Deshazo v. Baker Hughes Oilfield Operations, Inc. , 84 F. App'x 407 ( 2003 )

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS December 19, 2003
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
Charles R. Fulbruge III
___________________ Clerk
No. 03-20407
_____________________
Robert DeShazo; Andea DeShazo,
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
versus
Baker Hughes Oilfield Operations, Inc., Et al,
Defendants,
Baker Hughes Oilfield Operations, Inc.,
Defendant - Appellee.
_________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
District Court No. H-00-CV-2698
_________________________________________________________________
Before HIGGINBOTHAM, DAVIS and PRADO, Circuit Judges.1
PER CURIAM.
Appellants Robert DeShazo and Andea DeShazo appeal from the
district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Appellee
Baker Hughes Oilfield Operations, Inc. Finding no error, we
affirm.
This appeal concerns what law should apply to Appellants’
1
Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, this Court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R.
47.5.4.
1
personal injury claims. Appellant Robert DeShazo sued his former
employer, Baker Hughes Oilfield Operations, Inc. (BHOO) to
recover damages for the injuries he received during an automobile
accident in Egypt. At the time of the accident, DeShazo was a
passenger; an employee of a BHOO subsidiary was driving.
Originally, DeShazo filed a Jones Act suit in the Eastern
District of Louisiana. The district court dismissed that suit
after determining that DeShazo was not a Jones Act seaman.
Subsequently, DeShazo and his ex-wife, Andea DeShazo, filed the
current diversity suit in the Southern District of Texas,
claiming that BHOO was liable for the negligence of its driver.2
The district court granted BHOO’s motion for summary judgment,
concluding that the exclusive remedy provision of the Louisiana
Workers’ Compensation Act barred the DeShazos’ claims. Attaching
additional evidence, the DeShazos filed a motion for new trial or
for reconsideration, which the district court denied. This
appeal followed.
On appeal, the DeShazos make two arguments. First, they
argue that fact questions about Robert DeShazo’s intent to form a
Louisiana contract make summary judgment improper. Second, they
argue that the district court erred in applying Louisiana law.
Instead, the DeShazos contend that Egyptian law should apply to
their claims.
2
Claims against two other defendants were dismissed.
2
We review the grant of summary judgment de novo, using the
same standards as the district court. Hanks v. Transcon. Gas
Pipe Line Corp., 953 F.2d 996, 997 (5th Cir. 1992). To be
entitled to summary judgment, the movant must show the absence of
any genuine issue of material fact. Taylor v. Gregg, 36 F.3d
453, 457 (5th Cir. 1994).
In its ruling on BHOO’s summary judgment motion, the
district court first concluded that DeShazo’s claims were
governed by Louisiana law, specifically the Louisiana Workers’
Compensation Act. This act provides the exclusive remedy, with
some irrelevant exceptions, for a Louisiana worker injured in the
course of employment. LA. REV. STAT. § 23:1032. The district
court concluded that this law barred the DeShazos’ negligence
claims.
In reviewing this case, we must first determine what law
applies to the DeShazos’ claims. To begin with, a federal
district court sitting in diversity applies its forum state’s
choice-of-law rules. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313
U.S. 487, 496 (1941). Thus, the district court here properly
looked to Texas choice-of-law rules to determine what law to
apply. In general, Texas courts follow the most significant
relationship test when deciding what law to apply in a case.
Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 665 S.W.2d 414, 421 (Tex. 1984).
But Texas courts follow Section 184 of the Restatement (Second)
3
of Conflict of Laws when determining whether an exclusive-remedy
provision of a state’s workers’ compensation law applies. Hughes
Wood Prods., Inc. v. Wagner, 18 S.W.3d 202, 205 (Tex. 2000).
Section 184 states:
Recovery for tort or wrongful death will not be permitted
in any state if the defendant is declared immune from
such liability by the workmen's compensation statute of
a state under which the defendant is required to provide
insurance against the particular risk and under which
(a) the plaintiff has obtained an award for the injury,
or
(b) the plaintiff could obtain an award for the injury,
if this is the state (1) where the injury occurred,
or (2) where employment is principally located, or
(3) where the employer supervised the employee's
activities from a place of business in the state,
or (4) whose local law governs the contract of
employment under the rules of §§ 187-188 and 196.
The parties agree that the Louisiana workers’ compensation
law can only apply, if at all, under section 184(b)(4).3 Thus,
there are really two questions. First, could Robert DeShazo
obtain an award for his injury in Louisiana, and second, does
Louisiana law govern his employment contract?
Could Robert DeShazo obtain an award for his injury in Louisiana?
Under certain circumstances, the Louisiana Workers’
Compensation Act applies to injuries occurring outside Louisiana:
(1) If an employee, while working outside the
territorial limits of this state, suffers an injury on
account of which he, or in the event of his death, his
3
Although BHOO voluntarily paid Robert DeShazo money it
called worker’s compensation benefits, the district court
concluded that these payments did not qualify as an “award” for
purposes of § 184. BHOO has not challenged this conclusion.
4
dependents, would have been entitled to the benefits
provided by this Chapter had such injury occurred
within this state, such employee, or in the event of
his death resulting from such injury, his dependents,
shall be entitled to the benefits provided by this
Chapter, provided that at the time of such injury
(a) his employment is principally localized in this
state, or
(b) he is working under a contract of hire made in
this state.
LA. REV. STAT. § 23:1032
Under this extraterritorial provision, the central question
is whether Robert DeShazo was working under a contract of hire
made in Louisiana. As the DeShazos point out, Louisiana courts
have stated that “[i]n determining the origin of a contract of
hire, the parties’ intent should be paramount.” Harvey v. B E &
K Constr., 716 So. 514, 516, 30,825 (La. App. 2d Cir. 8/19/98).
The factors for determining whether the parties intended to form
a Louisiana contract include the parties’ domicile, the nature of
the work to be performed under the contract, and the location
where the parties initiated employment. Id. DeShazo argues that
fact questions concerning this intent should have prevented the
district judge from granting summary judgment.
The parties agree about most of the underlying facts. BHOO
contacted Robert DeShazo at his home in Louisiana to see if he
was interested in working for BHOO in Egypt. DeShazo was living
and working in Louisiana at the time, and listed an address in
Louisiana as his permanent address on his BHOO employment
application. DeShazo accepted employment in Louisiana and
dropped off his employment forms at BHOO’s Houma, Louisiana
5
office. As an employment requirement, DeShazo underwent drug and
alcohol testing in Lousiana. The initial plane tickets to Egypt
were delivered to DeShazo in Louisiana. Finally, DeShazo moved
to Mississippi at some point after beginning employment with
BHOO.
On appeal, the DeShazos argue that Robert DeShazo’s
Louisiana residence was only temporary, however, and that he
maintained his permanent domicile in Mississippi. According to
the DeShazos, his undisclosed plan to move means that DeShazo
never intended to form a Louisiana contract and that Egyptian law
should apply to the negligence claims.
The district judge concluded that there were no fact
questions about the parties’ intent to form a Louisiana contract.
The DeShazos argue that the district court erred because they
presented evidence to support a fact question about Robert
DeShazo’s intent. In support of his contention that he never
intended to form a Louisiana contract, the DeShazos point solely
to Robert’s alleged intent to move to Mississippi.4
4
Most of the evidence that the DeShazos cite to as part of
their argument that Robert DeShazo was domiciled in Mississippi
was not before the district court until the motion for new trial.
In particular, the DeShazos’ argument is largely based on the
affidavit that Robert DeShazo signed on August 17, 2002 and filed
on August 19, 2002. Both dates are after the August 8, 2002
summary judgment order. It is this affidavit, not the affidavit
attached to the DeShazos’ summary judgment response, that argues
that DeShazo intended to move to Mississippi. Thus, the district
court’s description of the DeShazos’ statements about intent as
“bald assertions” was not off the mark.
6
Both sides cite Louisiana cases to support their arguments.
These cases do not present a clear rule; rather, they appear to
be fairly fact-specific. The Deshazos emphasize two cases in
particular. In Milligan v. Glenburney Nursing Home, 408 So.2d
40, 41 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1981), the first of these cases, the
plaintiff, a nurses’ aide living in Louisiana, received an
employment application at her home. The application was for a
Mississippi nursing home. Id. The plaintiff filled out the
application in Louisiana, but interviewed in Mississippi and
signed papers in Mississippi. Id. In Mississippi, the parties
agreed that the plaintiff would be employed, but could not
determine her starting date. Id. Someone from the nursing home
called plaintiff at her home in Louisiana to tell her of her
starting date. Id. After that, the plaintiff reported to work
in Mississippi, and at some point during that work she was
injured. Id. The court in Milligan, after reviewing the
relevant factors, concluded that the contract was a Mississippi
one; the parties intended to create a Mississippi employment
relationship and a Mississippi contract. Id. at 42.
The DeShazos also point to Robinson v. Independent
Freightway, 673 So.2d 1091, 94-786 (La. App. 5th Cir. 4/16/96).
In Robinson, a truck driver who lived in Louisiana submitted an
application to an Illinois company in Illinois. Id. at 1093. He
then underwent federally-required drug and road tests in
Louisiana. Id. He signed an employment contract in Louisiana and
7
the company then signed the contract in Illinois. Id. The trial
court found that Robinson’s contract was not a Louisiana contract
of hire, and the appellate court affirmed those findings. Id.
In contrast, the district court cited several cases in which
courts found that the parties had formed a Louisiana contract.
The first of these cases is Offord v. Border to Border Trucking,
779 So.2d 1090, 2000-1201 (La. App. 3d Cir. 2/7/01). In Offord,
the workers’ compensation claimant, a Louisiana resident who
worked as a truck driver for a Texas company, suffered an injury
on the job in Tennessee. Id. at 1091. The story of the
claimant’s hiring was as follows. The defendant company had
brought an employment application to the claimant at his
Louisiana home. Id. at 1092. After the claimant filled out the
application in Louisiana, another employee of the defendant
company picked up the application from claimant in Louisiana and
drove it to Texas. Id. The claimant received a job offer via a
telephone call to his house in Louisiana and was then transported
to Texas where he completed the remaining employment formalities.
Id. The Offord court determined that this situation was almost
identical to another case in which a truck driver had been found
to be operating under a Louisiana contract of hire. Id. The
court affirmed the administrative judge’s determination that this
was a Louisiana contract of hire. Id. at 1093.
The district court also cited Lakvold v. Stevens Transport,
665 So.2d 828 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1995). In Lakvold, an appeals
8
court reversed a trial court’s conclusion that an employee was
not working under a Louisiana contract. Id. at 830. The
employer’s representative had contacted the employee in Louisiana
and gave him an application there. Id. at 829. The employee
completed in the application in Louisiana, which was also where
the employer notified the employee that it had accepted his
employment application. Id. The employee went to orientation in
Texas, where he also completed additional employment-related
forms. Id. at 829-30. The employer paid for his travel to Texas
for the orientation. Id. The court concluded that the contract
had been formed in Louisiana, making it a Louisiana contract of
hire. Id. at 830.
The district court correctly concluded that no fact question
existed concerning the parties’ intent to form a Louisiana
contract. Robert DeShazo’s undisclosed intent to move to
Mississippi does not create a fact question regarding whether the
parties intended to form a Louisiana contract.5 And although the
caselaw is not conclusive, on the whole, the facts here more
resemble Offord than they do Milligan. DeShazo was called in
Louisiana, where he was living, he completed the paperwork in
Louisiana, he dealt with BHOO’s Louisiana office, and he
originally departed to Egypt from Louisiana.
5
Therefore, the DeShazos’ argument that several of the
cases the district court cited were decided after trial, not on
summary judgment, is irrelevant.
9
The DeShazos also argue that because Robert DeShazo was an
at-will employee, his contract was formed again each time he
reported for work in Egypt. Because he had moved to Mississippi
before the hitch during which he was injured, Robert DeShazo
argues he was operating under a completely different contract
from the one he entered into originally. Yet the DeShazos find
little support for the contention that this move changed the
place of contracting. They only support this argument with broad
language about the nature of at-will employment, particularly
language indicating that parties constantly remake an at-will
contract. The DeShazos have not, however, pointed to any
Louisiana case in which this principle is use to change the place
where the parties formed a contract. Louisiana courts seem
unlikely to interpret the statutory language “a contract of hire
made in this state” so that an at-will employee could change
where his contract was made simply by moving to a different state
after being hired.
Does Louisiana law govern DeShazo’s employment contract?
The second factor in determining whether the Louisiana
Workers’ Compensation Act applies is whether Louisiana law
governs Robert DeShazo’s employment contract with BHOO. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 184.
Texas courts generally follow Section 196 when determining
what law applies to a contract for services. Pruitt v. Levi
Strauss & Co., 932 F.2d 458, 461 (5th Cir. 1991). This section
10
provides:
The validity of a contract for the rendition of services
and the rights created thereby are determined, in the
absence of an effective choice of law by the parties, by
the local law of the state where the contract requires
that the services, or a major portion of the services, be
rendered, unless, with respect to the particular issue,
some other state has a more significant relationship
under the principles stated in § 6 to the transaction and
the parties, in which the event the local law of the
other state will be applied
This section supports the DeShazos’ argument that Egyptian law
should apply to the contract. Egypt was, after all, the place
where a major portion of the services were to be rendered, and
the place of performance is generally conclusive of the issue.
Pruitt, 932 at 461 (quoting DeSantis v. Wackenhut Corp., 793
S.W.2d 670, 679 (Tex. 1990)). But there are exceptions, and for
these exceptions, the question then becomes whether some other
state has a more significant relationship under Section 6 of the
Restatement.
These relevant factors are:
(a) the needs of the interstate and international
systems,
(b) the relevant policies of the forum,
(c) the relevant policies of other interested states
and the relative interests of those states in the
determination of the particular issue,
(d) the protection of justified expectations,
(e) the basic policies underlying the particular field
of law,
(f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result,
and
(g) ease in the determination and application of the
law to be applied.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §6(2).
The district court found that, under this section,
11
Louisiana had a more significant relationship with the contract
than Egypt did. The district court concluded that by including
the extraterritorial provision, Louisiana expressed a strong
interest in having its workers’ compensation laws applied to
Louisiana workers injured outside the state. The district court
also concluded that uniform application is important to the
workers’ compensation system’s effectiveness. These interests,
according to the district court, far outweighed any interest
Egypt might have in having its tort laws applied to a United
States citizen harmed by an employee of a United States company.
And as did the district court, we conclude that, contrary to the
DeShazos’ arguments and charts, “the number of contacts with a
state is not determinative.” Torrington Co. v. Stutzman, 46
S.W.3d 829, 848 (Tex. 2000). We agree with the district court’s
thoughtful analysis; Louisiana law applies to Robert DeShazo’s
employment contract, and therefore the DeShazos are limited to
Louisiana workers’ compensation remedies.
AFFIRMED
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