Falcon Drilling Co v. Breeland ( 2004 )

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
For the Fifth Circuit
No. 95-30734
FALCON DRILLING COMPANY, INC.
Plaintiff-Appellee
VERSUS
BILLY RAY BREELAND
Defendant-Appellant
______________________________
No. 95-30754
FALCON DRILLING COMPANY, INCORPORATED
Plaintiff-Appellant
VERSUS
BILLY RAY BREELAND
Defendant-Appellee
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Louisiana
(94-CV-1992)
(April 26, 1996)
Before DUHÉ, BARKSDALE, and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges.
DUHÉ, Circuit Judge:1
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Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the Court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule 47.5.4.
Both parties appeal after the dismissal of a declaratory
judgment action concerning maintenance and cure obligations filed
by Falcon Drilling Company pursuant to federal admiralty and
maritime jurisdiction. Before dismissing the case, the district
court sanctioned Defendant, Billy Ray Breeland, for violating an
injunction. Falcon appeals the dismissal; Breeland appeals the
sanction order. We affirm the dismissal and dismiss Breeland’s
appeal as moot.
Breeland, a seaman employed by Falcon, complains of a neck
injury allegedly resulting from an accident aboard the ACHILLES, a
Falcon vessel. Falcon filed this declaratory judgment action
seeking determination of its general maritime law maintenance and
cure obligations after a dispute arose regarding the necessity of
surgery. The district court enjoined Breeland from having the
surgery until Falcon was able to obtain an independent medical
examination. Breeland underwent surgery in violation of the
injunction.
Breeland then sued in state court seeking Jones Act remedies
and maintenance and cure benefits and moved to dismiss the
declaratory judgment action promising to hold Falcon harmless for
the cost of surgery. Falcon moved for an order finding Breeland in
contempt of court and for sanctions.
The court sanctioned Breeland ordering that the surgeon’s
opinions and findings during or after surgery were inadmissible and
that Breeland could not recover from Falcon the cost of surgery or
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for aggravation of his condition caused by the surgery. Three days
later, the district court granted Breeland’s motion and dismissed
the declaratory judgment action for the following reasons:
1) There is currently pending in state court, a civil
suit involving the same parties, on the same issues
as the federal action.
2) The parties have available a forum to receive full
and adequate relief, and may litigate all issues in
the state forum.
3) The suit for declaratory judgment, filed prior to
the state court suit, can and will deprive the
plaintiff of his choice of forum in his Jones Act
suit, or result in piecemeal litigation of the same
issues.
4) This court finds that to entertain this declaratory
judgment complaint would deprive the plaintiff of
his right to a trial by jury on the issue of
maintenance and cure, by severing it from his Jones
Act claim.
A district court may not dismiss a declaratory judgment action
on whim or personal disinclination or without providing an
explanation for the dismissal. Rowan Companies, Inc. v. Griffin,
876 F.2d 26 (5th Cir. 1989). Otherwise, in this Circuit, district
courts have broad discretion to retain or dismiss declaratory
judgment actions. Mission Ins. Co. v. Puritan Fashions Corp., 706
F.2d 599 (5th Cir. 1983); Torch, Inc. v. LeBlanc, 947 F.2d 193
(1991). In making its determination, the district court may
consider a variety of factors including, but not limited to, the
existence of a pending state court proceeding in which the matters
in controversy may be fully litigated, whether the declaratory
complaint was filed in anticipation of another suit and is being
used for the purpose of forum shopping, possible inequities in
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permitting the plaintiff to gain precedence in time and forum, or
because of inconvenience to the parties or the witnesses. Rowan,
876 F.2d at 29.
Falcon argues that consideration of the Rowan factors weighs
against dismissal. Even if we agreed with Falcon, we cannot say
that the district court abused its broad discretion in dismissing
the case in light of the articulated reasons.
Falcon also argues that the declaratory judgment should not
have been dismissed because Breeland acted in bad faith when he
violated the injunction citing Belle Pass Towing Corp. v. Cheramie,
763 F. Supp. 1348 (E.D. La. 1991). The court could have, in the
exercise of its discretion, denied the motion to dismiss because of
the violation of the injunction. Bad faith is a factor that can be
considered and could justify a refusal to dismiss. The court did
not abuse its discretion, however, by dismissing the case despite
the violation.
Having successfully defended the district court’s dismissal of
the declaratory judgment action, Breeland’s appeal of the sanction
order is moot.
Judgment of dismissal is AFFIRMED. Breeland’s appeal is
DISMISSED as moot.
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