never spoke to Hansen’s counsel about his testimony, he did not
purport to have knowledge of Hansen’s childhood; and, the other
witnesses’ affidavits show Hansen’s counsel interviewed them before
they testified. Id.; cf. Leatherwood v. State, 473 So. 2d 964, 970
(Miss. 1985) (defense counsel did not interview witnesses before
they testified).
In his habeas affidavit, Hansen’s trial counsel stated he “was
not able to put forward [his] best effort for the sentencing phase”
or “conduct in depth interviews of sentencing phase witnesses”.
The Sixth Amendment requires counsel to provide “reasonable
professional services”. Hansen-USDC, at 20-21 (quoting Strickland,
466 U.S. at 687-88). The district court concluded: Hansen
received such services during the penalty phase; and the testimony
of witnesses not called would have been corroborative and largely
cumulative. Id. at 21.
Hansen has not shown reasonable jurists would disagree with
the district court. Due to time pressure (his objection to the
trial date was overruled; sentencing began the day after the
10
liability phase) and lack of investigative assistance (his request
for an investigator was denied), Hansen’s attorney was limited in
his investigation, learning about Hansen’s childhood abuse from
Hansen and relying upon Hansen to identify potential witnesses.
See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691 (“[W]hen the facts that support a
certain potential line of defense are generally known to counsel
because of what the defendant has said, the need for further
investigation may be considerably diminished or eliminated
altogether”.); cf. Armstrong v. Dugger, 833 F.2d 1430, 1432-33
(11th Cir. 1987) (preparation for penalty phase consisted of
meeting once with petitioner, his mother and stepfather, and
speaking with his parole officer, the sole mitigating witness;
counsel explained lack of preparation not strategic but result of
inexperience).
And, as noted, Hansen’s attorney interviewed and called seven
of those witnesses in mitigation, most of whom testified about
Hansen’s childhood abuse. For example, in response to questioning
by Hansen’s counsel, Hansen’s father testified that Hansen’s mother
(who also testified) “took her unhappiness with [Hansen’s father]
out on [their] children”. When asked how she accomplished that,
Hansen’s father answered: “The kids had severe whippings with
leather belts or sticks, whatever might be close”.
In the alternative, the district court concluded trial
counsel’s claimed deficiencies did not prejudice Hansen. Hansen-
11
USDC, at 22. It goes without saying that, because Hansen has not
shown reasonable jurists would find debatable or wrong the district
court’s assessment of Strickland’s deficiency prong, we need not
reach the prejudice prong.
2.
Hansen also claims trial counsel was ineffective for failing
to present psychological mitigating evidence. He asserts counsel
did not direct Dr. Matherne, the independent psychologist appointed
to evaluate Hansen, to the statutory mitigating circumstances (for
example, that Hansen committed the offense while “under the
influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance” or “under
extreme duress or under the substantial domination of another
person”, as discussed infra; or that Hansen’s capacity “to
appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct
to the requirements of law was substantially impaired”, see MISS.
CODE ANN. § 99-19-101(6)(b), (e)-(f) (emphasis added)). Hansen also
asserts counsel failed to direct Dr. Matherne to provide him with
any information about Hansen, and ignored mitigating evidence that
Dr. Matherne could have developed regarding Hansen’s personality
and the likelihood he was under the substantial domination of
Krecic.3
3
Hansen also asserts, for the first time on appeal, that
counsel was ineffective for failing to seek prison records that
would have revealed Hansen’s prescriptions for psychiatric
medications. For the reasons previously stated, we cannot consider
this new issue. Goodwin, 224 F.3d at 459 n.6.
12
The district court noted: trial counsel reviewed the
psychological report, in which Dr. Matherne concluded that,
regarding Hansen’s mental and emotional capacity at the time of the
alleged offense, Hansen satisfied the M’Naghten standard, see
Westbrook v. State, 658 So. 2d 847, 850 (Miss. 1995) (ability to
realize and appreciate nature and quality of deeds when committed
and distinguish between right and wrong); and, therefore, trial
counsel “felt it was not in [Hansen’s] best interest that Dr.
Matherne be called in this matter”. The district court also noted:
trial counsel explained he “did not specifically direct Dr.
Matherne to the mitigating circumstances listed in the capital
sentencing statute”, but “[i]f Dr. Matherne had reported that he
could testify in support of mitigation, [he] would have called him
as a witness in the sentencing phase”. Hansen-USDC, at 23-24.
The district court concluded that, although trial counsel
complained that time limitations deprived him of a thorough
investigation of mitigating psychological factors, “strategic
choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable
precisely to the extent that reasonable professional judgments
support the limitations on investigation”. Id. at 24 (quoting Loyd
v. Whitley, 977 F.2d 149, 158 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 508
U.S. 911 (1993), and Strickland, 466 U.S. at 681 (“[l]imitations of
time and money ... may force early strategic choices, often based
solely on conversations with the defendant and a review of the
13
prosecution’s evidence”)). “It is all too tempting for a defendant
to second-guess counsel’s assistance after conviction or adverse
sentence”, id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689), where, as
here, the defense strategy was ultimately unsuccessful. That
strategy was urging jurors to vote for life imprisonment without
parole (counsel advised the jury in closing argument for the
penalty phase that Hansen confessed his prior convictions to the
trial court and wanted to be sentenced without the possibility of
parole), for which counsel began to prepare well in advance of
trial, including moving for the court’s permission to introduce
evidence of Hansen’s habitual criminal status. Cf. Williams, 529
U.S. at 395 (counsel did not prepare for sentencing until week
before trial).4
The district court also determined that Hansen was not
prejudiced by any claimed deficiencies. Hansen-USDC, at 25. But,
again, because Hansen cannot show that reasonable jurists would
find debatable or wrong the district court’s assessment of
Strickland’s deficiency prong on this issue, we need not reach the
prejudice prong.
C.
4
Citing Lockett v. Anderson, 230 F.3d 695, 714 (5th Cir.
2000), Hansen contends counsel should have been alerted by Dr.
Matherne’s test results that more investigation was needed. Hansen
did not raise this issue in the district court, asserting instead
only that Hansen’s attorney was ineffective in failing to call Dr.
Matherne at sentencing. We, thus, cannot consider this new claim.
Goodwin, 224 F.3d at 459 n.6.
14
Hansen claims the district court held improperly that two of
his claims were procedurally barred and, alternatively, were
without merit: that the State’s suppression of a statement by
Barbara Duncan, a cell mate of Krecic, violated Brady v. Maryland,
373 U.S. 83 (1963), and Hansen’s due process rights; and that,
concomitantly, the Brady violation rendered his trial counsel
ineffective. Duncan’s recorded and transcribed statement informed
law enforcement officers that, inter alia, she overheard Krecic:
tell a man, “I am the one that killed ....”; and tell others that
Hansen would do whatever Krecic said.
Hansen contends the district court erred: by making no
finding that the Mississippi Supreme Court regularly and
consistently applies the procedural bar in cases, such as this,
where the underlying facts are outside the trial record and not
readily discoverable at time of trial; and by not considering
Duncan’s affidavit in determining whether the suppression of her
statement was material.
The district court applied the procedural bar found in § 99-
39-21(1) of the Mississippi Code, concluding Hansen did not meet
the “cause and prejudice” or “actual innocence” exceptions because:
his counsel could have raised the claim on direct appeal; and
Hansen did not show that it is more likely than not that no
reasonable juror would have found him guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt in the light of all the evidence, including Krecic’s alleged
15
statements overheard by Duncan. Hansen-USDC, at 33; see MISS. CODE
ANN. § 99-39-21(1) (“Failure by a prisoner to raise ... issues or
errors either in fact or law which were capable of determination at
trial and/or on direct appeal ... shall constitute a waiver thereof
and shall be procedurally barred.”) In addition, the court also
considered the merits of the Brady claim and held the exculpatory
value provided by Duncan’s statement was not sufficient, in the
light of all the contrary evidence, to undermine confidence in the
jury’s verdict. Hansen-USDC, at 40-41.
1.
In support of his contention that the Mississippi Supreme
Court does not consistently apply the § 99-39-21(1) procedural bar,
enacted in 1984, Hansen cites Malone v. State, 486 So. 2d 367
(Miss. 1986), and Read v. State, 430 So. 2d 832 (Miss. 1983). In
Malone, the petitioner, on application for post-conviction relief,
asserted there was a plea bargain agreement between the prosecution
and its star witness that had not been disclosed pre-trial. 486
So. 2d at 368. Concluding the petitioner made a prima facie
showing there was such a plea agreement, the Mississippi Supreme
Court remanded the case to the trial court for an evidentiary
hearing on the issue; the court did not cite, much less discuss,
the § 99-39-21(1) procedural bar. Id. at 369. We, thus, have no
way of knowing whether the petitioner could have raised his Brady
claim on direct appeal. Moreover, in Malone, the issue was whether
16
the plea bargain even existed pre-trial. On the other hand,
Hansen’s attorney knew about Duncan’s statement in April 1988,
approximately five months after trial and more than two years
before he filed his direct appeal.
In Read, rendered prior to the enactment in 1984 of the § 99-
39-21(1) procedural bar, the Mississippi Supreme Court concluded
that a petitioner is not precluded from raising an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim in a post-conviction proceeding even
though he raised the same claim on appeal. 430 So. 2d at 841. But
in the case at hand, as noted by the district court, Hansen did not
raise on appeal this ineffective assistance of counsel claim. And,
although the procedural bar does not apply to an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim when the petitioner is represented by
the same counsel at trial and on appeal, Martin v. Maxey, 98 F.3d
844, 848 (5th Cir. 1996), Hansen does not contend his trial counsel
was ineffective as a result of his own error or omission; instead,
Hansen claims counsel was rendered ineffective by the State’s
suppressing Duncan’s statement. Cf. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.
Hansen has not shown Mississippi’s procedural bar is not
regularly applied to “classes of claims” such as his. Cf. Sones v.
Hargett, 61 F.3d 410, 417 (5th Cir. 1995). Therefore, jurists of
reason would not find it debatable whether the district court was
correct in applying the bar.
17
2.
In the alternative, we consider Hansen’s claim that the
district court erroneously: concluded trial counsel’s strategy was
not adversely affected, particularly at the penalty phase; and
refused to consider Duncan’s affidavit in determining whether the
suppression of her statement was material. In support of this
claim, Hansen challenges the following decision by the district
court to not consider Duncan’s affidavit: “[T]he transcript of the
interview [of Duncan] by the two officers is the subject of the
Brady claim, not Duncan’s affidavit statements. Therefore, the
contents of the affidavit are not relevant to the Court’s
determination”. Hansen-USDC, at 34.
Hansen asserts: Duncan’s affidavit demonstrates she would
have given testimony that Krecic manipulated Hansen; and this
mitigating evidence is sufficient to undermine confidence in the
death penalty imposed by the jury. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-19-
101(6)(e) (jury to consider as one of the mitigating factors
whether a defendant “acted under extreme duress or under the
substantial domination of another person”).
To prevail under Brady, Hansen must show: Duncan’s statement
was not disclosed; it contained favorable evidence; and the
evidence was “material”. E.g., Wilson v. Whitley, 28 F.3d 433, 435
(5th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1091 (1995). Evidence is
“material” if there is a reasonable probability that, had it been
18
disclosed, the result of the trial would have been different. Id.
at 434. “The materiality of Brady material depends almost entirely
on the value of the evidence relative to the other evidence
mustered by the state.” Id. at 439 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
The transcript included statements by Duncan: that she
overheard Krecic tell others Hansen would do whatever Krecic said;
and that, before Officer Ladner was shot, Krecic told Hansen to
“‘Shoot the bitch. Shoot the bitch’”. The district court found
that any mitigating value of this evidence was “less than
crystalline” and not sufficient to undermine confidence in the
jury’s verdict. Id. at 41. Furthermore, it concluded that any
mitigating value was cumulative because other mitigating witnesses
had testified Krecic was “the leader” of Hansen. Id.
Regarding Hansen’s contention that the district court erred by
not considering Duncan’s affidavit regarding Krecic’s manipulation
of Hansen, the district court did consider this evidence and its
effect on the verdict, albeit via the transcript of Duncan’s
earlier statement, rather than Duncan’s affidavit. Hansen has not
shown that reasonable jurists would find debatable or wrong the
district court’s assessment that the evidence was not material.
D.
Hansen next contends that the district court erred in
upholding the exclusion of future-behavior-testimony by Fred Weist,
19
the social worker who counseled Hansen for several months between
August 1981 and April 1982 (approximately five years before the
murder) at a prison in Florida, where Hansen was then incarcerated.
In Lockett v. Ohio, the Supreme Court held:
[T]he Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require
that the sentencer, in all but the rarest kind
of capital case, not be precluded from
considering, as a mitigating factor, any
aspect of a defendant’s character or record
and any of the circumstances of the offense
that the defendant proffers as a basis for a
sentence less than death.
438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (emphasis in original; footnote omitted).
Specifically, Hansen asserts the district court misapplied
Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1 (1986). At issue in Skipper
was whether the exclusion of testimony regarding petitioner’s good
behavior during his pre-trial time in jail deprived him of his
right to present relevant mitigating evidence. Id. at 4. The
Court concluded such evidence could not be excluded. Id. at 5.
At the penalty phase of Hansen’s trial, the court sustained
the State’s objections to questions regarding future events: “Do
you think [Hansen] would adapt well in prison life?”; and “[D]o you
think [Hansen] is treatable in any prison setting?”. Stating it
was overruling the State’s objection to questions regarding past
events and, thus, admitting Weist’s testimony as to Hansen’s
peaceful, helpful disposition during his previous incarcerations,
the trial court ruled that questioning Weist about future events
was speculative and invaded the province of the jury.
20
The Mississippi Supreme Court agreed. It did so on the basis
that the record failed to reflect Weist was qualified or accepted
as an expert in predicting future behavior. Hansen, 592 So. 2d at
147 (citing MISS. R. EVID. 702).
The district court concluded that Skipper does not require the
trial court to admit speculative, opinion testimony by a non-expert
witness concerning a petitioner’s future behavior in jail.
Skipper, 476 U.S. at 6 (“Defense counsel was not offering opinion
testimony regarding future events.”).
Hansen has not shown that reasonable jurists would find the
district court’s ruling debatable or wrong.
E.
Hansen contends the district court misapplied the standard of
Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 629, 638 (1993) (internal
quotations omitted) (whether, for federal habeas relief purposes,
“trial error” constitutional violation “had substantial and
injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict”),
by concluding a Confrontation Clause violation nevertheless
constituted harmless error.
This contention concerns the following cross-examination of
Krecic by the State:
Q. Do you recall giving a statement to Sergeant Dean
Shephard in Gulfport, Mississippi on April the 11th of
this year [1987]?
A. I’m claiming the Fifth Amendment.
21
Q. Do you recall telling the officer that, quote, you know
who did it, it wasn’t me?
A. I’m claiming the Fifth Amendment.
Q. Do you remember that that answer was in response to the
question about who had shot the highway patrolman?
A. I’m claiming the Fifth Amendment.
Hansen contemporaneously objected.
On appeal, the Mississippi Supreme Court ruled there had been
a Confrontation Clause violation; but, applying Chapman v.
California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), it concluded: in the light of all
the evidence, the constitutional error was “harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt”. Hansen, 592 So. 2d at 135-37.
Citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), the district court held the
Mississippi Supreme Court’s ruling was neither contrary to, nor
involved, an unreasonable application of, clearly established
federal law. Hansen-USDC, at 12. Agreeing that the State had
violated the Confrontation Clause, the district court performed its
own harmless error review under the Brecht standard, and concluded:
“the error did not result in actual prejudice and did not have a
‘substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the
jury’s verdict’”. Id. at 13 (quoting Brecht, 507 U.S. at 638).
The district court reasoned: the questions regarding Krecic’s
alleged statement were few; the statement was exculpatory and did
not directly incriminate Hansen; and the “statement did not recite
‘in considerable detail the circumstances leading to and
22
surrounding the alleged crime’ and did not provide a ‘crucial link
in the proof’”. Id. (quoting Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415,
417, 419 (1965)).
Moreover, adopting the following facts found by the
Mississippi Supreme Court to be indicative of Hansen’s guilt, the
district court determined that other evidence “overwhelmingly”
supported finding guilt:
To begin with, all of the evidence shows two
persons, a young man and a young woman, with
[State Trooper] Ladner along I-10 on the
evening of April 10, 1987. Reasoning
backwards, we know Hansen was the man because
(a) Daisy Morgan identified Hansen as the man
who, a short while later, arrived with a
female companion in a Highway Patrol car, and
stole Morgan’s Ford Ranger; (b) Pat Ladner
identified Hansen as the man who arrived at
his house later that evening with a female
companion; (c) Jody Wade and Charlie Williams
identified Hansen whom they took, with Krecic,
first to the Ladners’ [home] and thereafter
toward Waveland; (d) State Troopers Freddie
Keel and Darryl Deschamp identified Hansen as
the man they took into custody while en route
to Waveland with Wade and Williams; and (e)
Critically, Troopers Keel and Deschamp found
on Hansen — some six hours after Ladner had
been shot — (1) the MHSP standard issue .357
Magnum which had been checked out to Ladner
and (2) a .38 caliber handgun — the bullet
removed from Ladner’s neck had been fired from
a .38 caliber gun.
If this be not enough, we return to April
10’s early evening hours and find that (f)
Kathy Romany, who had followed the blue town
car westward along I-10 all the way from
Florida, identified Hansen as the driver; (g)
William Forrest Runnels and Charles E.
Childress, both motorists passing by, said
they saw a blue town car, a state trooper’s
23
car, and a man and a woman and, of importance,
that they saw the man stuffing a large pistol
into his pants; (h) Steve Diaz identified
Hansen as the man he saw standing over the
wounded and bleeding state trooper and as the
man who drove away in the trooper’s car; and
(i) Paul Tibbetts and Donald Ray Meche each
made an in-court identification of Hansen as
the man who shot and killed Trooper Ladner.
If the cake need icing, (j) Clydell
Morgan testified that he found Hansen’s left
thumbprint on the consent to search form,
Hansen’s left little fingerprint on the map,
and a right palmprint on another incriminating
document. Add to this (k) the absence of the
slightest shred of evidence that Krecic pulled
the trigger, and we have in the record,
acceptable of consideration by reference to
the Court’s instructions to the jury, evidence
that overwhelms.
Hansen-USDC, at 13-14 (alterations in original; quoting Hansen, 592
So. 2d at 136-37).
The district court concluded: “In light of the record taken
as a whole, the Court finds that the prosecution’s violation of
[Hansen’s] rights under the Confrontation Clause did not have a
‘substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the
jury’s verdict’”. Id. at 14 (quoting Brecht, 507 U.S. at 638).
Reasonable jurists would not find this application of Brecht
debatable or wrong. See Brecht, 507 U.S. at 638-39.5
5
In Tucker v. Johnson, 242 F.3d 617, 629 n.16 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 2001 WL 744253 (5 Sep. 2001), our court noted the
doubt expressed regarding whether the Brecht standard is still
viable post-enactment of AEDPA. The parties have not briefed the
issue. In any event, because Hansen has not shown he is entitled
to relief under either standard, we need not decide it. See id.
24
F.
Hansen’s last claim is that he was entitled to an evidentiary
hearing.
1.
Subject to the exceptions stated in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2), if
a petitioner failed in state court to develop the factual basis of
a claim, the federal court may not hold an evidentiary hearing on
that claim. Such failure is not established unless there is “lack
of diligence, or some greater fault, attributable to the prisoner
or the prisoner’s counsel”. (Michael) Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S.
420, 432 (2000).
Hansen contends that, in state court, he presented facts
supporting the following claims: (1) his trial counsel was
ineffective in failing to properly investigate and present
mitigating evidence; (2) his trial counsel was ineffective in
failing to present psychological evidence at the penalty phase; (3)
the State’s refusal to provide his trial counsel with his Florida
prison records violated Brady; and (4) the State’s suppression of
Duncan’s statement violated Brady. (Each claim is discussed supra,
except for (2), concerning prison records.) The State does not
assert that Hansen failed in state court to develop the factual
basis for these claims.
Nevertheless, citing McDonald v. Johnson, 139 F.3d 1056, 1058-
60 (5th Cir. 1998), Hansen contends AEDPA’s presumptions and
25
limitations concerning state court findings and evidentiary
hearings in district court do not apply when the state court does
not conduct an evidentiary hearing. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1)
(presumption of correctness accorded state court fact finding).
Hansen misreads McDonald; it stands for the proposition that a
petitioner does not “fail” to develop a factual basis for his claim
when a state court finds the claim procedurally barred. The
Mississippi Supreme Court applied a procedural bar only to Hansen’s
claim regarding the State’s suppression of Duncan’s statement; the
court found the other claims meritless.
Hansen did request an evidentiary hearing in the state court
on the other claims. Although “[m]ere requests for evidentiary
hearings will not suffice”, Dowthitt v. Johnson, 230 F.3d 733, 758
(5th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 1250 (2001), Hansen was
diligent in procuring affidavits in support of each of his claims.
Cf. id. Accordingly, Hansen did not fail in state court to develop
the factual basis of his claims. Therefore, he was not precluded
by § 2254(e)(2) from seeking an evidentiary hearing in district
court.
2.
The denial of an evidentiary hearing is reviewed for abuse of
discretion. Clark v. Johnson, 227 F.3d 273, 284-85 (5th Cir.
2000), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 1129 (2001). It goes without
saying that, when a district court has “sufficient facts before it
26
to make an informed decision on the merits of [the petitioner’s]
claim, it does not abuse its discretion in failing to conduct an
evidentiary hearing”. Barrientes, 221 F.3d at 770 (internal
quotation marks omitted). To find an abuse of discretion, we must
be convinced that, if proven true, petitioner’s allegations would
entitle him to relief. Clark v. Johnson, 202 F.3d 760, 766 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 831 (2000). The district court did
not abuse its discretion by denying an evidentiary hearing.
a.
As discussed supra, based upon our review of the record,
including the exhibits submitted in support of his petition, we
conclude that Hansen has alleged no fact which, if proved, would
entitle him to relief on his ineffective assistance claims or his
Brady claim regarding Duncan’s statement.
b.
Regarding the other Brady claim (alleged suppression of
Hansen’s Florida prison records), Hansen has not shown the district
court erred in concluding the State was not under a duty to
disclose those records. See Hansen-USDC, at 28 (citing United
States v. Ellender, 947 F.2d 748, 757 (5th Cir. 1991)).
III.
In sum, for each of his claims, Hansen has failed to make the
showing required by 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) for obtaining a COA: he
has failed to demonstrate either that “reasonable jurists could
27
debate whether” his habeas “petition should have been resolved”
differently or that the claims he has raised at least “were
adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further”. Slack, 529
U.S. at 484 (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, a COA
is
DENIED.
28