Caudell v. Halliburton Energy ( 2002 )


Menu:
  •                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    ______________________________
    No. 01-40922
    ______________________________
    BRENDA CAUDELL, Etc; ET AL,
    Plaintiffs
    BRENDA CAUDELL, Individually and as Administrator of the Estate of
    JOSEPH M. CAUDELL, (deceased)
    Plaintiff - Appellee
    VERSUS
    HALLIBURTON ENERGY SERVICES, INC; ET AL
    Defendants
    FMC CORPORATION, doing business as FMC Energysystems Group
    Defendant - Appellant
    ___________________________________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    For the Southern District of Texas
    No. G-99-CV-789
    ___________________________________________________
    July 15, 2002
    Before KING, Chief Judge, PARKER, Circuit Judge, and ELLISON*,
    District Judge.
    *
    District Judge of the Southern District of Texas, sitting by
    designation.
    1
    PER CURIAM:**
    I.     INTRODUCTION
    The Plaintiff-Appellee Brenda Caudell brought suit against the
    various defendants as a result of an accident in which her husband,
    Joseph Caudell, was killed when a pipe parted from a valve under
    high pressure.    The case was tried to a jury.     The jury determined
    that the Defendant-Appellant, FMC Corporation (“FMC”), was 50% at
    fault in causing Mr. Caudell’s death and awarded the plaintiff more
    than $5 million dollars in damages. The damage award included $3.5
    million for Mrs. Caudell’s loss of society and $1 million for Mr.
    Caudell’s   conscious    pain    and   suffering.   The   district   court
    adjudged that Mrs. Caudell recover approximately $3 million from
    FMC.
    FMC appeals from that judgment in favor of plaintiff-appellee
    Brenda Caudell.       FMC argues that the district court erred in
    failing to grant a mistrial after the district court questioned a
    witness.
    II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
    We review the district court’s denial of a motion for mistrial
    for abuse of discretion.        U.S. v. Bentley-Smith, 
    2 F.3d 1368
    , 1378
    (5th Cir. 1993).      In doing so, we consider the jury charge and any
    corrective measures taken by the trial court to cure possible
    **
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that
    this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
    under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
    2
    errors.    Streber v. Hunter, 
    221 F.3d 701
    , 740 (5th Cir. 2000).
    III. DISCUSSION
    Our    role   is   to   determine   whether   the   district   court’s
    questions were so prejudicial that FMC was denied a fair, as
    opposed to a perfect, trial.       United States v. Williams, 
    809 F.2d 1072
    , 1086 (5th Cir. 1987).         In making this determination, we
    review the proceedings as a whole and consider such factors as the
    context of the questions, the person to whom the questions were
    directed, and the presence of curative instructions. United States
    v. Saenz, 
    134 F.3d 697
    , 702 (5th Cir. 1998).
    Rule 614(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence permits judges to
    question witnesses. We have previously stated that a trial judge’s
    questioning of witnesses is permissible if aimed at clarifying the
    evidence or managing the trial.           
    Williams, 809 F.2d at 1087
    .
    However, we have also clearly stated that a judge’s questioning
    should never evince or appear to evince partiality to one side over
    the other.     United States v. Davis, 
    285 F.3d 378
    , 381 (5th Cir.
    2001).     In short, “a judge’s discretion to question witnesses is
    not unfettered.     A judge cannot assume the role of an advocate for
    either side.”      U.S. v. Martin, 
    189 F.3d 547
    , 553 (7th Cir. 1999).
    After careful consideration, we conclude that the district
    court’s questions and comments crossed the line to the point where
    a reasonable jury could question the impartiality of the trial
    judge.     Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the district court
    3
    and remand the case back to the district court for a new trial.1
    FMC’s request to remove Judge Kent from retrial of the case is
    denied.
    1
    FMC raises several other issues on appeal. Because we have
    concluded that FMC is entitled to a new trial, we decline to
    address the other issues except to note that the district court’s
    decision to allow the Garth Brooks song to be played to the jury
    was reversible error. On retrial, the district court can allow the
    video with the pictures of Mr. and Mrs. Caudell to be shown to the
    jury. However, the audio portion of the video which included the
    Garth Brooks song shall not be broadcast to the jury.
    4