United States v. Gonzalez-Palomo ( 2003 )


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  •                                                        United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    F I L E D
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT                 October 22, 2003
    Charles R. Fulbruge III
    Clerk
    No. 03-50622
    Conference Calendar
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    versus
    RUFINO GONZALEZ-PALOMO, also known as Palomo
    R. Gonzales, also known as Refugio Gonzales,
    also known as Rufino Paloma, also known as Rufino
    G. Palomo, also known as Rufino Gonzalez, also known
    as Rufino Gonzales, also known as Rufino P. Gonzalez,
    also known as Miguel Angel Gonzalez, also known as
    Rufino Palomo Gonzalez, also known as Miguel Gonzales,
    also known as Rufino P. Gonzales, also known as Marino
    Gonzalez,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    --------------------
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Western District of Texas
    USDC No. SA-99-CR-433-ALL
    --------------------
    Before KING, Chief Judge, and JOLLY and STEWART, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    Rufino Gonzalez-Palomo appeals the sentence imposed following
    his guilty plea conviction of being found in the United States
    after deportation/removal in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326.
    Gonzalez contends that 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) and 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
    that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
    except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
    R. 47.5.4.
    No. 03-50622
    -2-
    define separate offenses.    He argues that the prior conviction
    that resulted in his increased sentence is an element of a
    separate offense under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b) that should have been
    alleged in his indictment.    Gonzalez maintains that he pleaded
    guilty to an indictment which charged only simple reentry under
    8 U.S.C. § 1326(a).    He argues that his sentence exceeds the
    maximum term of imprisonment and supervised release which may be
    imposed for that offense.
    In Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 
    523 U.S. 224
    , 235
    (1998), the Supreme Court held that the enhanced penalties in
    8 U.S.C. § 1326(b) are sentencing provisions, not elements of
    separate offenses.    The Court further held that the sentencing
    provisions do not violate the Due Process Clause.     
    Id. at 239-47.
    Gonzalez acknowledges that his argument is foreclosed by
    Almendarez-Torres, but asserts that the decision has been cast
    into doubt by Apprendi v. New Jersey, 
    530 U.S. 466
    , 490 (2000).
    He seeks to preserve his argument for further review.
    Apprendi did not overrule Almendarez-Torres.   See 
    Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 489-90
    ; United States v. Dabeit, 
    231 F.3d 979
    , 984
    (5th Cir. 2000).    This court must follow Almendarez-Torres
    “unless and until the Supreme Court itself determines to overrule
    it.”    
    Dabeit, 231 F.3d at 984
    (internal quotation marks and
    citation omitted).    The judgment of the district court is
    AFFIRMED.
    The Government has moved for a summary affirmance in lieu of
    filing an appellee’s brief.    In its motion, the Government asks
    that an appellee’s brief not be required.    The motion is GRANTED.
    No. 03-50622
    -3-
    AFFIRMED; MOTION GRANTED.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 03-50622

Filed Date: 10/21/2003

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/18/2021